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Abstract 
 
The research is presented as an audio-visual thesis, consisting of a 62,000-word 
thesis and two documentary film artefacts (forty-five and forty-eight minutes, 
respectively). The equal ratio of theory and practice symbiotically combines the 
background research, written analysis and practical experimentation. 
The portrayal of blind people in Western media largely conforms to 
stereotypical representations that oscillate between two poles: either as 
unfortunate, disabled and deprived, or exotic, mysterious and in touch with the 
supernatural. This ‘othering’ of blindness in documentaries is the symptom and 
partial cause of socio-cultural stigmatisation and ‘ableist’ hegemony.  
Challenging this hegemony, the thesis proposes the adoption of a 
spectatorship-based approach to film practice. It first identifies a range of 
stereotypes in mainstream documentaries, revealing the overwhelming use of 
formulaic narratives that foreground either tragic or heroic, goal-oriented plot 
trajectories, and stylistic devices that objectify blind characters. These insights 
frame the making of my own documentary films about two blind people. The aim is 
the mediation of everyday experience from the characters’ own perspective, with 
the result that the spectator experiences them as ordinary people, performing 
ordinary activities, albeit with extraordinary bodies. The films focus on everyday 
objects and spaces, and use narrative fragmentation to elicit a temporal sense of 
‘everydayness’. The methodology operates on two levels of filmic mediation: the 
pre-filmic, comprising my first-person encounters with the subjects, and the post-
filmic that addresses the mediation of pre-filmic experience to the audience via the 
film. The pre-filmic level makes use of phenomenological methods; the post-filmic 
implements a range of methods adapted from cognitive film studies. This 
spectatorship-focused model offers a new way of representing and communicating 
the ordinary ‘everyday’ of the two blind characters, undoing the stereotypes that 
consistently ‘other’ members of this community. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Context 
In 2004 I made A Touch of Colour, a 12-minute documentary about Terry, a blind 
painter (figure 1). Since I am neither blind, nor do I have any blind relatives or 
acquaintances, the motivation for that film lay in the fascination of portraying the 
extraordinary story of someone who, although completely blind, continues to 
create visual art. The plot depicts the painting process; Terry describes how his 
traumatic loss of sight, which brought with it increasing social isolation and caused 
him to abandon drawing, also forced him to reinvent his painting style. As such, it 
conformed with the emotive plot trajectories recommended by documentary 
textbooks and, for this reason, it resonated with film festivals 1
 
 and fellow 
filmmakers. At the time, I considered disability representation and critical 
filmmaking to be secondary issues. 
 
Figure 1: A Touch of Colour (2004) 
 
Art historian Moshe Barasch points out that the representation of blindness 
in Western thought has oscillated between two binary stereotypes: deprivation and 
                                                             
1 The film was shown at the Picture This Film Festival (2004), The Other Film Festival (2004), Assim 
Vivemos Film Festival (2005) and The Disability Audiovisual Festival (2005), among others. 
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a presumed mysterious link with a supernatural reality (Barasch, 2001, p. 147). 
Since making the short documentary in 2004, I encountered these two stereotypes, 
albeit in different manifestations, in almost every film I saw that featured blind 
people. I slowly came to realise that my film was part of this unfortunate trend. 
Stereotypical media representations of disability are the mechanisms of boundary 
maintenance deployed by an abled culture to distinguish the disabled as inferior 
and deficient, creating societal barriers that limit interpersonal interactions 
between abled and disabled people, and perpetuating the subordination of this 
community (Haller, 2010, pp. iii–iv). The term ‘representation’ in this context is 
understood as the use of a shared language (written words, spoken sounds or visual 
images) to refer to concepts depicting people, objects and events in either the 
‘real’, physical world or the world of the imagination (Hall, 1997, pp. 17–18). As 
Walter Lippmann (1991) argues, the former has a direct impact on the latter, for the 
only feeling anyone holds about a certain event or person he/she does not directly 
experience is a feeling induced by his/her mental image of that event (p. 13), and 
that mental image is in turn a response to human depictions of the real world that 
are (usually) assumed to be veridical (pp. 15–17). Of course, these mental images 
are responsible for our behaviour in the real world (p. 15), comprising, amongst 
others, physical interactions with, and depictions (e.g. audio-visual representations) 
of other people. This resulting loop thematically pervades the research design of 
this thesis, as representations of disability reflect, inform and are informed by the 
social reality of disabled people in an able-bodied world, as well as our mental 
constructions of that social reality. 
Stereotypes are prerequisites for that mental construction. They represent 
“standardised conceptions of people, primarily based on an individual’s belonging 
to a category ... or the possession of characteristics traits symbolizing one of these 
categories” (Schweinitz, 2011, p. 4). In more general terms, stereotypes are 
essential cognitive strategies for mapping, comprehending and acting within the 
world around us through the simplification and classification of that perceived 
world. Hence, this thesis does not attempt to undo stereotypes in general, since this 
would mean to reprogram hard-wired human traits. The focus here is specifically on 
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stereotypes that relate to and have disadvantaged blind people within their social 
reality. The aim of this doctoral research is to identify these stereotypes in 
contemporary documentaries and attempt, by means of my own documentary 
practice, to conceptualise alternative representations that dismantle or ‘undo’ 
these stereotypes. In a sense, it has served as a way of redeeming myself for the 
stereotypical portrayal of blindness in my 2004 film, and for this reason, I again 
chose Terry as one of the characters, in order to undo my earlier representation of 
him.  
The impetus for this endeavour lies in challenging one of the most inherent 
traits of stereotypes, their persistence, which Lippmann cogently explicates:  
[Stereotypes] may not be a complete picture of the world, but 
they are a picture of a possible world to which we are adapted. 
In that world people and things have their well-known places, 
and do certain expected things. We feel at home there. We fit in. 
We are members. We know the way around. There we find the 
charm of the familiar, the normal, the dependable; ... No 
wonder, then, that any disturbance of the stereotypes seems like 
an attack upon the foundations of the universe. (1991, p. 95) 
Examining this persistence of stereotypes in a disability discourse bears 
strong parallels to post-colonial discourse, both dealing with rigid socio-cultural 
hegemonic relations. In this regard, Homi Bhabha (1983, p. 18) deems the colonial 
stereotype a discursive “sign of cultural/historical/racial difference” that endures 
through changing historical and discursive periods – an argument identical to 
Moshe Barash’s in relation to representations of blindness in Western art. Bhabha 
identifies the reason for this endurance as the ambivalence between the stereotype 
existing on the one hand as an assertive, tacit and tenacious phenomenon, and on 
the other hand as an anxious and validation-seeking phenomenon that needs to be 
perpetually repeated (p. 18).  
Undoing rigid blindness stereotypes requires the adoption of a critical 
framework for documentary practice, one that recognises that the filmmaker’s 
actions are informed by ‘cultural knowledge’, resulting in a cultural artefact with 
particular implications (Wayne, 1997, pp. 9–10) for the spectator’s “interpretations, 
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knowledges, experiences and modes of comparison” (Fuery, 2012, p. 85). These 
include the formation and confirmation of stereotypes based not only on the 
reception of the film text, but also on contextual factors relating to the dispositions 
of the spectator and their preceding knowledge. The major paradigm of this thesis 
is based on the proposition that filmmaking practices that potentially lead to 
stereotypical representations need to be approached through the critical 
deployment of spectatorship theories. Such theories help prevent the formation of 
stereotypes by gauging the spectator’s response to the final film artefact in relation 
to the preconceptions he/she has acquired through viewing previous films.    
Mike Wayne (1997, p. 11) argues that the critical2
 
 framing of documentary 
practice enables the practitioner to place his/her work in relation to other cultural 
artefacts and hence discern connections with or departures from certain traditions 
of representation. Further, it illuminates the effects of textual strategies on the 
audience and provides the practitioner with a vocabulary that enables the 
understanding and communication of complex ideas through filmic form, the 
reflexive interrogation of the implicit assumptions underpinning formal 
conventions, and the conception of potential alternatives (pp. 11–12). In this 
respect, documentary practice can be seen as a teleological endeavour in which 
authorial field practices and filmic expression ultimately result in a specific audience 
experience. The conceptualisation of this experience needs to frame the filmmaking 
process. Thus, the two research questions this thesis explores are as follows: 
1. How can the application of spectatorship theories establish a documentary 
film practice that critically addresses the received ways (audience 3
                                                             
2 The use of the term ‘critical’ in this thesis primarily relates to the theoretical framing of film 
practice in relation to spectatorship –  discussed in detail in Chapter Two. It does not explicitly refer 
to ‘critical theory’ as a school of thought, though it is loosely related to its tenets. For a detailed 
discourse on (documentary) film practice and critical theory, see Wayne (1997, 2008). 
 
3 Throughout the thesis the terms ‘spectator’ and ‘audience’ are used interchangeably. In strictly 
scholarly terms, the ‘spectator’ is an “idealized, universalized subject theorised as the actual effect of 
the [film] text” (Shimpach, 2011, p. 69), while the ‘audience’ is “a group of people who buy tickets at 
the box office ... categorized according to age, sex, and socio-economic status” (Kuhn, 1984, p. 23). 
As Staiger (1992, p. 49) argues, the former constitutes the ‘psychological’ and the latter the ‘social’ 
context of film viewing. However, the inextricable connection between the psychological and social 
aspects of film viewing is central to this thesis, since socio-cultural stereotypes inform and are 
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experience) and related conceived ways (filmmaking practices) in which the 
portrayal of particular subjects are perpetuated in documentary film? 
 
2. Can documentary practice, informed by spectatorship theories, assess the 
public perception of blind people and undo common stereotypes in the 
portrayal of this group? 
 
These questions do not relate to the subject of my film practice (blindness) per se, 
but rather to the medium of documentary practice. The first question addresses 
gaps in current research; it requires a methodology that is pragmatic, malleable and 
inductive, in order to accommodate the second question. Hence, rather than 
generating new data or meta-theoretical knowledge, this research is focused first 
and foremost on producing a methodology for documentary practice. The second 
question comprises the case study used to test the methodology, but even here the 
data produced does not refer to blindness or disability but to its representation. The 
knowledge generated by this doctoral thesis is therefore praxical – that is, it can be 
practically applied to any subject matter that bears even a remote similarity to the 
case study, including other frequently stereotyped communities or topics. 
Nevertheless, the subject of blindness is particularly pertinent. The attempt 
to represent people who experience the world in a very different way to the 
filmmaker and the sighted audience tests the boundaries of the proposed 
methodology. The filmmaker, in attempting to conceptualise narrative and 
aesthetic representations of blindness, is faced with a challenge: because film is an 
audio-visual medium, it is technically incapable of conveying touch or smell, the 
essential sensory means by which a blind person apprehends the world. Thus, the 
blind character is experienced by the spectator through the one sense the character 
does not possess. This raises the question of the capacity of the proposed 
                                                                                                                                                                             
informed by psychological viewing processes. This is demonstrated in Chapters Two and Four, which 
analyse social contexts in a constitutive relationship to psychological contexts. Thus, for my 
purposes, it would be problematic to draw a strict semantic boundary between the two terms. 
Pragmatic film theories, such as cognitive film studies, also use these terms interchangeably for 
exactly the same reasons. The only exception will be made when I refer in Chapter Seven to the 
exhibition of my films to actual viewers, when I restrict myself to the term ‘audience’. 
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methodology to convey the character’s subjective experience to the viewer without 
simply resorting to sound as the main aesthetic mediator. The thesis addresses this 
question by reassessing the notions of ‘subjective experience’ and ‘filmic 
mediation’. 
In terms of gauging spectatorship (audience dispositions and reception), this 
research operates from a filmmaker’s perspective and therefore uses a hypothetical 
spectator to justify all its related filmmaking decisions. Neither its scope nor its 
objectives allow for a dedicated audience study in order to conceptualise the films 
or verify the desired impact of the finished artefacts; the spectatorship mentioned 
in the research questions is conceptual, not empirical. However, as will become 
apparent throughout the thesis, a conceptual approach is more efficient and 
pragmatic than an empirical one, not least because it is usual practice for 
filmmakers to base their work on the premise of a constructed audience. Hence, 
one of the key questions explored in this thesis concerns which theories are used to 
construct the audience, and how this informs the filmmaking process.  
 
1.2 Components 
The thesis is composed of three artefacts: the written exegesis and two 
documentaries, the eponymous Terry (48 minutes) and June (45 minutes). As 
explained below, it is recommended to read the thesis before watching the films. In 
terms of viewing conditions, it is preferable to watch the films on a large screen, not 
on a computer or television screen. This is for two reasons: firstly, the films are 
primarily intended for audiences in large-screen settings (for example, festivals, 
community screenings or conferences); and secondly, the research paradigms 
address the mapping and capturing of bodies, objects and spaces in direct relation 
to each other, and this entails, for the most part, wide shots and a large depth of 
field. As the thesis includes numerous references to the spectatorial impact of the 
details within these shots, the apprehension of these would be considerably 
diminished if they were viewed on a small screen. 
The two films are saved as QuickTime files on the accompanying USB flash 
drive. For the purpose of easy transferability and playability, the files are 
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compressed, using the Vimeo compression recommendations. 4
 
 Although these 
provide a good compromise between file size and quality, compression artefacts 
will be moderately visible. Case studies discussed in-depth in Chapters Five and Six 
are identified by scene name, which corresponds to the actual scene titles used in 
the films, and by the scene’s timecode in the QuickTime files. The USB stick also 
includes a PDF version of the written exegesis and the 2004 documentary, A Touch 
of Colour (12 minutes), referred to earlier. 
Terry Hopwood-Jackson June Bretherton 
  
Figure 2: The characters 
 
Terry and June, the two characters (figure 2), are both (non-congenitally) 
totally blind. Terry, a freelance painter, lives with his partner, Pam, in a small, 
crowded flat on the outskirts of Basingstoke. June, a former drama teacher, lives in 
a spacious house in Harwich with her partner, David, and is a freelance writer and 
trainer/consultant on issues affecting blind people. Terry and June are markedly 
different in character and temperament, especially in relation to their feelings 
about being blind, as well as in their social lives and everyday activities; this 
becomes evident through the way they are portrayed in the films. Their difference 
was a major reason why I chose to make two separate films – one based on each 
character – since juxtaposing them in the same film would have created a binary 
                                                             
4 See: https://vimeo.com/help/compression 
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opposition between them, rendering their pre-filmic personae as comparative 
screen personae and considerably attenuating their individuality and particularity, 
which, as Chapter Four argues, are crucial to undoing stereotypes. Forcing 
characters into the same film through intercutting would fragment their 
contribution and forfeit their individual integrity (McLaughlin, 2010, p. 97). Even if 
there were no evident links between the characters, and they were each portrayed 
in a long, individual segment to prevent intercutting, the spectator would still 
discover relationships and infer cross-plot meanings, because the human mind is an 
association-driven engine, accumulating and contextualising knowledge by linking 
things that occur within the same time frame. Indeed, the exploitation of this ability 
is one of the main mechanisms of multi-character film narratives (Cutting et al., 
2013, pp. 85–86). Hence, when the above films are disseminated in non-academic 
circles, such as film festivals, they will be treated as two separate artefacts, 
although a detailed discussion on exhibition lies outside the scope of this thesis. 
Dedicating a separate film to each character maintains their uniqueness; 
however, in terms of the actual research, they are in fact related case studies that 
enact the methodology. As such, they represent a diptych of two separate artefacts 
connected by a hinge – the methodology. The huge disparity between the 
characters tests the resilience of that hinge, and requires the deployment of a 
plethora of different strategies. For this reason, in an academic context, I 
recommend watching both films together after reading the written exegesis, or at 
least after reading this chapter and Chapter Four. Chapter Four provides an 
essential framing to the representation of blindness in documentary film – 
identifying current stereotypes, analysing their socio-cultural impact on blind 
people, and proposing concrete strategies to undo these stereotypes. Reading the 
chapter before watching the films reflects the inductive nature of the written 
exegesis in which the entire literature review and methodology are grounded in the 
issue of the representation of blindness; it also resembles the way I have presented 
the project at conferences and in academic publications.  
In the context of this research, the written and the practical components are 
inseparable, since they frame one another. The written thesis is implicated in the 
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practice but is not merely illustrational, informative or supportive. Trinh T. Minh-ha 
encapsulates this relationship with regards to her filmmaking and her writing: 
I theorize with my films, not about them [emphasis in the original]. 
The relationship between the verbal, the musical and the visual, 
just like the relationship between theory and practice is not one of 
illustration, description or explication. It can be one of inquiry, 
displacement and expansive enrichment. (Minh-ha, 2007, p. 107) 
A project that is simultaneously theorised practice and practised theory 
relies on the concept of bricolage. Jacques Derrida (2001, p. 360) explains that the 
‘bricoleur’ uses “the instruments he finds at his [disposal] around him, [trying] by 
trial and error to adapt them, not hesitating to change them whenever it appears 
necessary, or to try several of them at once, even if their form and their origin are 
heterogeneous”. While bricolage has long been embraced by practitioners, scholars 
often deem it to be synonymous with cherry-picking. In order to prevent this, Joe 
Kincheloe (2001, p. 685) argues that the academic bricoleur needs to have a diverse 
understanding of disciplinary processes, recognising at the same time their 
parochial and restrictive dimensions. In addition, using parts of a theory in a 
bricolage requires the initial examination of what is discerned and discernible in 
relation to its suitability for the particular research questions at hand (Mason, 2011, 
p. 7). The inductive deployment of discernible parts from different theories needs 
to be complementary; that is, the particular methods should neither contradict 
each other nor fulfil the same practical function in a different form. Overall, the aim 
of the written exegesis is to formulate a bricolage methodology that is academically 
rigorous and coherent, yet grounded and pragmatic, demonstrating the chiasm of 
theory grounded in practice and practice grounded in theory. 
 
1.3 Outline 
The formulation of the methodology and its application progressively crystallised as 
a result of my interaction with Terry and June, and the interaction between theory 
and practice. It has been led by experimentation in theory and practice, and has 
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been constantly revised and refined. In this sense, it bears similarities with 
ethnographic research in which data collection and analysis continually inform the 
research design, and “all subsequent data collection is guided strategically by the 
emergent theory” (Walsh, 2012, p. 248). This ‘funnel structure’, through which the 
methodology is gradually channelled, rejects a strictly sequential research design 
that “compartmentalises it into distinct stages” (p. 250). However, the inductive 
actuality of the research design is different to its deductive presentation in the 
written exegesis. Given that the objective is to produce a praxical methodology that 
is applicable to other research contexts and subject matters, a seemingly theory- 
and discourse-led structure is more efficient.  
Chapter Two, ‘Documentary Practice and Spectatorship’, provides a critical 
review of the relevant literature. It first looks at documentary filmmaking textbooks, 
arguing that the lack of critical, spectatorship-focused theories results in the 
circulation of narrative and aesthetic formulas, which, although pedagogically 
efficient for teaching filmic storytelling, are prone to the sort of schematic 
stereotyping that has a particularly adverse effect on the representation of 
disability. Existing documentary study texts, therefore, offer little scope to apply 
spectatorship theories in order to critically frame the practical endeavour of 
undoing blindness stereotypes. By contrast, a cognitive approach provides this 
critical framing by gauging spectatorship in terms of the socio-cultural mental 
dispositions that inform film viewing, as well as the actual experience of the film 
text in terms of narrative and aesthetics. It also offers possibilities for adopting 
cross-disciplinary methods and exploring spectatorship in terms of momentary, 
embodied experiences. 
 Chapter Three, ‘Dispositions and Mediations’, presents the main 
methodology, which formulates two stages of documentary practice. The first, a 
content analysis, identifies spectatorship dispositions towards a particular topic 
such as blindness. The sampling of films for the content analysis necessarily 
corresponds to the target audience of my own film practice, which is identified as a 
‘public’ audience as opposed to a ‘connoisseur’ or ‘amateur’ audience (Sawyer, 
2006, p. 2006). The second stage involves the consideration of documentary 
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practice as a process of mediation on a ‘pre-filmic’ and a ‘post-filmic’ level. The pre-
filmic level addresses my personal encounters with the characters; the post-filmic 
level addresses the spectators’ collective encounter with the film text. The object of 
mediation at both levels is identified as the subjective experience of the characters 
in relation to their embodied interactions with spaces and objects. The mediation of 
embodied experience from the characters’ point of view helps to undo stereotypes, 
and also results in a more homogenous spectator experience.  
 Chapter Four, ‘The Framing of Documentary Practice’, applies the first stage 
of the methodology to the condition of blindness. A content analysis of 
documentaries depicting blind characters identifies the common denominators in 
narrative and aesthetic stereotypes, with particular reference to the filmmaking 
formulas critiqued in Chapter Two. These stereotypes inadvertently use 
mechanisms of binary opposites, perpetuating an ‘ableist’ (able-bodied) hegemony 
that serves to ostracise the disabled community. The two main strategies for 
undoing these stereotypes are the focus on ordinary embodied experience within 
an everyday context and the focus on ‘alterity’, which maintains the particularity 
and complexity of characters without forcing them into universalised narrative 
schemas.  
Chapter Five, ‘Ordinary Materialities’, and Chapter Six, ‘Ordinary 
Temporalities’, outline the variety of methods used in the actual filmmaking 
process. Both chapters distinguish, according to the methodology, the pre-filmic 
and post-filmic methods, and address the mediation of ‘everydayness’ and the 
characters’ embodied experiences from two separate angles. Chapter Five focuses 
on Terry’s and June’s material experiences with ordinary objects and spaces, using 
the anthropological concept of ‘objectification’ to mediate the reversible 
relationship between body and objects (Tilley, 2006). Chapter Six, meanwhile, 
concentrates on the temporal aspect of ordinary experience as mediated through a 
narrative structure. Two of the main strategies deployed include the use of 
‘narrative fragments’ to mediate incompleteness and the use of ‘narrative 
cyclicality’ to mediate the repetition of everyday rituals. Chapters Five and Six are 
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based on micro-detailed textual analyses of momentary aesthetics (for example, 
cinematography and editing) and global narrative structures such as motifs. 
The conclusion in Chapter Seven reflects on the key issues of the thesis, such 
as the viability of hypothesising an audience and mediating ordinary, everyday 
experience through film. It also suggests possible avenues for disseminating the film 
and the thesis, pinpointing institutional channels, as well as areas for further 
academic research. 
This strong focus on spectatorship limits the need and the space in which to 
discuss the filmmaking process from an authorial perspective.5
Ultimately, I undertook this research in order to widen my horizons – both 
as a practitioner and as a film lecturer in the higher education sector – in relation to 
the reception and socio-cultural implications of my practice and to the pedagogical 
 Thus, issues of 
research and production are only addressed if they have implications for the 
spectatorial experience, as in the case of the pre-filmic practice of ‘database 
filmmaking’, which leads to narrative fragmentation. The same holds for authorship, 
which is only examined in particular instances where aesthetic and narrative 
strategies convey my presence to the spectator through ‘deep reflexivity’ 
(MacDougall, 1998) and ‘political reflexivity’ (Nichols, 2001). Similarly, ethical issues 
are only referred to if they arise for the spectator, as is the case for the ‘back shot’ 
examples and narrative beginnings. Equally, my relationship to Terry and June, as 
well as various aspects of their lives, are not mentioned unless they are revealed to 
the viewer through the film text or have direct implications for the aesthetic and 
narrative choices, such as the filmmaking motif in Terry’s film. This almost exclusive 
focus on spectatorship is tailored to the two research questions, whose remit is the 
formation and undoing of stereotypes in the spectator, not the filmmaker. 
Nevertheless, the stereotypical representations identified in Chapter Four also 
relate to my own preconceptions prior to this study, as my 2004 documentary 
about Terry demonstrates. As such, the first part of Chapter Four represents a 
quasi-self-reflexive endeavour.  
                                                             
5 Other doctoral theses, such as those of Butler (2009), Dowmunt (2010), Kerrigan (2011) and Daniels 
(2014), already present excellent explorations of the authorial process of documentary filmmaking.  
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task of guiding students towards a similar awareness of their own practice. I also 
intended to extend the boundaries of my knowledge as a film scholar on the subject 
of spectatorship across several disciplines, including cognitive film studies, 
documentary studies and disability studies, in particular. However, whether in 
pedagogical, academic or practice terms, this research is a de facto activist pursuit, 
since it aims to contribute to the deconstruction of disability stereotypes and ableist 
hegemonies. Unfortunately, analysing the results of this pursuit is beyond the remit 
of this thesis; however, it will inform future research. 
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Chapter Two: Documentary Practice and Spectatorship  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The following chapter surveys the relevant literature in light of my first research 
question: How can the application of spectatorship theories establish a 
documentary film practice that critically addresses the received ways (audience 
experience) and related conceived ways (filmmaking) in which particular subjects 
are consistently portrayed in documentary film?  
The chapter starts with an examination of the most popular textbooks on 
documentary film practice, since this type of literature is responsible for the way 
practitioners deploy narrative and aesthetic formulas in their films. The literature’s 
disregard of spectatorship theories leads to the formation and perpetuation of 
schematic narrative formulas that result in the formation and perpetuation of 
preconceived ideas (including stereotypes) in the spectator. These formulas are 
then employed by filmmakers because they conform in turn to audience 
expectations. The chapter relates the search for a critical spectatorship approach 
that would address such preconceived ideas and thus enable the conception of a 
film practice aimed at reconfiguring audience dispositions. It briefly highlights the 
omissions in the documentary studies literature before outlining the reasons why 
cognitive theory is the most appropriate tool for the essential task of critically 
framing documentary practice.  
The theoretical underpinning of the methodology deployed in this research, 
therefore, falls broadly into two fields, both of which are examined here: 
documentary practice and cognitive film theory. Their intersection may still be a 
largely unexplored locus, but it is one that allows a grounded, pragmatic and 
interdisciplinary bricolage approach, incorporating such disciplines as social 
cognition, anthropology and disability studies, as the later practice chapters 
demonstrate.  
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2.2 Documentary and spectatorship 
2.2.1 Documentary practice textbooks 
This handbook smuggles in a little film theory here and there. 
Apologies in advance! 
The inclusion of any theory in filmmaking textbooks has always been regarded as 
problematic, as the above quotation from Ilisa Barbash and Lucien Taylor (1997, 
p. 3) shows. The quote is of course ironic; the authors go on to criticise 
documentary filmmaking manuals for being prescriptive and favouring the how 
rather than the why (p. 3). A de-theorised, purely empirical approach to practice is 
potentially deceitful as it undermines perspective and differentiation, “often 
contributing to a retreat from critical engagement” (Petrie and Stoneman, 2014, 
p. 286). However, the incorporation of theory into documentary practice is marked 
by a recurrent paradox: the filmmaking community tends to praise the value of 
theory and highlight its necessity, while simultaneously alleging that its apparently 
abstract nature is both a distraction and a stumbling block to what should be an 
intuitive, artistic and pragmatic filmmaking process. Undoubtedly, some theories 
are more suitable to film practice than others, but even these are usually frowned 
upon or distilled to their bare minimum when it comes to teaching or practising 
filmmaking. Theory is dismissed as too “ethereal, speculative, abstract or 
indefinite”, an attitude that derives from the filmmaker’s faith in the tangible and 
empirical nature of his/her practice (Petrie and Stoneman, 2014, p. 286). Indeed, for 
Brian Winston this resentment is mutual and affects aspiring filmmakers: 
The practitioners pour scorn on the scholars and hold their 
analyses to be incomprehensible irrelevances. The academy barely 
tolerates practitioners and thinks their more abstract musings are 
inadequate inanities. And the students[6
                                                             
6 In distinction to Winston, this chapter understands the term ‘student’ to refer to anyone who is an 
aspiring filmmaker and not simply to those studying filmmaking in an academic institution. Thus, a 
student is anyone who is likely to learn filmmaking through consulting the textbooks. 
], ‘great artists’ in the 
making, are in the middle and, all too often, hostile to traditional 
academic demands and concerns. (Winston, 2012, p. 196) 
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This mutual resentment accounts for the gaps in both documentary practice and 
documentary studies literature, and underlines the necessity to build bridges 
between both camps, especially in relation to the objective of contributing to socio-
cultural awareness through undoing disability stereotypes in film, the formation of 
which can be traced back to the influence of documentary filmmaking textbooks.  
 Textbooks explain the theory of the craft and are seen as separate from 
either handbooks, which focus purely on technical knowledge, or practitioner 
interviews or essays, which recount biographical anecdotes and subjective 
preferences (Orpen, 2003, pp. 10–11). Wayne (1997, pp. 9–10) explains that 
‘technical knowledge’ provides the competence necessary to operate technical 
equipment and organise the logistics of filmmaking, while ‘cultural knowledge’ 
comprises customs that determine how this technical knowledge is mobilised in 
particular ways to produce the final film artefact. Documentary textbooks represent 
the main interface between these two types of knowledge, whereby cultural 
knowledge operates implicitly rather than reflexively, leaving the practitioner 
oblivious to the fact that this knowledge, and the resulting representations, are 
culturally constructed and may have negative social consequences.  
The most popular textbooks, which are the recommended reading on both 
the academic and non-academic courses I have taught on,7
                                                             
7 These courses are as follows: BA in Film at the University of South Wales; BA in Film Production at 
the University of West London; BA in Television Production at Middlesex University; MA in Screen 
Documentary at Goldsmiths, University of London; Documentary Production at the London Academy 
of Film, Media and TV; and Documentary Filmmaking at Open City. 
 are Documentaries: And 
how to Make Them (Glynne, 2008), Directing the Documentary (Rabiger, 2004), 
Documentary Storytelling (Bernard, 2007), Creative Documentary: Theory and 
Practice (de Jong et al., 2012) and Documentary Editing (Everett, 2010). These 
books have two primary aims: the successful acquisition of skills that streamline the 
production process and the accomplishment of a maximum audience impact that 
would render the finished film either commercially successful or ‘critically 
acclaimed’. Both of these aims address strategies of storytelling through aesthetics 
and narrative structuring, but the lack of any reference to spectatorship theories 
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results in a variety of uncritical and normative assumptions about how the 
spectator experiences or interprets film texts.  
Aesthetics and spectatorship 
Andy Glynne (2008, p. 137) reflects the dominance of aesthetic considerations in 
this literature when he presents the rule-of-thirds as an essential requisite for 
cinematographic composition, arguing that it is more aesthetically pleasing if points 
of interest are placed on one of the four intersections of imaginary lines (for 
example, if eyes are placed on the upper intersections), and that breaking this rule 
(for example, by centring a subject) results in the audience perceiving it as 
unaesthetic and amateurish. Another example is Michael Rabiger’s (2004, pp. 149–
150) vivid explanation of the 180-degree rule and how adherence to it places the 
spectator into the pro-filmic event as a passive observer. Although the rule-of-
thirds, unlike the 180-degree rule, is far more of a Western convention than the 
emulation of human perception, both are simple and efficient, and both pre-
determine a normative spectator response. As all textbooks are aimed at beginners, 
these sorts of simple formulas would be didactically marred by the introduction of a 
deeper theoretical framework.  
However, the lack (and even rejection) of alternatives that would break 
these rules represents a modus operandi that discourages the consideration of 
alternative aesthetic representations. For example, deviating from the rule-of-thirds 
by centring a face through framing may be aesthetically pleasing and even 
thematically relevant, as Abbas Kiarostami’s documentary Homework (1989) 
demonstrates (figure 3). The framing of the pupils is strongly linked to Kiarostami’s 
self-reflexive, interrogative interview technique, and the centrality of the face 
mediates the experience of being figuratively framed and vulnerable, since the lack 
of lead room minimises the character’s bodily action affordances. A more extreme 
example is Erroll Morris’s Fog of War (2004), which breaks not only the rule-of-
thirds but also the rule that framing should be parallel to lines within the space 
(figure 4). Morris’s aim is to aesthetically mediate the film’s major themes of 
uncertainty, memory and manipulation by deliberately breaking conventions.      
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Figure 3: Homework (1989) 
 
 
Figure 4: Fog of War (2004) 
 
Of course, the inclusion of examples that break the rules within a textbook 
dedicated to imparting the basics of filmmaking would be impractical and counter-
productive, diluting its efficacy and distracting students from acquiring and 
practising conventional skills before experimenting with alternatives. Providing 
short, simple and efficient conventions is one of the major strength of these texts, 
as students can quickly memorise these conventions and spontaneously apply them 
in the field. However, this pedagogically efficient yet normative tactic is problematic 
when it comes to a critical consideration of spectator impact, especially if applied to 
a more complex configuration of aesthetic elements. One example is Erik Knudsen’s 
(de Jong et al., 2012, pp. 136–140) close reading of the documentary Anything Can 
Happen (1995) by Marcel Lozinski (figure 5). Lozinski films his young son randomly 
approaching elderly strangers in a park and starting casual conversations on 
different topics. Knudsen analyses the film in terms of a spectatorially perceived 
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diegesis in which the narrator has a strong presence through the use of long lenses 
and the out-of-focus foliage on screen, which contrasts with the clarity of the heard 
dialogue. He highlights the evocative juxtaposition between the distant camera 
perspective and the proximal auditory sharpness of the dialogue, which 
metaphorically relates to the boy’s short encounter with the elderly people, who 
are “abandoned and lonely, living with their memories and regrets, waiting to die” 
(p. 140).  
 
  
Figure 5: Anything Can Happen (1995) 
 
Whilst Knudsen acknowledges that the elderly people were most likely 
oblivious to the fact that they were being filmed, he does not raise any ethical 
issues, focusing instead on the diegetic dialogue between the boy and the 
characters. Given the overt camera distance and the fact that it is documentary not 
fiction, the audience is likely to question the filmmaker’s voyeuristic point of view 
and ask a range of ethical questions: Was consent given? Were the people aware 
they were being filmed? Were they aware their voices were being recorded by the 
(most likely hidden) microphone the boy was wearing? Would they have responded 
differently to the more intimate and uncomfortable questions had they known they 
were being recorded? Neither does Knudsen discuss issues of representation, such 
as the stereotypical depiction of elderly people as being lonely, miserable, indulging 
in memories and spending their lives sitting on park benches.  
That being said, Knudsen’s close reading is rare and commendable, as none 
of the other textbooks analyse aesthetic elements in such depth. His comprehensive 
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and plausible reading links character and themes to aesthetics and narrative 
structure, and this benefits students’ conceptual understanding of the interaction of 
a multitude of aesthetic elements. To a certain degree, it also encourages students 
to consciously make choices about micro-aesthetic filming elements, such as focal 
length, which paradigmatically involves a contextualisation of one choice within a 
range of alternative choices. However, without a critical consideration of 
spectatorship (for example, in terms of possible reactions to a particular form of 
visual representation), these kinds of choices remain purely based on formalist 
theories that form the basis of Knudsen’s reading. Formalist theories place the focus 
on aesthetic experience and narrative comprehension in a bottom-up manner, 
largely disregarding top-down processes, such as the socio-cultural framing of film 
viewing. In addition, such approaches are based on textual readings rather than 
spectatorship models. As Vivian Sobchack (1992, p. 16) explains, formalists assume 
that expression and meaning are located in the text, and that the text somehow 
transcends its origin in the real world with real people, such as the characters in the 
documentary and its spectators; this “transcendental idealism” regards the film as 
“expression-in-itself – subjectivity freed from worldly constraint”. 
Still, Wilma de Jong, Erik Knudsen and Jerry Rothwell’s Creative 
Documentary (2012) has the most theoretical framing compared with all other 
practice textbooks, and is (comparatively) the most critical and efficient text when it 
comes to amalgamating theory and practice. Its numerous citations of key texts on 
theory may prompt the practitioner to undertake additional reading and foster 
critical thinking that questions normative methods. However, in terms of critically 
considering spectatorship, as the example of Knudsen’s critique of Anything Can 
Happen (1995) and the following discussion on narrative show, there are limits in all 
textbooks. This means that higher-education lecturers who run documentary 
practice modules must either add texts on theory to their course reading lists or rely 
on separate modules on documentary theory (usually run simultaneously with the 
practice modules). The result is that students tentatively adopt critical theory when 
writing essays and reflective analyses but rarely use it to frame their films, a fact 
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confirmed by Winston (2012) when addressing students’ aversion to theory (cited 
above).8
Textbooks are indispensable teaching and learning tools that provide the 
norms of professional practice, and I use them extensively in my own teaching and 
film practice. However, the implicit assumptions about spectatorship in these texts 
may inadvertently lead to unsolicited audience experiences, which, in the best case 
scenario, may considerably diverge from the filmmaker’s intentions, and in the 
worst, may reinforce preconceived ideas by perpetuating the use of the same 
formulas. 
  
Narrative, spectatorship and folk psychology 
In terms of teaching audio-visual aesthetics, documentary textbooks are rather 
sparse when compared with textbooks on fiction filmmaking. It appears that the 
common assumption about the spontaneous and unpredictable nature of 
documentary production deters authors from engaging more deeply with film 
language. Another related common assumption is that documentaries are ‘made’ in 
postproduction as it is only there that the author has full control over the rushes. 
Hence, when it comes to narrative structuring, textbooks present intricate plot 
recipes that are reasonably accurate in gauging audience impact, especially in 
eliciting emotional empathy for screen characters; however, the lack of critical 
framing9
Sheila Curran Bernard (2007, p. 27) presents the main aim of documentary 
narratives as “telling a story for greatest emotional impact and audience 
participation”. Similarly, Rabiger (2004, p. 135) declares that “documentary should 
act on our hearts, not on our minds alone ... It exists not just to inform us about 
something but to change how we feel about it too.” These emotions are 
 means there is a high risk that these recipes will perpetuate general 
stereotypes. 
                                                             
8 For further discussion on how to address the conundrum of the practice-theory divide in higher 
education curricula, see Wayne (2003) and Houtman et al. (2014) 
9 One notable exception is Searle Kochberg’s Introduction to Documentary Production (2002), which 
touches on discussions of representation and authorship in the chapter entitled ‘Narrative Intent’. 
Unfortunately, given that the book has not been revised since 2002, which means that the sections 
on technical knowledge are out of date, it is rarely used on practice courses. 
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predominantly evoked through character-centred narratives that make the 
audience “draw difficult conclusions about motives and responsibilities, and takes 
us along as accomplices in a painful quest for truth” (p. 11). The audience should 
emotionally experience the tension between the character’s aims and the obstacles 
they face, developing empathy for the character (de Jong et al., 2012, p. 123). 
According to Karen Everett (2010, pp. 68–87), a plot journey has to start with a life-
altering conflict that upsets the character’s world at the beginning of a narrative, 
guaranteeing that the audience empathises with the character and feels motivated 
to follow him/her through their hard journey towards a final denouement. 
Evidently, all textbooks link the idea of an engaging and successful narrative to the 
audience’s emotional investment in three-act plot structures that follow characters 
on a metaphorical journey, pursuing their goals in the face of successive obstacles 
and dealing with conflict-laden predicaments.  
Interestingly, de Jong et al. (2012) use the rare strategy of introducing 
alternative narrative structuring methodologies, such as inductive and deductive, 
essayistic, classical and transcendental narratives. This juxtaposition of alternatives 
does indeed challenge implicit narrative assumptions, and may well trigger a critical 
consideration of representational issues. Unfortunately, the more experimental 
narrative forms are only briefly mentioned as part of a larger taxonomy. Only 
Knudsen’s chapter on transcendental narrative offers a comprehensive 
counterpoint to the classical narrative trajectory cited above in that it suggests that 
narrative events can equally be states that reflect the character’s psyche and add to 
the audience’s progressive psychological engagement with the characters, leaving 
aside the classical elements of conflict, obstacles and goal-driven journey (pp. 132-
135). Still, as with the classical narrative structure, the transcendental narrative 
places a strong emphasis on the need for the audience to empathise with the 
characters and fully understand (or experience) their motivations and behaviour 
within a three-act plot depicting their psychological development.    
The narrative strategies found in these textbooks are based on assumptions 
found in ‘folk psychology’. The disciplines of the philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science use this term to denote our hard-wired cognitive drive to the unreflective 
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use of everyday knowledge “to predict and explain the behaviour of others” (Currie, 
2004, p. 108). This universal human urge to make sense of the thoughts, feelings 
and actions of others manifests itself in the construction of narratives (Hutto, 2007, 
p. 45), and film is one of the cultural artefacts that shape and are shaped by this 
inbuilt narrative practice.10
The folk-psychological plots prescribed in textbooks take the form of 
dynamic trajectories in which each of a character’s moves towards attaining a goal 
triggers a new action,  signified by a cut, a particular shift in visual aesthetics or a 
particular plot direction, that initiates a new state of being. These constant shifts 
elicit spectatorial empathy with the character on two levels. Firstly, each plot shift 
presents a novel situation in which the character and the audience have to orient 
themselves. This, according to Plantinga  (2009a, p. 22), represents one of the key 
pleasures of watching a film. Secondly, a shift in situation creates specific emotions 
in the character and the viewer, as an emotion is a “change in action readiness as a 
result of the subject’s appraisal of the situation or event” (Tan, 1996, p. 46).  
 Carl Plantinga (2011, p. 30) calls this the ‘filmmaker-
audience loop’. This term describes the shared assumptions filmmakers and 
spectators hold about human psychology and behaviour – assumptions that, on the 
one hand, enable an audience to understand character-led narratives, and on the 
other, enable filmmakers to predict audience response. There is an inextricable 
connection between filmmaking practice and viewing practice in so far as the 
spectator and the filmmaker approach the film artefact with similar sorts of 
knowledge, interpretations and experiences. 
In order to naturalise character behaviour and motivations in a variety of 
circumstances, the textbooks (see, for example, Everett, 2010, p. 91) recommend a 
clear exposition of character traits and constellations through the establishment of 
character archetypes. The most popular constellation of these ‘stock characters’ is 
the binary of protagonist-antagonist, whereby the antagonist can represent either a 
literal obstacle (as with Eugène Terre’Blanche in Nick Broomfield’s 1991 film, The 
Leader, His Driver and the Driver’s Wife) or a symbolic obstacle (such as Charlton 
                                                             
10 For a detailed account of how folk psychology operates in both real life and in film, see Persson 
(2003, pp. 161–246). 
 
 
36 
Heston, who stands for the US gun lobby in Michael Moore’s 2002 Bowling for 
Columbine) to the character’s journey (Bernard, 2007, pp. 25–26; de Jong et al., 
2012, pp. 122–123). 
James Polichak and Richard Gerrig (2002, p. 72) point out that, from a social 
cognition perspective, the audience’s active responses to films involve the same 
cognitive processes as their responses to real-life situations. Constantly 
experiencing the same stock characters and similar narrative structures can shape 
the audience’s long-term mental representations and even change their general 
beliefs (p. 92). Familiarity with narrative formulas, and the general beliefs these 
sustain or inculcate, are integral parts of the human folk psychology absorbed by 
spectators and filmmakers alike, and inform the cognitive formation of social 
schemas. These are “organised collections of information stored in memory and 
based on past experience” and are composed of role and event schemas 
(Pennington, 2000, p. 69) – role schemas determine our expectations of people’s 
behaviour in a particular situation, while event schemas inform our expectations in 
relation to particular circumstances or places (pp. 72-73).  
Social schemas therefore provide our brain with clear-cut mental scripts that 
enable us to quickly evaluate and experience social life, and they operate in the 
same way with a film’s narrative (Bondebjerg, 1994; Persson, 2003; Bordwell, 2008). 
In essence, film narratives inform and are informed by our values, beliefs, 
experiences and knowledge, and documentary textbooks are excellent repositories 
of narrative schemas that reflect social schemas, which in turn determine our 
perceptions and actions. It is not surprising that the textbooks selected as examples 
in this chapter hold the most popular appeal for practitioners, lecturers and 
students because of their successful folk-psychological resonance with authors, 
filmmakers and audiences. However, from a critical perspective, the strength of 
their folk-psychological approach is also their major flaw.     
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Folk psychology and stereotyping 
The constant exposure to schematic narratives has fossilised cognitive schemas to 
the extent that they have become resistant to change, resulting in strong pressure 
to maintain the status quo (Pennington, 2000, p. 75). As cognitive schemas simplify 
the information we process in order to produce spontaneous judgements, 
deliberate, critical thinking takes place only on rare occasions (pp. 79-80). Much of 
our mental processing has been relegated by habit, routine and evolution to the 
subconscious. This means that we tend to perceive, without question, our everyday 
experiences of people, things and events as immediate and truthful (Moskowitz, 
2005, p. 69). This effect, known as ‘phenomenal immediacy’, occurs especially in 
(folk-psychological) documentary narratives that leave no space for doubt or 
ambiguity as to role or event schemas, but the implicit exploitation of this tendency 
to spontaneous judgement is also mirrored by mainstream 11
In terms of the cognitive attributes, schemas are identical to Walter 
Lippmann’s concept of stereotypes discussed previously, both being essential, hard-
wired brain mechanisms. However, the stereotype specifically relates to our 
perception of and interaction with actual people, whether individuals or collectives 
(see Lippmann, 1991; Moskowitz, 2005; Dyer, 2006; Schweinitz, 2011). Being the 
stereotype’s hypernym, the schema describes the cognitive classification of 
information in general, which can include prevalent narrative and aesthetic 
formulas. The focus of this thesis is strictly on schemas and stereotypes that 
operate within hegemonic representation systems in relation to blindness - the 
term ‘stereotype’ will henceforth be used in this particular context. The key 
principle for examining hegemonic stereotypes is Jörg Schweinitz’s (2011, p. 48) 
distinction between two inter-related concepts of stereotyping: the social-science 
 filmmakers, who 
uncritically and unreflexively use storytelling conventions without considering their 
socio-cultural impact on spectatorship. 
                                                             
11 In this thesis, the term ‘mainstream’ denotes the common reception of films based on the 
predominant narrative and aesthetic conventions. As such, it refers to the reception of normative 
film texts that results in largely homogenous spectator experiences; it does not address production 
practices, exhibition modes or economic factors, which lie beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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concept relates to the perception of individuals or collectives from ‘other’12 social 
or cultural groups, such as homosexuals, the disabled, housewives or ethnic 
minorities, which guides our everyday attitudes and behaviour; the narrative 
concept comprises, for example, the imaginary narrative and aesthetic construct of 
characters, as dictated by genre conventions. Although Schweinitz is only referring 
to fiction film when he points out that these concepts often intertwine, the fact that 
documentary generally references the real world means that their relationship is 
less an intertwining than a constitutive one,13
Still, Schweinitz’s distinction between the two concepts is methodologically 
invaluable, since it is only through an examination of existing narrative stereotypes 
that we can draw conclusions about social stereotypes and the hegemonic 
dispositions that determine who proposes, enforces and maintains them within a 
society (Dyer, 2000, p. 248). Chapter Four analyses how documentaries about blind 
people employ folk-psychological storytelling formulas, which (inadvertently) 
generate social stereotypes that continue to have a detrimental effect on the social 
awareness of blindness. This insight allows for the conceptualisation of alternative 
representations, potentially leading to a reconfiguration of social stereotypes.  
 as manifest in Plantinga’s (2011) 
filmmaker-audience loop (mentioned above). Stereotypical narrative formulas form 
and are formed by social stereotypes, which has profound social and ethical 
implications for the documentary filmmaking process. 
It is worth mentioning here that only two authors of standard filmmaking 
textbooks raise the issue of representation and stereotyping: Rabiger (2004, 
pp. 108–111) provides a brief outline and checklist of representational issues, and 
de Jong et al. (2012, p. 103) describe Bill Nichols’s reflexive documentary mode and 
its exposition of the act of representation to the audience. Unfortunately, in both 
cases, the discussion remains speculative and is mostly divorced from the more 
                                                             
12 The term ‘other’ (and related derivates like ‘otherness’) is used in this thesis to address social or 
cultural groups that are perceived as ‘aberrant’ according to mainstream Western norms, and who 
are therefore prone to hegemonic oppression, partly through stereotyping, as is often the case with 
the disabled (see, for example, Said, 1979; Schillmeier, 2006). 
13 Schweinitz’s dichotomy is reminiscent of Staiger’s distinction of the social context (the ‘audience’) 
and the psychological context (the ‘spectator’) of film viewing (see footnote 3).   
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practice-based chapters that recommend the sort of folk-psychological narrative 
techniques that help produce such stereotyping in the first place.  
Nevertheless, the use of folk-psychological storytelling formulas must not be 
demonised. On the contrary, folk psychology is the most efficient method of 
creating an interface between the film text and the audience; it is also a natural 
phenomenon, an essential part of our being, which explains the popularity of these 
textbooks and the success of films that apply the prescribed formulas. Hence, 
filmmakers, such as myself, who target a public, mainstream audience must 
embrace but critically understand folk-psychological mechanisms in film practice 
and spectatorship. In order to do so, Plantinga (2011, p. 45) suggests supplementing 
these mechanisms with scientific and philosophical spectatorship theories. Framing 
folk-psychological filmmaking conventions with a rigorous spectatorship theory 
enables the filmmaker to create films that resonate with a mainstream audience 
and, at the same time, gauge spectatorship in relation to the generation or 
reconfiguration of stereotypes.  
 
2.2.2 Documentary studies texts 
While traditional documentary studies do contain some notable attempts to 
explore spectatorship, these are relatively limited. For instance, Michael Renov’s 
(1993, p. 22) taxonomy of documentary construction, function and effect identifies 
four modalities in relation to ‘desire’: to record, persuade, analyse and express. 
Renov mentions spectatorship when focusing on ontological issues concerning the 
documentary image and the role of the filmmaker, but as he does not discuss any 
particular spectatorship model, it is unclear whether he wants to argue that the 
filmmaker’s desire is somehow transcendentally mediated to the spectator, or 
whether he is strictly referring to authorship. 
Paul Ward (2005), on the other hand, focuses exclusively on spectatorship in 
relation to three different documentary genres: historical, comedy and animation. 
Unfortunately, most of his analyses are textual readings, and the pre-dispositional 
schemas he examines are mainly related to formalistic genre typologies rather than 
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socio-cultural representations. Furthermore, because of his strong emphasis on 
genres and narrative, he falls short on close readings that link aesthetic elements to 
spectatorship. 
Thomas Austin’s (2007) approach to spectatorship is through audience 
research, which certainly gives a clearer picture of the socio-cultural contexts of film 
viewing. However, his predominant reliance on empirical data, amalgamated with 
ideas from film studies, sociology and cultural studies, leaves little room for 
theorising a spectator in relation to experiential narrative and aesthetic elements – 
the only way that my film practice can gauge spectatorship, as a dedicated audience 
research study is not feasible within the confines of this research.  
By contrast, Belinda Smaill (2010, p. 8) does theorise a spectator in relation 
to the social context of emotions, and recognises “a need to grasp the particularity 
of historical contextualisation and its impact on textual production and circulation”. 
However, for my thesis, the prototypical emotions she establishes by using 
psychoanalytic paradigms neglect the “dynamic ebb and flow of feelings that 
characterises viewers’ experiences” (Campbell, 2011), and Smaill’s declared 
exclusion of cognitive models (2010, pp. 7–8) prevents her from rigorously 
examining spectatorial processes, such as sensory experience, narrative 
comprehension and, of course, the relation between socio-cultural and narrative 
schemas. Furthermore, there is repeated confusion over whose emotions she is 
referencing, and whether the filmmaker’s or the screen character’s emotions are 
automatically transferred to the spectator.  
Jane Chapman’s Issues in Contemporary Documentary (2009) is in principle a 
very good addition to the filmmaking textbook canon. Being a documentary studies 
textbook (rather than a scholar ‘text’ with a specific theoretical scope as is the 
literature mentioned above), it comprises a wide range of pragmatic theories 
concerning such subjects as authorship, representation and reflexivity, 
accompanied by close readings of case studies, although these readings refer to 
narrative themes, authorship and institutions rather than actual spectatorship. Due 
to the usual necessary compression of textbooks, Chapman’s chapter dedicated to 
‘audiences’, however, leaves little scope to elaborate on the theories she presents, 
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and her range of spectatorship models is limited to the fields of audience research, 
cultural studies, media platforms, social activism, political conditions and 
epistemology – all of which are models that do not theorise a spectator in the 
manner my research questions require. 
That being said, the examples cited above which touch on spectatorship 
represent a minority voice within the documentary studies canon. As Austin (2007, 
p. 2) points out, whereas textual form, address, ethical concerns and industrial 
contexts have been widely studied, studies on actual audience perspectives remain 
woefully underrepresented. Scholars have frequently approached spectatorship 
through the opaque lens of forms of authorial address, such as subjectivity (Renov, 
2004), performativity (Bruzzi, 2006), documentary types/genres (Nichols, 2001) and 
constructed realities (Winston, 2008). Spectatorship approaches in the form of 
audience research or audience reception are scarce.  
This lacuna may be due to two types of conflation in documentary studies. 
Firstly, like the aforementioned formalist approaches predominant in filmmaking 
textbooks, documentary studies texts, such as Renov (1993), Ward (2005) and 
Smaill (2010), synthesise expression and perception, which results in what Sobchack 
(1992, pp. 16–17) calls a “critical rhetoric, charging cinematic communication with 
some equivalent to sophistry”. Secondly, as John Corner (2008, p. 23) suggests, 
there is a repeated scholarly neglect to differentiate between arguments 
concerning the documentary’s indexical origination, which address the ontology of 
the indexical image in terms of its filmic construction, and those regarding its formal 
organisation, which focus on the perceptual dimension of that filmic construction 
(this can be observed in, for example, Bruzzi (2006), Nichols (2001), Winston (2008) 
and Baron (2014), and in numerous contributions in Grant and Sloniowski’s (1998) 
edited work). 
In summary, then, the theorisation of documentary practice through 
spectatorship could open new paths for documentary scholars, especially by 
addressing these two conflations. For instance, this thesis overtly distinguishes 
between expression and reception, focusing on the latter, but it also deliberately 
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bypasses issues of indexical origination in order to focus on formal organisation in 
relation to spectatorship. 
 
2.3 Cognitive film theory 
2.3.1 Cognitive film theory and documentary practice  
The field of cognitive film theory offers an approach that appears the most useful 
for an exploration of the issues raised in my research questions. For example, 
filmmaker and academic, Henry Breitrose (n.d., p. 6), who argues for the adoption 
of a cognitive approach to documentary practice, demonstrates that cognitive 
theory accounts for how people “make sense of the world” and can therefore be 
used to determine how the structure of a documentary mediates between the 
content and the presumed audience. Cognitive models, by linking audience 
reception to the formal elements of the film, can engage the audience and provide 
the filmmaker with some confidence in the process (p. 5). This confidence arises 
from the theoretical framing practice that Wayne (1997, p. 12) proposes, which 
facilitates the filmmaker’s understanding and the communication of complex ideas 
through film form, and allows the reflexive interrogation of implicit formal and 
socio-cultural assumptions.  
Breitrose’s premise, however, is shaped by his pedagogical purpose: to 
educate conventional, mainstream documentary practitioners. Thus, in a 
structuralist-formalist fashion, he somewhat misleadingly singles out narrative 
structure as cognitive film theory’s main asset, dismissing aesthetics, for example. 
His emphasis on a universal audience response based on folk-psychological 
narratives is reminiscent of the themes of the documentary textbooks, albeit with a 
more theoretical approach, and is not sufficiently rigorous or critical. Fortunately, 
Breitrose does acknowledge the socio-cultural and subjective framing of authorship 
and spectatorship, and encourages documentary students to consider “his or her 
intentions and the intentional systems of the audience, as well as the background of 
knowledge and abilities that the audience brings to the screen” (n.d., p. 12). As 
such, his short text, although too speculative and conforming too much to 
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mainstream filmmaking tropes, provides the impetus for a cognitive spectatorship-
focused approach to documentary practice.  
 
2.3.2 Cognitive film theory and documentary spectatorship 
There has been very little convergence between documentary practice and studies 
and cognitive film theory. Documentary scholars deem cognitive models too 
limited. This is due to their attempt to establish scientific and normative models 
that account for a hardwired audience reception based on hypothesising a universal 
body of spectators, thus neglecting socio-cultural and historical framings (for 
example, Smaill, 2010, p. 8). In light of the current body of work in cognitive film 
studies, this argument is indeed justified. Although cognitive film scholars do 
marginally acknowledge the importance of social, cultural and historical contexts 
(for example, Peterson, 1996; Plantinga, 2011) rigorous studies have been scarce at 
best.14
Cognitive film scholars have also largely failed to focus on documentary, 
favouring fiction instead. This may have two causes. Firstly, cognitive film theory 
was established in the 1990s arguably as an antithesis to the post-structuralist, 
Marxist, psychoanalytic-semiological Screen tradition (Bordwell and Carroll, 1996; 
Tan, 1996; Plantinga and Smith, 1999). Given that the ‘Screen scholars’ focused 
mainly on fiction, it was logical that the cognitivists offered their alternative 
theories in the same territory – where they continue to remain today. Secondly, the 
popularity of mainstream fiction amongst the public has overshadowed that of 
documentary. Given that one of the cognitivists’ main aims is to examine the 
popularity of mainstream films through an analysis of prototypical narratives, in 
order to understand our most common movie experience (Shimamura, 2013, p. 4), 
it is therefore natural that the focus on documentary has not been a priority. For 
instance, in Cognitive Media Theory (Nannicelli and Taberham, 2014), only Ed Tan’s 
chapter touches on documentary; even then, he merely uses nature documentary 
and fashion show reportage as comparative case studies to illustrate his argument 
  
                                                             
14 Notable exceptions, albeit for fiction film spectatorship, include Barratt (2014) and Coëgnarts and 
Kravanja (2015). 
 
 
44 
that they elicit emotionally detached audience responses in contrast to the engaged 
responses to fiction films. Meanwhile, in Psychocinematics – Exploring Cognition at 
the Movies, Arthur Shimamura (2013, p. 21) even declares the redundancy of 
discussing documentary, stating that “it is noteworthy to point out that nonfiction 
films (i.e., documentaries) generally adhere to the same cognitive and aesthetic 
features as will be described for fictional narratives”. 
The few cognitive approaches to documentary can be broadly divided into 
three strands: neo-formalist (Plantinga, 1997), semiotic (Currie, 1999; Ponech, 1999; 
Carroll, 2003) and pragmatic (Bondebjerg, 1994; Eitzen, 1995; Smith, 2007). The 
neo-formalist and semiotic strands offer thorough examinations of documentary 
texts in relation to narrative structure and perspective, the nature of documentary 
compared with fiction, and authorial intentionality. For instance, working in the 
neo-formalist tradition established by David Bordwell, Plantinga (1997) establishes 
an intricate classification that delineates, among other things, different narrative 
voices such as the ‘formal’ voice, which adopts an epistemically authoritative 
position to make categorical claims about the world (pp. 110-111), and the ‘open’ 
voice, which is epistemically hesitant, thus allowing for a degree of reflexivity and 
interpretation (pp. 115-116), a distinction reminiscent of Umberto Eco’s (1979) 
‘close-open text’ model. Noël Carroll (2003), meanwhile, examines the question of  
authorial intentionality in documentary film, which theorises an audience response 
based on intentional ‘indexing’ by either the filmmaker or the film text. Indexing 
involves the use of textual, contextual and institutional cues to distinguish 
documentary from fiction, raising different expectations in the spectator. Trevor 
Ponech (1999), on the other hand, attributes authorial intentionality predominantly 
to the text, not the viewer’s experience.  
These neo-formalist and semiotic models represent seminal landmarks in 
the scant documentary discourse in cognitive film studies, but they are only 
marginally relevant to this project’s research, partly because they do not take into 
account predispositional socio-cultural schemas in the viewer, and partly as they do 
not focus on actual spectatorial film experience, instead exploring either the 
rhetorical dimension of the film text or the indexical relationship between the film 
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text and the world. The pragmatic strand, which is the most promising for 
documentary practice but the least scholarly developed, consisting of a few short 
texts, will be discussed further below.   
Despite Breitrose’s seminal attempt to align documentary practice and 
cognitive theory (albeit purely for the benefit of filmmakers, not scholars), there is a 
profound lack of practice-based cognitive research in the field of filmmaking. The 
only practice-based cognitive research is to be found in empirical studies that 
measure audience responses during audio-visual viewings (see, for example, Vo et 
al., 2012; Heimann et al., 2014; Cutting and Armstrong, 2016). These studies use 
cognitive theory as an analytical tool rather than a synthesising, reverse-engineering 
tool that enables the filmmaker to gauge audience experience, as is my intention.15
[F]ilmmakers could be said to be conducting experiments in 
cognitive science and their first experimental participants are 
themselves. Many hours in the cutting room are the equivalent of 
many hours in the laboratory with the filmmaker as both 
experimenter and as participant. The resulting discoveries are 
deployed in order to manipulate our experience ... The discoveries 
of filmmakers, editors in particular, predate the recent 
formalizations of cognitive science but the parallels are many. 
(Rogers, 2012, p. 45) 
 
The reason for this gap in the literature probably lies in the filmmaker-audience-
loop phenomenon, which may prompt cognitive scholars and practitioners to 
assume that cognitive models already mirror filmmaking practices, deeming the 
demonstration of their practical application redundant. Sheena Rogers observes: 
Rogers’s assumption is correct when it comes to the hardwired folk 
psychology that filmmakers and audiences share – the focal point of cognitive film 
analyses. However, she does not take into account the fact that numerous 
canonised filmmaking conventions are based not on hardwired cognitive principles 
but on aesthetic ones that are relative to social, cultural and historical 
                                                             
15 A rare example is Seeley and Carroll (2014, pp. 235–236), who, in the course of conducting a close 
reading of Hitchcock’s Rear Window (1954) in order to analyse folk-psychological conventions, 
mention in passing the possible use of cognitive film theory as a tool for filmmakers of similar value 
to Eisenstein’s formalist and Bazin’s realist theories. 
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developments. In this respect, many conventions, such as the rule-of-thirds, the 
avoidance of jump cuts and the three-act narrative, have become fossilised in the 
filmmaker’s toolbox and have not been subjected to critical evaluation in terms of 
their actual socio-cultural impact on spectatorship. In the same vein, her 
observation exemplifies the often criticised modus operandi of film cognitivists, by 
which they focus solely on the mechanics of film viewing rather than the social or 
cultural predispositions that shape these mechanics. All in all, Rogers’s statement is 
symptomatic of filmmakers’ uncritical and implicit deployment of formulaic 
conventions that make ample use of stereotypes, as well as of cognitive scholars’ 
disregard of socio-cultural contexts and the practice-based application of their 
theories. 
On the one hand, therefore, although it has not yet been attempted, 
cognitive film theory is well suited to analysing a film practice that facilitates the use 
of aesthetic and narrative conventions, as well as to conceiving alternatives that 
would appeal to a wide audience. On the other hand, however, it lacks the initial 
social framing that would take into account how the representation of topics and 
characters reveals the repetitive use of narrative formulas that generate 
preconceived and potentially hegemonic ideas in the spectator. This is particularly 
important as it is the prerequisite for formulating alternatives that could 
reconfigure these ideas. Nevertheless, in relation to this project, an overall cognitive 
approach has the potential to overcome its limitations. This can be summarised in 
the three cognitive paradigms discussed below: pragmatism, self-correction through 
cross-disciplinarity, and spectatorship beyond cognition and narrative. 
 
2.3.3 Cognitive paradigms 
Pragmatism  
Early cognitive approaches to documentary film, as well as numerous non-cognitive 
documentary studies, have focused on the indexical relationship between 
representation and represented, and have tried to define the term ‘documentary’, 
especially in contrast to ‘fiction’. However, the huge divergence in documentary 
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forms, institutions, forms of exhibition, media platforms and spectatorship in the 
last decade makes a generalised discourse about the nature of documentary and its 
indexicality academically unsound and reminiscent of the abstract categorising of 
‘grand theories’. The pragmatic strand of cognitive scholars who study documentary 
takes a different approach. For instance, Dirk Eitzen (1995, p. 98) suggests that it is 
not necessary to define documentary; rather, we should examine how people make 
sense of a particular discourse through the documentary text. Thus, he pinpoints 
the key cognitive paradigm for documentary spectatorship as an understanding of 
documentary as a ‘mode of reception’.  
Eitzen concludes that a documentary does not always make arguments or 
truth claims: “Documentaries are presumed to be truthful, even though 
considerations about the veracity of particular assertions may play little role in how 
viewers actually make sense of them” (p. 88). Hence, the study of documentary 
spectatorship needs to go beyond the examination of truth claims, arguments or 
emotional engagement based on (or conflated with) authorial intent, analysing 
instead the spectator’s response to any particular assertion in relation to situational 
cues and textual features. In effect, Eitzen is careful not to fall prey to the 
conflations, mentioned earlier, of expression/reception and 
origination/organisation by regarding documentary not as a kind of ‘film text’ but as 
a kind of ‘reading’ (p. 92).  
Similarly, Ib Bondebjerg (1994, pp. 66–67) avoids indexical questions of truth 
claims, authenticity and objectivity by arguing that documentary reception involves 
an intersubjective mediation of the reality formed by the context and the mental 
framework of the spectator. For Plantinga (2005, p. 111), this mediation comprises 
the translation of pro-filmic experience to the spectator in order to form an 
equivalent experience or belief about the subject. The idea of documentary as a 
process of ‘mediation’ is a key paradigm for this thesis and will be elaborated more 
fully in the next chapter. Given the underdevelopment of documentary 
spectatorship in cognitive film studies, especially in the pragmatic strand, Eitzen’s, 
Bondebjerg’s and Plantinga’s ideas remain embryonic, particularly as they are 
attempting to lay the foundations for a larger documentary discourse that 
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(unfortunately) has not yet taken place. By adopting their paradigms, however, the 
critical theorisation of film practice could also advance the academic discourse 
these three scholars have initiated. 
Self-correction through cross-disciplinarity 
Cognitive film theorists largely analyse film spectatorship in terms of folk 
psychology, a methodology that is more pragmatic than other spectatorship 
theories such as apparatus theory because it explains the common assumptions 
filmmakers and spectators share about human psychology and behaviour in general 
(Plantinga, 2011, pp. 41–43). Thus, a cognitive approach also provides a subtle 
method for anticipating and explaining the behaviour of people in real, everyday life 
(Currie, 2004, p. 108), and in light of the attempt by this research to reconfigure 
blindness stereotypes, it confers an essential benefit.  
Cognitive theorising is usually speculative and diffident, formulating 
scientifically plausible and coherent but at the same time flexible and corrigible 
arguments (Rushton and Bettinson, 2010, p. 160). In this vein, Plantinga (2011, 
p. 44) points out that the folk-psychological approach is flexible and has room for 
deviation and disagreement without the need to have a universal, fixed spectator or 
a fixed filmmaker/apparatus, as is the case, for instance, in psychoanalytic film 
theory. Cognitive film discourses are in principle flexible enough to theorise social 
identities, such as gender, race and disability, even though it has rarely been done. 
However, Gregory Currie (2004, p. 108) argues that folk psychology must be 
regimented, refined and corrected by academic constructions based on ‘deep 
theory’, which brings psychological processes and mechanisms to the fore. Critically 
examining these processes and mechanisms can provide important insights on 
stereotyping, benefiting scholarship, as well as documentary practice.  
Social cognition is one example of regimenting deep theory – this has been 
used earlier in this chapter, and will be used again in Chapter Four to explain the 
link between narrative schemas and blindness stereotypes. Social cognition and 
cognitive film theory, which are based on cognitive psychology, share in the 
examination of the mental schemas that accounts for collective human responses to 
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both the real world and films. However, as mentioned above, cognitive film models 
usually only address the narrative dimension of schemas in relation to a 
universalised spectator who processes the folk-psychological narratives or genre 
codes; they are rarely linked to historical/cultural context, representation and 
stereotyping – a frequent criticism of cognitive film studies (see, for example, 
Campbell, 2005; Smaill, 2010). Daniel Barratt (2014, p. 78) addresses this issue by 
examining the cultural framing of spectatorship in relation to visual perception and 
cognitive reasoning, and openly calls for cognitive film theory to reassess its 
predominantly universalist approach. Hence, social cognition theory, in conjunction 
with stereotype models from cultural studies, offers cognitive film theory an 
efficient frame through which to link the social context with the hard-wired 
psychological context of spectatorship16 and thus account for spectator difference 
or identity politics, which is still uncharted territory for cognitive film studies17
Currie (2004, p. 106) explains that cognitivism is a ‘programme’ rather than a 
specific theory, encouraging the bricolage approach of mixing theories and models 
across disciplines according to the case study at hand.
 
(Plantinga, 2009b, p. 257). 
18
Anthropological approaches to film combine scientific rigour with artistic 
aspirations and inherently link theory to practice. For instance, practice-oriented 
ethnographic texts are imbued with theoretical framings (see, for example, Barbash 
 In scholarly terms, this 
thesis argues that mapping spectatorship requires a range of models from different 
fields, including disciplines such as anthropology and phenomenology, which at first 
glance appear remote from or incompatible with cognitive models. 
                                                             
16 This makes the distinction between ‘audience’ and ‘spectator’ methodologically superfluous (see 
footnote 3). 
17 Cognitive scholar Per Persson (2003, pp. 9–10) makes a clear distinction between narrative and 
social schemas in fiction-film spectatorship, which is reminiscent of Schweinitz’s stereotype 
distinction, but his analysis of social schemas swerves into universalist film readings and remains 
largely unexplored in relation to real life.  
18 The first cognitive film theory manifesto, Post-Theory (Bordwell and Carroll, 1996), was critical of 
bricolage, considering it a legacy of ‘grand theories’ such as apparatus theory. Contemporary 
cognitive anthologies, such as Psychocinematics: Exploring Cognition at the Movies (Shimamura, 
2013) and Cognitive Media Theory (Nannicelli and Taberham, 2014), however, demonstrate the 
value of bricolage for allowing cognitive film theory to progress beyond neo-formalist and 
computational paradigms that, following a Cartesian tradition, focused predominantly on mental 
processes. 
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and Taylor, 1997; Grimshaw and Ravetz, 2005; Heider, 2006; Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007; Pink, 2007; Pink, 2015), while theory-oriented texts make frequent 
references to the research and production process (see, for example, Crawford and 
Turton, 1992; Devereaux and Hillman, 1995; MacDougall, 1998; Russell, 1999a; 
Ruby, 2000). However, as with documentary studies texts, the limitation of 
anthropological texts lies in their predominant focus on the filmmaker/researcher’s 
role in gathering data, interacting with social actors, representing them and 
theorising that representation. Spectatorship is largely missing from their 
discourses.19
Still, their preoccupation with the researcher’s encounter with and 
representation of ‘others’ makes anthropological paradigms in general a suitable 
supplement to cognitive theory as they facilitate the conceptualisation of the first-
person, embodied encounter between filmmaker and characters, laying the 
foundation for a corresponding textual construction and spectatorial reception (see 
Chapter Three). As such, the anthropological models used in this thesis are based on 
Heidegger’s existential and Merleau-Ponty’s embodied phenomenology. The reason 
for approaching these concepts through anthropology is that the discipline 
naturalises and pragmatises these philosophical streams in order to allow the 
empirical mapping and representation of human experience. In fact, the 
intersection between phenomenology and cognitive film studies, addressing 
spectatorship beyond pure cognition, has generated the development of a 
considerable academic subfield in the last ten years.  
  
Spectatorship beyond cognition and narrative 
Post-cognitive developments in a variety of fields such as philosophy, biology and 
psychology have led to the synergy of phenomenological and cognitive paradigms, 
                                                             
19 Martinez (1992) and Ruby (2000, pp. 181–194) are the two most notable texts on ethnographic 
film spectatorship. However, although both approach the subject through ethnographic audience 
studies (similar to Austin’s qualitative audience research study in 2007), evaluated with theories that 
shed light on socio-cultural contexts (Marxism, semiotics and apparatus theory), they say little about 
actual experience during film viewing. As anthropologists, their primary focus on culture (Ruby, 
2000, p. 184) is understandable, but this leads to a general scepticism, symptomatic in ethnography 
and visual anthropology, about using psychological spectatorship theories.   
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manifested in such concepts as ‘embodied cognition’ (Shapiro, 2011) and the 
‘phenomenological mind’ (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008). This has resulted in 
cognitive film scholars moving away from computational and narrative-
constructivist approaches, the predominant paradigms in the early stages of this 
field (Sweeney, 1994; Groves, 2006; Elsaesser and Hagener, 2010), towards 
exploring the link between mental cognition and embodied experience. Thus, 
cognitive film models have started addressing spectatorship beyond the level of 
pure cognition, exploring the subject on a variety of interconnected levels: sensorial 
and motor responses, feelings, emotions and cognition (see, for example, Grodal, 
2009; Antunes, 2016). The necessary empirical data is usually provided by 
neuroscientific studies (see, for example, Hasson et al., 2008; Zacks et al., 2006; 
Smith and Mital, 2013; Heimann et al., 2014). 
However, while neuroscientists produce these data by examining 
momentary experiences through a focus on online (moment-to-moment, real-time) 
cerebral and somatic responses to film viewing, cognitive film scholars tend to 
embed these data into narrative-based analyses in which aesthetics and momentary 
experiences are subordinated to folk-psychological plots, characters and themes. 
This narrative legacy probably still prevails because of the perseverance of the use 
of mainstream fiction films as case studies (Brunick et al., 2013).20
The focus of cognitive film scholars on folk-psychological narratives has 
resulted in appraisal theory, which defines emotion as feelings elicited by the 
appraisal of  a person’s current condition in relation to his/her aims, becoming the 
 Neuroscientists 
would in theory be able to challenge this narrative dominance, but, unfortunately, 
they have shown little interest in embedding their empirical results in more 
elaborate film analyses. As Uri Hasson et al. (2008, pp. 21–22), in their study on 
intersubjective audience correlation in filmic responses, succinctly conclude, this 
data “should probably not be used to evaluate the aesthetic, artistic, social, or 
political value of movies ... the critical evaluation of each film is outside the domain 
of this research”. 
                                                             
20 Notable exceptions, apart from the few documentary examples mentioned earlier, include 
Taberham (2014), who analyses avant-garde films, and Gregerson (2014), who studies video games. 
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dominant approach to analysing emotion in fiction film, as Patrick Hogan (2007, 
pp. 42–43) observes. Emotion-generation is thus attributed to the character’s 
appraisal of how narrative conditions obstruct or facilitate his/her goal. The 
resulting emotion in the character (and the spectator) triggers the motivation to 
perform a certain action that will change the narrative conditions, after which the 
appraisal process starts anew.  
However, Hogan interjects that appraisal theory cannot easily account for 
emotional responses based on a momentary experience that does not necessarily 
involve a judgement concerning long-term goals (p. 42). Momentary sensorimotor 
projections, such as the reaction to a screen movement or a cut, are even “more 
directly involved with emotional experience in that, being more perceptually 
concrete, they are more directly connected with emotion triggers” (p. 45). Lalita 
Hogan (2009, p. 109) observes that an imagined character identification, which for 
many cognitive film scholars is a precondition for the appraisal theory to work, is 
not necessary for cinematic emotion: “A viewer can become invested in tasks such 
as a character dropping an object, and wait for him to pick it up with as much 
eagerness as [if] he or she might wait for the unravelling of a murder mystery.” 
Thus, short-term emotions can be evoked by the spectator’s proximity to an object 
or body, and by the sense of a present, tangible reality, such as movement, gestures 
and everyday tasks. Greg Smith’s mood-cue model (2003), discussed in Chapter 
Five, is a good example in that it discusses mood generation through momentary 
emotional cues that are not primarily based on plot structures or character 
empathy.  
Smith (2007, pp. 91–92) also argues for a focus on momentary experience in 
documentary by exploring how local, textual structures elicit spectatorial cognition 
and emotion. The formal elements of documentary can vary greatly (for example, in 
interviews and observational, archival and performance-based films), and often do 
so within the same scene. Smith asserts that documentary spectatorship should be 
analysed in relation to disparities and shifts in textual cues, rather than a top-down 
analysis that presumes a homogenous narrative experience based on prototypical 
documentary genres or modes of address. 
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However, this does not mean that my films reject narrative per se. On the 
contrary, Chapter Six uses a variety of narrative structuring strategies that 
coherently mediate Terry’s and June’s subjective, everyday experiences. However, 
these strategies do not adhere to folk-psychological narratives; rather, they address 
contrasting momentary experiences as constituents of heterogeneous, global 
narrative structures. In this way, the top-down mechanism of folk-psychological 
narratives, which subordinates momentary, embodied experiences and places them 
in strict relation to character-led plot trajectories, is inverted and transformed into a 
bottom-up mechanism where themes, characters and narrative structures 
organically emerge from momentary, embodied experiences. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The value of a cognitive approach to my film practice is two-fold. Firstly, social 
cognition models, linked to an analysis of folk-psychological narratives and aesthetic 
tropes in films representing blind characters, enable the identification of disability 
stereotypes in common film practices and spectatorship dispositions. The 
awareness of these societal predispositions critically informs my film practice, which 
seeks to undo such stereotypes. Secondly, through its focus on mainstream 
audience reception, a cognitive approach can target a Western mainstream 
audience (as hypothesised in the following chapter) by deploying filmic conventions 
in conjunction with alternative modes of representation. 
This thesis, therefore, operates over three disciplines.  First of all, it attempts 
to conceive a critical methodology for documentary film practice, tested in the 
domain of disability representation. It aims to take into account socio-cultural 
implications by overriding the normative function of the practice textbooks, which 
tend to solicit normative spectatorship schemas. In addition, its focus on 
spectatorship deviates from the usual practice-led research that predominantly 
addresses either authorship or the work itself. The second discipline is cognitive film 
studies. Here, the thesis aims to (a) incorporate social cognition, thus providing a 
social identity to the spectator; (b) challenge predominant narrative models by 
addressing momentary, embodied experience elicited through aesthetic and 
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narrative strategies; (c) demonstrate a practice-based application through the 
reverse-engineering of cognitive models; and (d) develop the limited documentary 
discourse by addressing documentary spectatorship in a scholarly and practice-
based context. The third discipline this research inhabits is documentary film 
studies, in which it aims to expand the discourse on spectatorship approaches and 
introduce cognitive theory as a viable research tool that will extend the boundaries 
of the field.  
The common denominator in these three areas is the connection between 
theory and practice. A theorised film practice demonstrates the value of cross-
disciplinarity and tests the complementary nature and pragmatic applicability of 
every model involved, and this in turn produces praxical knowledge for both 
practitioners and scholars. The next chapter formulates a methodology that pursues 
the dual task of scholarly rigour and practice-focused applicability. 
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Chapter Three: Dispositions and Mediations 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The following chapter proposes a methodology that enables a rigorous response to 
the research questions identified in Chapter One. As indicated in the last chapter, 
this practice-focused methodology is neither meta-theoretical, nor does it deal 
specifically with the actual subject of disability. Instead, it aims to establish a critical, 
theoretical framework for film practice, which, although initially conceived as a 
result of my experience of making two films focused on blind protagonists, could be 
easily adapted to other subject matter involving characters who are part of a 
specific social or cultural group that suffers societal discrimination.   
This methodological framework is a flexible one that introduces certain 
premises and suitable academic fields rather than medium-specific filmmaking 
methods (these are introduced in the subsequent practice chapters). As Wayne 
(2008, p. 84) explains, it is standard practice in the field of social sciences to 
distinguish between methodologies and methods, and this is a useful procedure. 
According to this view, a methodology is a coherent set of principles that inform the 
approach to knowledge 21
The methodology consists of two stages. The first involves the mapping of 
pre-existing audience dispositions through a content analysis of existing 
 generation (for example, cognitive theory, 
phenomenology and ethnography), while a method represents a medium-specific 
tool that executes these principles (for example, the use of interviews and narrative 
structuring in documentary film). It is only through the identification of a 
methodology that “activities and interactions with culturally constructed meanings” 
are reflexively brought to the fore, whereas the deployment of methods without 
methodological contextualisation may lead to implicit assumptions that forfeit 
critical considerations (pp. 84-85) – a trait that is commonplace in documentary 
practice textbooks.  
                                                             
21 Wayne uses the term ‘knowledge’ very generically, implying that it could also include ‘experience’. 
This chapter will establish and contextualise the concept of experience as the major focus of the 
methodology.     
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documentaries focusing on the same subject matter in order to identify schemas 
and potential stereotypes based in the social cognition and folk-psychological 
theories established in Chapter Two. This procedure offers a critical framework for 
my documentary practice in that it identifies strategies for undoing portrayals that 
lead to the othering of blind people. The second stage, which is informed by the 
outcome of the content analysis, identifies documentary practice as a process of 
mediation. The mechanism of this process, in relation to my practice, consists of my 
encounters with the characters and their pro-filmic experiences, mediated by 
phenomenological paradigms (pre-filmic mediation), and the audience’s encounter 
with the film text, mediated by cognitive paradigms (post-filmic mediation).  
Given that the methodology targets spectatorial experience as the ultimate 
outcome of the practice, arguably this chapter’s most ambitious objective is to 
demarcate the actual audience. A target audience is therefore hypothesised in the 
section on dispositions (below). Later, the section on post-filmic mediation 
identifies the means for gauging specific types of audience experience, and the 
chapter ends with a discussion on the role of ethical principles in the mediation 
process. 
 
3.2 Spectator dispositions 
3.2.1 Dispositions through content analysis 
Per Persson’s (2003, pp. 23–24) cognitive approach to film analysis attributes two 
external parameters to spectatorship: the discourse, which comprises all the audio-
visual cues and stimuli perceived in the film, and the spectator’s dispositions, which 
refers to expectations, schemas, cultural models and ideology. Bordwell (1985, 
p. 32) identifies dispositions as “prior knowledge and experience”, and reveals that 
the generation of knowledge and formation of experience during film viewing are 
necessarily linked to schemas derived from our interactions with the everyday 
world and with other art and media outputs. As mentioned earlier, these schemas 
are created through simplification and categorisation, and the social cognition 
perspective provides the link between narrative-based, universalist cognitive film 
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models and socio-cultural stereotyping. Neil Macrae and Galen Bodenhausen 
explain: 
[P]eople’s outputs (evaluations, impressions, memories) are 
shaped and guided by their knowledge and pre-existing beliefs 
about the social world ... rather than viewing individuals on the 
basis of their unique constellations of attributes and proclivities, 
perceivers prefer instead to furnish categorical (i.e. stereotype-
based) conceptions of others ... [I]nformation processing is an 
active process that is guided and shaped by people’s generic 
beliefs about the world (i.e. schematic thinking) ... rather than 
responding to the world as it really is ... Reliance on categorical 
knowledge structures is mentally easier than the alternative of 
forming data-based, individuated impressions of others ... Simply 
stated, categorical thinking is preferred because it is cognitively 
economical. (Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2001, pp. 240–241) 
With reference to Plantinga’s filmmaker-audience loop, this categorical 
thinking informs and is informed by stereotypical representations in fine art, media 
and literature, and is guided by folk-psychological narrative formulas in particular. 
However, another loop exists that pertains to the link between media images and 
real life: representations have consequences for public awareness and social 
behaviour, especially when it comes to disability, and this in turn perpetuates 
stereotypes. According to Richard Dyer (2002, p. 1), how “social groups are treated 
in cultural representation is part and parcel of how they are treated in life … 
poverty, harassment, self-hate and discrimination (in housing, jobs, educational 
opportunity and so on) are shored up and instituted by representation”. 
For this reason, Anne Pointon (1997, pp. 84–92) calls for documentary 
filmmakers to critically engage with their own and their peers’ media practice in 
order to address stereotypical representations of disability, a call that echoes Mike 
Wayne’s and Patrick Fuery’s demands for a critical film practice. In this respect, 
qualitative content analysis offers an efficient strategy for gauging the spectator’s 
and the filmmaker’s own dispositions, including the tendency towards stereotyping, 
as well as encouraging the filmmaker to consider alternative narrative and aesthetic 
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strategies. 22
Clive Seale and Fran Tonkiss (2012, p. 460) explain that content analysis 
generally involves the quantitative examination of media outputs in terms of the 
presence and frequency of specific terms, narratives or concepts. However, it is not 
always necessary to embark on an empirically rigorous and large-scale content 
analysis, especially for the practice-based researcher. For instance, Haller uses a 
qualitative content analysis consisting of only five films to evaluate disability 
portrayals in media. Limiting research to a small sample enables the researcher to 
understand the production and interpretation of meaning in media texts, and to 
draw conclusions about wider social and cultural practices (Haller, 2010, pp. 34–35). 
Hence, for the purposes of this thesis, an anecdotal list of documentaries portraying 
blind people is sufficient. As Sean Cubitt (2013a, p. 6) asserts, the extreme 
specificity of the anecdotal method “provides depth and colour to the generalist 
findings of methods that deal with multiple instances and large-scale tendencies”, 
and grounds more abstract formations, such as representations, in a specific 
instance.  
 Disability scholar Beth Haller (2010, p. 27) explains that content 
analysis reflects the mass-mediation of Western societies “in which their citizens 
understand ‘reality’ through personal experience and mass media information”. 
Louis Cheskin (cited in Hartley, 2003, p. 128) even argues that media content is 
reality, as our experience of it “constitutes a significant, and growing, part of our 
overall experience of life”. Any consistencies, or likewise any changes, in media 
content reliably reflect the social reality of the moment; hence, apart from revealing 
the status quo of our culture in the media, content analysis also reveals the 
performance of the media (McQuail, cited in Haller, 2010, pp. 26–27). This 
performance does not only pertain to the mode of representation, but also to what 
is and what is not being represented. For example, in relation to blindness, it will 
become apparent that there is a significant lack of representations of the ordinary 
or everyday experience of blind characters.  
                                                             
22 While a content analysis may be useful for the making of a documentary about a commonly mis- 
or under-represented group, it may not be relevant for certain types of documentaries, such as auto-
biographical or essay films, and this thesis does not propose that is adopted as standard procedure 
in documentary practice. 
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However, anecdotal evidence can be problematic, especially when drawing 
conclusions about common denominators and the potential prevalence of 
stereotypes, but, a small-scale content analysis can be substantiated through a 
mechanism of critical and theoretical framing from relevant academic fields, which 
can provide insights into larger social issues (Seale and Tonkiss, 2012, p. 465). As a 
consequence, the content analysis in the next chapter involves first of all the 
identification of folk-psychological narrative models and aesthetic tropes, framed by 
the schematic models of social cognition theory. This analysis is then evaluated 
using models from disability and cultural studies, revealing in the process 
potentially alternative forms of representation that reconfigure stereotypes of 
blindness.  
 
3.2.2 The target audience 
The content analysis inevitably relates to the target audience for my documentaries, 
since the sample of documentary films about blindness needs to represent the 
same constituency of spectators as my own practice. This constituency can be 
heuristically described by means of the following three criteria. Firstly, bearing in 
mind the research questions, it should be an audience composed of the ‘general 
public’. Keith Sawyer (2006, p. 127) offers a simple yet pragmatic audience model 
by distinguishing between three group of spectators: ‘connoisseurs’, ‘amateurs’ and 
the ‘public’. In my case, these audience groups need to be differentiated according 
to the extent of their critical knowledge about stereotypical representations of blind 
people.  
Connoisseurs know most about the domain in question; they are creatively 
and intellectually more active and more critical (p. 127). In terms of blindness, it can 
be assumed that connoisseurs include disability studies scholars, neuroscientists, 
psychologists, psychotherapists and any other academic or non-academic 
professionals who are active in this area. However, this group should also include 
media and ethnographic scholars who are familiar with a wide range of issues 
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surrounding documentary film practice and representations of otherness.23
Amateurs, according to Sawyer, have been exposed to some experience of 
the topic or the medium, but not in a professional context (p. 129). In terms of 
blindness, this group could be made up of people who have blind acquaintances or 
relatives, and have first-hand, personal or anecdotal experience of the other but 
lack the critical context a connoisseur would bring to the film. Of course, familiarity 
can result in an awareness of stereotypes, and amateurs may resist them, but this is 
by no means verifiable or possible to hypothesise, just as many industry filmmakers 
may or may not have the appropriate critical framework to avoid stereotypes about 
blindness. Overall, it is not easy to predict the reactions of amateurs. 
 As such, 
these connoisseurs can be presumed not to be susceptible to stereotypes, and 
when watching films about blindness, their dispositions with regard to disability will 
be, by default, critical and reflexive. However, their professional expertise may lead 
them to focus on specific issues, detracting from their overall experience of the film, 
which would not be the case for an ideal viewer – this would apply whether the film 
operates with stereotypes or attempts to reconfigure them. 
The boundary between connoisseurs and amateurs is porous, but if my 
target audience is the general public, the boundary between this group and the 
previous two is altogether more clear-cut. As Sawyer explains, such an audience 
operates collectively and represents the majority of spectators (p. 130). The public 
is familiar with blind people only through mediated content that lacks a critical 
framework which would avert the formation of stereotypes. With reference to 
Walter Lippmann’s (1991, pp. 13–17) idea of how public opinion is shaped by 
unquestioned stereotypes due to the lack of personal experience, a public audience 
does not have first-hand experience of blind people, nor is it familiar with critical or 
theoretical debates about disability. For this reason, this group is very prone to the 
implicit consumption of folk-psychological formulas and the adoption of 
stereotypes. Viewed from this perspective, filmmakers who follow the documentary 
practice textbooks without supplementing them with critical theory also fall into 
this group, even if they have personal contact with blind characters during filming. 
                                                             
23 See footnote 12 for an explanation of how the notion of the ‘other’ is used in this thesis. 
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As the content analysis in the next chapter reveals, neither first-hand experience of 
blind people (in the case of all the featured filmmakers), nor first-person experience 
of blindness itself (in the case of one blind filmmaker), can guarantee they will 
bypass the stereotypes. 
In addition, a public audience can also represent a mainstream 24
The second criterion refers to contemporary audiences. This is a necessary 
restriction given my aim of using my films to reconfigure the stereotypes that are 
generated by contemporary films and filmmakers, and consumed by contemporary 
spectators. Further, due to limitations of time and space, it was not possible to 
include an historical analysis of media representations. For these reasons, I chose a 
sample of films made after 2000.  
 film 
audience. It is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss the definition of the 
term ‘mainstream’; rather, the term is used loosely to mean the polar opposite of 
experimental or avant-garde films. An experimental film audience is, compared with 
a public one, a minority that may well fall into the amateur category when it comes 
to disability representations. For this reason, experimental films are not selected as 
samples for the content analysis later in the research, as they do not attract a public 
audience; instead, the sample comprises films whose exhibition and distribution 
strategies indicate they are targeted at just such an audience. The use of the elusive 
notion of mainstream is also an inherent trait of documentary practice textbooks 
and their folk-psychological formulas, as well as the cognitivists’ attribution of folk-
psychological narratives to mainstream films, both of which my sample needs to 
reflect. In addition, when disability scholars discuss abled/disabled power 
distributions in relation to media, as well as the formation and perpetuation of 
stereotypes, they predominantly refer to a public audience or mainstream media 
practitioners. Thus, my work needs to be located in the same mainstream-audience 
context in order to benefit from this academic field and to reconfigure existing 
stereotypes. In crude terms, blindness is mainly subject to stereotyping in the 
mainstream media, and for this reason, it needs to be ‘de-stereotyped’ and 
reconfigured in the mainstream, too.  
                                                             
24 For an explanation of the use of the term ‘mainstream’ in this thesis, see footnote 11. 
 
 
62 
The third criterion refers to a Western audience. Again, it is not within the 
scope of this thesis to define the term ‘Western’, but given the cultural context I am 
familiar with, I broadly define it as comprising Europe, the US, Canada and Australia. 
This approach at least offers a conscious approximation of a cultural context, unlike 
the majority of universalist cognitive film theories. To summarise, the sample will 
include those films depicting blind people that are likely to have been seen by a 
public, mainstream, Western audience.25
The content analysis provides insights into spectator dispositions towards 
blindness, derived from the continual use of particular, stereotypical portrayals in 
documentaries. This allows the conception of alternative portrayals as a first step to 
potentially reconfiguring these dispositions. Consequently, the analytical 
interpretation of the film content provides a critical framework for my documentary 
practice, which identifies the focus of representation as my two blind characters, 
Terry and June; in other words, it establishes what needs to be filmically mediated.   
  
 
3.3 Documentary practice as a process of mediation 
3.3.1 The mediation process 
Bondebjerg (1994, pp. 67–70) argues that documentary spectatorship involves the 
experience of a mediated reality, informed by the context in which it is viewed and 
the dispositions of the spectator and the filmmaker. If documentary is considered a 
mediated reception, and its creation an act of mediation, this process becomes 
necessarily teleological: the aim is to mediate something to someone. This 
represents the major paradigm of my thesis, and is also the general position of 
cognitive film scholars, who study films strictly from a spectator’s perspective. 
Documentary mediation also echoes Haller’s earlier idea that Western society is 
mass-mediated (see above). As an antidote, she proposes content analysis as a way 
of gauging disability representations and their corresponding stereotypes. However, 
while the outcome of the content analysis in the next chapter will frame my 
                                                             
25 This will be heuristically judged by festival screenings and broadcasts. 
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mediation process, it is first necessary to establish a fundamental methodological 
structure of documentary mediation which can later be adapted to the case study.  
As a term, mediation literally means the conveyance of meaning or 
information through a particular agent, resulting in an indirect transferral of that 
meaning or information (Hayward, 2000, p. 213). The inherent indirectness of 
mediation is a significant paradigm – as Cubitt (2013b, p. 1) puts it, “[t]here is no 
immediate [my emphasis]”. This comment resonates with Bondebjerg’s (1994, 
pp. 67–68) assertion that it is futile to discuss documentary in relation to one ‘real’ 
reality that is skewed by mediation; instead, we should accept and examine 
multiple, mediated realities. For Cubitt (2013b, p. 1), mediation is also part of the 
universal phenomenon of interaction and connectivity. This means that the 
mediation process in documentary film comprises the interaction between four 
interlocutors: the characters, the filmmaker, the film text and the spectator. The 
interfaces between these agents play an important role in documentary practice. 
 
3.3.2 A model of mediation 
Renov’s (1986) model of mediation is a good starting point for documentary 
practice. His pragmatic aim is to bypass discussions about ‘factuality’ and 
‘objectivity’ by proposing a modular framework of accumulative mediation from the 
historical ‘real’ to the spectatorially perceived ‘real’. In a similar way to Cubitt, 
Renov considers mediation a relational zone in which transformative operations 
between related experiences take place, and he identifies three distinct levels of 
mediation (p. 72): 1) from the historical real to the pro-filmic; 2) from the pro-filmic 
to the text; and 3) from the text to the spectator. 
Unfortunately for this research, Renov discusses the meta-theoretical 
grounding of the model and elaborates on levels 1 and 2 (p. 76), but does not use 
the same theoretical rigour for the third stage, which he leaves open for future 
examination.26
                                                             
26 Renov follows this up in later works, such as Toward a Poetics of Documentary (1993), choosing a 
psychoanalytic approach – see Chapter Two. 
 Still, his model crucially distinguishes between the filmmaker’s and 
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the spectator’s experience, preventing the conflation of expression and perception 
discussed in the previous chapter. Furthermore, his focus on mediating certain 
phenomena refocuses attention from ontological and semiotic concerns towards 
the transformation of experience from production to reception (p. 72). Experience, 
as such, will be identified as the object of mediation later in this chapter, where it is 
argued that it transcends cumbersome differentiations between knowledge, 
emotions and embodied sensations.  
Nevertheless, Renov’s model requires some adaptation. For example, his 
first level (from historical real to pro-filmic) is too concerned with questions of 
authorial intervention and performance, questioning how the historical real is 
affected by the presence of the filmmaker (p. 72). Phenomenologist Alan Casebier 
(1991, p. 139) rightly points out that Renov’s distinction between the historical real 
and the pro-filmic is only an idealist or nominalist model, since there is no reason to 
consider the historical object exists independently of any relationship to the 
filmmaker or the audience. However, this stage does address the experiential first-
hand encounter between filmmaker and subject, without bringing medium-specific 
formal elements and their reception into the discussion. This does not mean that 
spectatorship is ignored; on the contrary, especially in this thesis, the content 
analysis makes spectatorial assumptions that directly inform the filmmaker-subject 
encounter with the aim of ultimately reconfiguring stereotypical spectatorial 
dispositions. But, at this stage, the practitioner’s main aim, prior to filmic capture, is 
to map spatio-temporal experiences by either observing or orchestrating 
characters, spaces and events, based on creative authorial choices, not 
spectatorship (though both can be related).  
However, this first-hand encounter is not only pro-filmic, as Renov suggests, 
but can also include the virtual encounter of the filmmaker with the subjects 
through the camera lens, in the rushes during editing, or in any kind of archive 
material. Of course, film-formal choices are chronologically and conceptually 
inseparable from the filmmaker’s encounter with the subjects or the film rushes, 
but it is here that the confusion between expression and perception occurs. For 
instance, the use of a certain shot size could have been made to allow the 
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filmmaker a vantage point in the filming situation or simply to execute a creative 
idea, which does not mean that the spectator will experience the shot size in the 
same manner as the filmmaker. If, however, the shot size was chosen with the 
spectator in mind, then it refers to Renov’s third level, the encounter between 
spectator and film text. Consequently, the two instances – the filmmaker’s first-
hand experience of the subjects and the audience’s collective experience of the film 
text – require different methods. A spectatorship-focused approach to 
documentary practice needs to acknowledge this methodological (not chronological 
or conceptual) distinction, especially if the filmmaker wants to map a certain 
experience aimed at prompting a corresponding experience in the spectator. 
The proposed model (figure 6) suggests that the first level of mediation 
refers to the filmmaker’s first-hand encounter with the raw materials of the 
documentary (including subjects, rushes, archives, animations and sound effects) 
and could be called the ‘pre-filmic level’. The second, which refers to the audience’s 
collective encounter with the constructed film text, could be called the ‘post-filmic 
level’. This level combines Renov‘s last two levels in one and compensates for his 
problematic distinction between film form (level 2) and spectatorship (level 3). My 
premise is that at the post-filmic level the film is ‘formed’ with the spectator in 
mind.27
 
  
                                                             
27 In several respects, the pre-filmic/post-filmic distinction appears similar to Stuart Hall’s (1980) 
encoding/decoding model, with its consideration of dispositions to production and reception 
(‘frameworks of knowledge’). However, Hall’s semiotic model is not targeted at media practice but 
media analysis, and discusses many aspects that would not be practical for documentary practice to 
consider (for example, the technical infrastructure of film viewing). Furthermore, the model’s 
emphasis on encoded meaning or knowledge, and the related audience positions of dominant, 
negotiated and oppositional, leaves little scope to explore the embodied audience experience that 
constitutes a major part of this thesis. Hall does briefly mention different audience responses, such 
as emotions (p. 130), but his main focus is on ‘meaning’. For a comprehensive sociological and 
ethnographic approach to media audiences using Hall’s model, see Shaun Moores’ Interpreting 
Audiences (1993). My thesis also uses phenomenological-anthropological paradigms that would be 
difficult to integrate into Hall’s model. As argued later, the consideration of meaning-making on pre-
filmic and post-filmic levels is not a primary objective for documentaries that aim to mediate 
subjective experience, and distracts from the conceptualisation process. Lastly, the 
encoding/decoding distinction contradicts the notion of a permeable interface between two 
relational zones that operate in conjunction with each other via mediation – an operation which is 
embodied by the filmmaker’s dual work on the pre-filmic and post-filmic levels. In short, it is more 
expedient for my methodology to adapt Renov’s rather than Hall’s model.  
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Figure 6: Filmmaking as a mediation process 
 
3.4 Pre-filmic mediation 
Thus far, I have used the generic term ‘experience’ as the object of filmic mediation. 
A pragmatic understanding of experience28
 
 can be reached by asking two questions 
in relation to mediation: firstly, whose experience needs to be mediated, and 
secondly, how can experience be mapped pre-filmically so that it can be transposed 
onto the spectator post-filmically, triggering an equivalent but not necessarily 
identical viewing experience.  
3.4.1 Whose experience? 
The representation of otherness has been part of an ongoing discourse in 
anthropology. Allison Reid-Cunningham (2009, p. 102) explains that research about 
and representation of disability experienced a significant shift in the 1970s; prior to 
this, anthropological studies focused on ‘etic’ accounts of disabled people. Etic 
research is conducted from outside a social group from the perspective of an 
                                                             
28 ‘Pragmatic’, in this context, refers to practical application through documentary practice, not the 
philosophical tradition. For a pragmatic-philosophical discussion of the concept of experience, see 
John Dewey’s Experience and Nature (1994). 
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observer who attempts to describe behaviour in culturally neutral terms that can be 
applied across cultures. David MacDougall (1998, p. 78) calls this, “knowledge by 
description”, which in classical ethnography generally referred to (written) 
language. The shift in the 1970s saw an adoption of phenomenological perspectives 
taking an ‘emic’ approach, which, in contrast, offers detailed descriptions of lived 
experience – that is, it attempts to present the subject from their own perspective 
(Reid-Cunningham, 2009, p. 102). Emic research produces “knowledge by 
acquaintance”, where meaning is not the “outcome of reflection upon experience 
but necessarily includes the experience ... the experience is the knowledge” 
(MacDougall, 1998, p. 79). Unlike descriptive or explanatory knowledge, knowledge 
by acquaintance is affective and falls within the domain of experience.  
The anthropological understanding of experience, therefore, relates to the 
point of view of the characters portrayed on film in order to reduce any form of 
otherness. Peter Crawford’s (1992, p. 77) idea of an experiential mode of 
ethnographic filmmaking describes films that emphasise the similarities between 
‘us’ and ‘them’ through aesthetic and narrative strategies, resulting in the audience 
perceiving the everyday reality of other social or cultural groups. Pre-filmically, this 
means that instead of focusing on the social structures of a generalised disability, I 
focus on the first-hand experiential structures of the characters – something 
documentary filmmakers already attempt to do, especially in character-driven 
documentaries. Documentary practice, as prescribed in the textbooks and executed 
in reality, strives to mediate emic experience through externalising emotions and 
motivations, as do folk-psychological narratives. Some films even use elaborate 
aesthetic experimentation to approximate how blind people perceive the physical 
world and experience memories. Unfortunately, as Chapter Four reveals, these 
attempts result in the mediation of etic (authorial and artistic) experiences or a folk-
psychological formulaic experience disguised as emic experience, which 
perpetuates the stereotyping and othering of blind people. 
Does this mean that the pursuit of emic experience is futile, especially if a 
sighted filmmaker makes a film about a blind subject? According to MacDougall 
(2006, p. 16), represented experience cannot be a one-to-one rendition of the so-
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called ‘real’ experience because representations “create new experience in their 
own right”. However, the amalgamation of the experiences of characters, 
filmmakers and audience is the very premise on which mediation rests, and it does 
not disqualify the attempt to approximate emic experience. Indeed, a critically 
theorised approximation is essential to reducing otherness. In relation to blind 
people (and other stereotyped social groups), Chapter Four promotes a focus on the 
ordinary, everyday lives and the alterity (as distinguished from otherness) of the 
characters. This has the potential to lead to a reconfiguration of stereotypes. 
However, if it is to work as a foundation for such an outcome, this strategy requires 
a general set of methodological paradigms that theorise the practical mapping of 
emic experience on pre-filmic and post-filmic levels.  
It needs to be stressed, however, that an emic methodology does not imply 
an observational filmic approach with minimum intervention. On the contrary, this 
would be dogmatic as it pre-supposes the controversial assumption that subjects 
can ignore the presence of the filmmaker and the camera, and behave in the way 
they would if the camera was absent. Furthermore, it would exclude valuable non-
observational techniques (such as the interview, the voice-over or the use of 
archive material) to mediate emic experiences that would not otherwise be 
palpable. Also, an emic approach should not seek to hide the authorial presence of 
the filmmaker, neither pre-filmically nor post-filmically; if his or her presence has a 
mappable impact on the characters’ encounter with the filmmaker, that impact 
should not be denied.  
For example, several scenes in the film with Terry reveal my presence, 
overtly displaying how that presence alters Terry’s emic experience during the 
filmmaking process, and also make direct references to the editing process from 
Terry’s point of view. In both films, numerous scenes reveal my presence through 
Terry’s and June’s direct address to the camera or through certain reflexive 
aesthetics such as long static takes of the characters’ backs. Emic research and 
reflexive authorship are not mutually exclusive as long as that reflexivity is a by-
product of the character’s own experience, not a purely authorial choice (which 
would turn the emic approach into an etic one). MacDougall (1998, p. 89) refers to 
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this as ‘deep reflexivity’, which positions the author within rather than outside the 
film text.  
 
3.4.2 Mapping emic experience 
The shift from etic to emic and experiential approaches in anthropological research 
was only possible through the adoption of a phenomenological perspective. 
According to Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi (2008, p. 7), the main aim of 
phenomenology is to describe the first-person perspective of the agent of 
experience (the researched subject), not of the researcher. These authors further 
argue that experience need not be defined or described; rather, it should be 
mapped by exploring its structures (p. 9). This pragmatic approach is not concerned 
with philosophical theorisations about what experience actually means, but with 
identifying parameters that allow the filmmaker to observe and map emic 
experience. In this, it mirrors the film cognitivist approach to documentary, in which 
the term ‘documentary’ is not defined but mapped in terms of its perception (see 
Chapter Two).  
Gallagher and Zahavi (2008, p. 8) explain that experience is not only a purely 
subjective phenomenon, but also the lived experience of “a perceiver who is in the 
world, and who is also an embodied agent with motivations and purposes”. Thus, 
perceptual experience involves the interaction of spatial, temporal and bodily 
structures – the constituents of phenomenological inquiry. A range of 
anthropologists and sociologists who have adopted phenomenology have made a 
particular case for experience being linked to the physical external world. For 
example, Yi-fu Tuan (1977, p. 9) asserts that “experience is directed to the external 
world ... Seeing and thinking clearly reach out beyond the self.” He regards 
experience as chaotic, fleeting and elusive, and claim that we use spaces (as 
concrete artefacts) and our body (as words and actions) to provide it with duration 
and coherence (Tuan, 1980, p. 466). This is another form of mediation. According to 
Cubitt (2013b, p. 1), mediation takes place not only between human entities, but 
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between humans and their physical environments. Experience is thus captured in 
something empirically tangible; it becomes embodied.  
The relationship between body and physical space has been illuminated by 
James Gibson’s (1986) ‘affordance theory’. As the relation between an organism 
and the object or environment that affords it the opportunity to perform an action, 
affordance involves, simultaneously, the action-readiness of the subject and the 
physical qualities of the object or space in question (pp. 127–128). If perceptual 
experience is seen in this context, identifying affordances of the body in relation to 
space can be particularly enlightening, especially in relation to blindness. For 
instance, Tuan (1977, p. 12) explains that space is experienced through movement, 
which is “often directed toward, or repulsed by, objects and places”. Thus, action 
and perception are inextricably linked. Phenomenological philosopher Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty (1962, pp. 121, 167, 293–295) has called this connection ‘intentional 
threads’; the body is ‘anchored’ in space, it has a ‘grip’ on the physical environment 
and is ‘geared’ towards the objects it works with. As he puts it, “being is 
synonymous with being situated” (p. 294), and being situated means interacting 
with a physical environment (Dant, 2008, p. 19).  
This anchoring is informed in particular by accumulated corporeal 
knowledge about a particular situation and space. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, Nick 
Crossley (2001, p. 102) identifies these as corporeal schemas, which are the 
“fundamental coordination of the embodied agent with both self and world”, 
whereby a “corporeal schema is an incorporated bodily know-how and practical 
sense; a perspectival grasp upon the world from the ‘point of view’ of the body”. On 
a pre-filmic level, this suggests that the filmmaker needs to pay particular attention 
to the temporal interaction between the character’s body, space and objects.  
In addition, the concept of a ‘corporeal schema’ is very useful for mapping 
emic experience in an everyday context. The subject’s level of dexterity when 
interacting with physical spaces serves as a good benchmark by which the 
filmmaker can judge whether these are everyday actions, and how the presence of 
the filmmaker impacts them, such as the incident where Terry bumps into the 
camera during a cigarette break (see Chapter Six). All these considerations about 
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embodied experience facilitate the mapping, filming and, ultimately, the mediation 
of emic experience to the audience. As these considerations are based on first-hand 
experiences in relation to body and space, the pre-filmic methods in the practice 
chapters will constitute phenomenological models largely adopted from visual 
anthropology, sociology and cultural studies. These fields have had a long tradition 
of assimilating the complex concepts of classical phenomenologists, such as Husserl 
and Heidegger, and developing them into pragmatic models for empirical research. 
Finally, as this thesis is spectatorship-focused, the pre-filmic level will only 
be discussed and theorised to the extent necessary to map emic experience which 
can then be post-filmically mediated; issues of authorial creativity, introspection or 
intuition, or research strategies that are only tangentially related to spectatorship, 
will not be discussed. Naturally, all these issues are paramount components of the 
mediation process, but they fall outside the scope of the theoretical discourse of 
this thesis. 
 
3.5 Post-filmic mediation 
3.5.1 The naturalisation of emic experience 
The post-filmic level of mediation refers to the ‘encounter’ between audience and 
film text. It has two interrelated dimensions: the filmmaker’s activity when 
formalising the emic experience, mapped pre-filmically, and the audience’s activity 
when approximating a corresponding (although not equal) experience. The 
consensus among spectatorship scholars is that audiences are theorised as 
collectives, as aggregates of individuals (Reinhard, 2016). Thus, the interface 
between pre-filmic and post-filmic requires careful consideration since pre-filmic 
experience is not automatically mediated to the audience in the way it is enacted or 
intended by the filmmaker pre-filmically. Pre-filmic data is phenomenological (first-
person, subjective, corporeally situated) and needs to be ‘translated’ into post-
filmic data (third-person, collective, textually situated). The principles of this 
translation can be pinpointed by looking at how phenomenological data is captured 
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or described in natural science, a process that has been coined as ‘naturalising 
phenomenology’ (Petitot et al., 1999).     
Within the study of consciousness, Gallagher and Zahavi (2008, p. 30) 
describe Eduard Marbach’s approach to naturalisation as the embedding of 
empirical results of phenomenological observations into “formalized descriptions 
that bear intersubjectively shareable meanings”. This procedure aims to facilitate 
the interpretation and communicability of subjective, phenomenological data 
through the use of a common notation that expresses not the content of 
experience, but its formal structure, and essentially renders experience capable of 
being shared or mediated. With regards to film, this notation corresponds to the 
conceptualisation of film form through spectatorship models that account for a 
collective response to emic experience. Through reverse engineering, these models 
can ‘imply’ the audience through the design of the film form (Plantinga, 2009b, 
p. 250). This raises two pressing questions: who is this implied audience and what 
are the most suitable models for formalising (emic) experience? 
 
3.5.2 The implied audience 
As noted above, my target audience is a public one. However, at a post-filmic stage, 
that audience needs to be theorised through the type of experience they will have 
when viewing the film. The pre-filmic experience has been phenomenologically 
framed; that is, embodied in the interaction between bodies, spaces and objects. 
Thus, the post-filmic experience needs to ensure that this embodiment is mediated 
by embodying the audience itself in the film text, unlike, for example, films in the 
Soviet formalist tradition, which use montage techniques that elicit the audience’s 
construction of the film through inference and interpretation from an external 
position. In this sense, my aim is to post-filmically create a film text that generates 
an audience, rather than eliciting an audience reception. Post-filmic experience 
should involve the audience’s perception of screen bodies and physical spaces in a 
mutually embodied relationship. This assumes a pre-conscious and implicit 
formation of impressions about screen characters’ bodies. Nicole Markotić (2012, 
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p. 3) refers to this as a “somatic filmic truth”, which is not questioned or evaluated 
but experienced. 
 
  
Figure 7: Drinking for England (1998) – being drunk 
 
A good example of this is a scene in Brian Hill’s documentary, Drinking for 
England (1998), depicting two drunken women weaving along a street for a fairly 
long period of screen time (figure 7). The scene foregrounds experience over 
meaning, and does not need to be cognitively inferred or evaluated by the 
audience. Of course, the audience may create thematic associations related to 
British culture, class, gender, or their own drinking habits – or they may temporarily 
experience the moment without any interpretation. Whichever the case, it is first 
and foremost simply what it is: an embodied experience of being drunk. 
Films like Drinking for England are described by Nichols (2001) as 
performative 29
                                                             
29 It is not within the scope of this thesis to define the concepts of ‘performance’ or ‘performativity’, 
since they are marginal to the methodology of my film practice, and because there are various 
interpretations of these terms within documentary film studies. For example, while Nichols (2001, 
p. 131) refers to it as subjective and embodied knowledge, Bruzzi (2006, p. 154), in Judith Butler’s 
tradition, describes it as “utterances that simultaneously both describe and perform an action”. 
 documentaries. They generate audience experience through 
concrete and embodied knowledge rather than the transmission of generalised and 
abstract meanings (p. 131). This type of experience is purely subjective and departs 
from factual recounting. Furthermore, these films do not address the spectator 
“with commands or imperatives necessarily, but with a sense of emphatic 
engagement”, turning the viewer, rather than the historical world, into the primary 
referent (Nichols, 1994, p. 94) – the viewer is embodied in the film. Thus, Nichols 
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implies that the post-filmic representation of emic experience has the potential to 
background questions about meaning, ethics and indexicality. 
However, Nichols (2001, p. 131) is prudent to point out that these films may 
still prompt the audience to make meaning, but in an affective manner that results 
in polysemic readings, since the strong subjectivity of portrayed experience results 
in different meanings for different spectators and “underscores the complexity of 
our knowledge of the world”. As John Little (2007, p. 25) confirms, these films may 
“suggest, and not argue a message by drawing a conclusion from the viewer – not 
for the viewer”. This type of film relates to Eco’s (1979, p. 9) concept of the ‘open 
text’, in which the interpretive work is done by the reader, and the interplay of 
numerous possible interpretations takes place. Post-filmically, my films need to 
operate on this open and experiential level in order to mediate emic experience. 
This does not mean that I deny spectatorial readings, but since I aim to primarily 
mediate embodied experiences, the gauging of high-level audience interpretations 
(whether polysemic or not) would require a dedicated audience research study, 
which is impractical for documentary practice. 
 
3.5.3 The homogeneity of post-filmic experience 
All of the above hypotheses about post-filmic experience assume that embodied 
experience (through audio-visual perception) is fundamental to spectatorship, and 
it provides a largely homogenous low-level perceptual and cognitive response. High-
level cognitive processes, such as thematic interpretation, may or may not occur. 
The examination of these high-level processes, building on theories such as Eco’s 
(1979) open/closed text model, Hall’s (1980) dominant/negotiated/oppositional 
audience positions (1980) or David Morley’s (1980) polysemic reception study, may 
be of scholarly interest; however, for a documentary practice that aims to primarily 
evoke emic experience not transfer meaning (though meaning-making is not 
denied), it would be impractical and distracting to theorise the mediation of 
meaning or knowledge, since the argument holds that these are built upon 
embodied experience. 
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This bottom-up approach is supported by cognitive film scholars such as 
Bordwell (2006) and Grodal (2009), phenomenological film scholars such as 
Sobchack (1992) and Wahlberg (2008), and neuroscientists such as Hasson et al. 
(2008) and Gallese and Guerra (2012). The homogeneity in low-level spectatorship 
is, according to Plantinga (2009b, pp. 255–256), based on hard-wired evolutionary 
physical and psychological attributes that account for collective responses and 
transcend (to a large extent) historical and cultural boundaries. In terms of my 
methodology, this transcendence only refers to the post-filmic stage of 
spectatorship, not to the entire mediation process. After all, my mediation process 
is indeed informed by top-down socio-cultural factors in relation to disability 
stereotypes, which primes the mediated experience from the pre-filmic to the post-
filmic level. Overall, the mediation process I propose is not universalist, but takes 
into account both the bottom-up and top-down mechanisms of spectatorship 
(Bordwell, 1989a; Branigan, 1992; Persson, 2003; Brewer and Loschky, 2005), 
although, as discussed in Chapter Two, top-down considerations have been mostly 
neglected by cognitive film theorists (Plantinga, 2009b, p. 257).   
Interestingly, the socio-cultural framing of my cognitive framework will 
reveal a quasi-hard-wired aspect of audience attitude when it comes to blind 
people. The content analysis in the next chapter will reveal a rather homogenous 
and rigid array of narrative and aesthetic stereotypes. This is not only due to a 
homogeneity in the use of folk-psychological narrative formulas in documentary 
filmmaking, but also to the uniform representations of blindness in other fields, 
such as philosophy and fine art, which has resulted in the fossilisation of persistent 
hegemonic structures. Consequently, it may be assumed that if an audience 
watches my films, their stereotypical dispositions towards blindness may largely be 
homogenous in terms of expectations and reconfigurations. 
Another validation for assuming a post-filmically homogenous and 
experiential (rather than interpretative) audience response to my documentaries is 
Eitzen’s (1995, p. 96) argument that documentary is a mode of reception (see 
Chapter Two), where audiences do not ask questions per se about the 
‘truthfulness’, ‘authenticity’ or ‘partiality’ of the film text unless they have concrete 
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reasons to do so. If the audience is a public one, not connoisseurs or amateurs, 
these reasons can only lie in the film text,30
Eitzen’s case study for his theory is interesting insofar as it is not an 
observational or ‘open text’ documentary, but an expositional, historical 
documentary that uses predominantly archive material – Ken Burn’s The Civil War 
(1991). The final scene of the first episode quotes from a sentimental love letter 
from a soldier to his wife, written shortly before his death. The voice-over is 
accompanied by a melancholy tune and a visual montage of portraits of soldiers and 
their wives, highlighting their faces and their linked hands (figure 8), and is followed 
by shots of a canon against a crimson sky. This scene, Eitzen suggests, involves a 
strong experiential involvement that goes beyond questions of ‘truth claims’, 
‘hidden agendas’ and ‘argumentative persuasion’ (p. 87). Indexical questions – for 
example, whether the letter is actually from one of the soldiers in the pictures, or 
whether the canon has been planted in the field as a film prop – are secondary to 
the critical reflections on patriotism, secession and slavery. Eitzen’s claim of the 
experiential impact of this sequence is supported by audience responses, consisting 
of reviews, inquiries received by the broadcaster, news announcements and an 
audience research study (p. 100).  
 not in the deployment of previous or 
critical knowledge. 
 
 
 
                                                             
30 This is the case, for example, in Marcel Lozinski’s film Anything Can Happen (1995), where the 
cinematographic and aural attributes of the text may well prompt the viewer to ask questions about 
voyeuristic authorship. I would argue that viewers would not actually ask these questions, but simply 
assume that the filmmaker filmed the unknowing subjects from a covert vantage point. So, whether 
viewers reflexively ask indexical questions, or implicitly experience an act of skewed or unethical 
authenticity, documentary spectatorship is constituted by the reception of – to use semiotic 
terminology – the ‘signifier’, not the ‘sign’ as a whole, neither its intentional construction, nor the 
indexical ‘signified’. This shows that, at least in terms of spectatorship, a semiotic model and issues 
of indexicality would be largely irrelevant, since only the signifier (the film text) and the viewer’s 
perception of it matters.  
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Figure 8: The Civil War (1991) 
 
However, authorship and deep reflexivity can also provide an embodied 
experience. Consider the scene in Drinking for England (1998), where one of the 
characters suddenly switches from talking about his alcohol habits to singing about 
them (figure 9). This was Hill’s first documentary musical, and his technique of 
switching between interviews and musical numbers is likely to have provoked an 
unsettling reflexive jolt in the audience, challenging not only their documentary 
schemas, but also showcasing the filmmaker’s creative virtuosity. Since this style is 
consistent throughout the film, and given the naïve joviality of the moment when 
the interview transforms into the singing scene embodies the character’s attitude 
towards drinking and to life in general, the spectator is likely to experience this 
moment in a corresponding (if unusual) way, without questioning Hill’s intentions or 
the character’s mediocre singing abilities.  
 
Interview: talking Musical: singing 
  
Figure 9: Drinking for England (1998) – talking/singing 
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Lastly, the conceptualisation of my film texts will also use three strategies 
that foster homogenous experiential responses while minimising narrative 
comprehension and dispersing high-level interpretations. Firstly, folk-psychological 
narrative formulas and thematic symbolism will be actively avoided, since, as the 
next chapter argues, these are recipes for othering and stereotyping blind people. 
Secondly, the deployment of narrative gaps, openness and ambiguity will be given 
priority over totalised and schematic character expositions. Thirdly, the focus on 
fragmented, everyday events in Terry’s and June’s lives will reduce the impetus for 
larger developments and their comprehension, highlighting unique, momentary 
experiences. It will be argued that the everyday is iconic rather than symbolic. 
Fundamentally, it is what it is, just like the drunkenness scene in Drinking for 
England, which is portrayed as an ordinary, everyday occurrence in the characters’ 
lives.  
 
3.5.4 Spectatorship models for formalising emic experience 
The previous chapter has established the benefits of a cognitive approach. As it 
explores the mediation between filmmaker, screen character, film text and 
spectator, and hypothesises the audience as a collective by gauging spectator 
dispositions, this approach especially lends itself to the theorisation of post-filmic 
experience. However, the post-structuralist, apparatus-psychoanalytic, semiological 
Screen theory offers in principle an alternative spectatorship approach. Shaun 
Moores (1993, p. 13) observes that its aim is to reveal ideological “symbolic 
mechanisms through which cinematic texts confer subjectivity upon readers, sewing 
them into the film narrative through the production of subject positions”. In 
relation to my methodology, however, this objective carries two problems which 
tend to arise to different degrees in contemporary theories in the Screen tradition. 
Firstly, the film text is seen not as a mode of reception but as a commodity, 
appropriating the passive viewer via the only possible position in the text (p. 15). 
This fixed position is one of ideology, meaning and interpellation based on Lacan’s 
mirror model, and it denies the possibility of polysemic readings (p. 16). The 
interpellation of subject positions is seen as the foundation of spectatorship, a 
 
 
79 
template that moulds any type of filmic experience – an understanding that is very 
remote from my proposition that (embodied) experience is the foundation of 
spectatorship, and may also serve as the foundation of polysemic meaning-making.    
Secondly, spectatorship is seen to be hedonistically motivated by 
mechanisms originating in Freudian or Lacanian versions of the unconscious. 
Mechanisms such as voyeurism, fetishism, narcissism and psychosexual fantasies, 
most of which generate different types of desire, channel the spectator toward 
“repression or socially acceptable patterns of subjectivity” (Plantinga, 2009b, 
p. 253). Film cognitivists argue that this focus on the unconscious neglects the 
interaction between perceptual, emotive and cognitive processes, and claim that 
the rational/irrational dichotomy holds theoretical dangers, opting rather to analyse 
‘pre-conscious’ (for example, somatic perception) and ‘conscious’ (for example, 
cognitive hypothesising) responses. 
Although, as the previous chapter shows, cognitive film theory offers 
essential tools with which to explore pre-conscious and conscious audience 
responses, post-filmic methods need not be exclusively rooted in cognitive film 
studies. Neo-formalist and even folk-psychological assumptions can prove useful 
when conceptualising aesthetics, in particular; however, these will predominantly 
be ‘regimented’ by the insights provided by cognitive psychology. Although the 
actual methods will be deployed in the practice chapters, some preliminary 
considerations need to be made, since the conceptualisation of post-filmic 
experience needs to adhere to the parameters of emic experience, as identified on 
the pre-filmic level. 
 
3.5.5 Film form and emic experience 
Emic experience is pre-filmically manifested in the situated interaction between 
body and physical space, which needs to be post-filmically experienced through 
aesthetics. Siegfried Kracauer (1960, p. 198) proposes that aesthetic apprehension 
requires the experience of actual phenomena in the physical world. Film is capable 
of rendering visible what we could not see before, enabling us to grasp the flow of 
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corporeal life through its psycho-physical correspondences, but it must actually 
show what these portray (p. 300). Kracauer’s focus here is on physical space and 
situatedness, a concept that is similar to Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the body’s ‘spatial 
anchoring’, discussed earlier, which (in post-filmic terms) dictates a holistic, 
aesthetic apprehension of the body. This strategy not only reveals exterior, but also 
interior emic experience. As Persson (2003, p. 160) confirms, portrayals of the 
screen character’s external bodily phenomena (mimicry, gesture and noise, for 
example) are experienced by a spectator as bearing a causal relationship to internal 
bodily phenomena such as sensations, feelings and emotions. 
It may seem superfluous to mention post-filmic situatedness, since 
conventional, character-driven documentaries are empirical by nature, depicting 
characters performing concrete actions in concrete places. Nevertheless, as 
discussed in Chapter Four, there are several examples of films where the blind 
person’s body is omitted for the entirety of the film, or examples where the spatial 
anchoring of the body is missing because of the overuse of close-ups that atomise 
body parts. These aesthetic experimentations, it could be argued, contradict the 
notion of emic experience, resulting in the othering of blind people. Consequently, 
the post-filmic mediation of bodily situatedness is not a secondary point and will be 
analysed extensively in Chapter Five. As Kracauer (1960, p. 301) warns, the 
mediation of the physicality of bodies and objects is not inherent to film form, since 
avant-garde films or films influenced by theatre and fine art tend to an abstract 
portrayal by distorting or removing them from their natural context.  
Nevertheless, as demonstrated earlier with the examples of Burn’s and Hill’s 
documentaries, film form does not have to be observational or resort to wide shots 
and long takes alone to mediate embodied emic experience through situatedness. 
Several scenes in my films mediate emic experience through archive material, 
overlaid timelines, close-ups of objects and filmmaker-character interactions. 
Kracauer points out that the mediation of physical space in film does not 
presuppose present space, but can also include the past, the fantastical and even 
abstract ideas as long as the film form focuses on concrete things within concrete 
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moments (p. 303).31
Based on the above considerations, cognitive models deployed on a post-
filmic level need to address audience experience of what Kaitlin Brunick et al. (2013, 
p. 133) call the ‘low-level features’ of film, which comprise any “physical, 
quantitative aspect that occurs regardless of the narrative”. Using Kracauer’s terms, 
low-level features constitute the temporal flow of aesthetic film elements (for 
example, the shot’s composition, framing, colour, movement and temporal 
structure) in which the screen character’s emic experience and the audience’s 
experience are simultaneously anchored. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
spectatorship models predominantly analyse films in a top-down
 Thus, an approach to film form that focuses on situatedness 
also needs to manifest the temporality of situatedness by emphasising the 
particularity of the moment. Pepita Hesselberth (2014, pp. 94–96) terms this the 
event’s ‘presence’ – that is, presence, not in a metaphysical sense, but “being within 
reach”, tangible to the spectator and tied to on-screen actions (or action 
affordances) that emerge from the situatedness within a physical space. Chapter Six 
will explore narrative-related strategies that mediate the particularity of the 
moment. 
32
Finally, as cognitive studies on documentary are very limited (see Chapter 
Two), it is necessary to consider adopting fiction models instead, and this inevitably 
 manner, where 
narratives appear to subordinate and determine low-level elements, but Brunick et 
al. suggest that in some cases low-level elements may well be determinants of the 
narrative’s meaning. My thesis adopts this bottom-up approach, since one core 
post-filmic aim is to avoid folk-psychological narrative patterns, instead focusing on 
momentary, low-level experiences. As discussed later in the thesis, the sum of 
individually experienced scenes about everydayness in my two films determines the 
overall narrative experience in relation to everydayness, and that is why individual 
scenes and momentary experiences will be discussed in Chapter Five before 
exploring narrative structure and global experience in Chapter Six.  
                                                             
31 Kracauer’s ‘moment’ relates to large narratives; it does not denote an instance, but a short event 
like a film scene. This thesis adopts this interpretation of the term. 
32 ‘Top-down’ is here understood within the context of aesthetic perception, not social, cultural or 
historical contextualisation, which, as already established, is neglected in cognitive film studies. This 
thesis uses social cognition models to compensate. 
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raises the issue of the difference between documentary and fiction spectators. For 
example, Bondebjerg (1994, p. 14) explains that, unlike fiction, the documentary 
audience assumes there is a more direct and causal link between the film images 
and the pro-filmic event; they tend to make direct assumptions about the pro-filmic 
reality and its relation to the mediated version, as well as to the public and private 
reality of everyday life. Eitzen (1995, pp. 93–95) argues that under particular 
circumstances the documentary spectator, in contrast to the fiction spectator, may 
ask different ethical questions regarding the role of the author in relation to the 
pro-filmic event (as mediated), as well as to the actual filmic mediation of that 
event. 
The indexical, ethical and authorship-related questions Bondebjerg and 
Eitzen allude to are ‘high-level’ assumptions that, in relation to Eitzen’s earlier 
point, are triggered by the text and not by audience dispositions, especially with a 
public audience. Also, given that I employ strategies that encourage the post-filmic 
mediation of a largely homogenous embodied experience based on momentary, 
low-level responses, either the audience will not engage in indexical reflections 
concerning authorship, or these engagements will be a supplement to embodied 
experience. However, the scenes where authorship is latently or overtly reflexive 
will be analysed accordingly, taking my own embodied experience into account, but 
the decision as to whether this occurs or not will be made on a case-by-case basis. 
Furthermore, my use of MacDougall’s (1998, p. 89) concept of ‘deep reflexivity’ 
(described earlier) encourages the audience to primarily experience my authorial 
position as embodied in the work, “whatever the external explanations may be”. 
All in all, there is a large repository of cognitive fiction models available for 
my purposes, as long as – in a bricolage manner – the models are adapted to the 
particular indexical, ethical and authorship-related circumstances of the case at 
hand. With regards to ethnographic documentary, MacDougall (1998) highlights the 
value of fiction cinema techniques to produce “complex constructions of the social 
experience of individuals” (p. 67), and theorises the mediation of affective 
knowledge (or emic experience) using Deleuze’s (fiction) film image model (p. 82).   
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3.6 Ethics 
The relation between ethics and filmic mediation is summed up by Calvin Pryluck 
(2005, p. 195), when he writes that “ethical assumptions have aesthetic 
consequences, and aesthetic assumptions have ethical consequences”. As 
Emmanuel Levinas (1989, pp. 82–83) explains in more fundamental terms, when 
one individual confronts another face-to-face this has consequences, and the one is 
indebted to the other. This is especially the case if a sighted filmmaker (or 
spectator) encounters a blind character. In my case, as a sighted filmmaker filming 
with blind people, this involves two notions of otherness, and these have ethical 
implications. On the pre-filmic level, Levinas’ phenomenological concept of the 
other operates in my encounter with Terry and June: the strong disparities in ability 
(sighted/blind), age (middle-aged/elderly) and culture (Austrian/British) widen the 
gap between us. However, on the post-filmic level, I am attempting to undo the 
hegemonic concept of the other, as identified in the content analysis in Chapter 
Four. The fundamental ethical frame in which this project operates is the attempt to 
deconstruct hegemonic stereotypes of blind people. From this perspective, 
adhering to a critical theorisation of documentary practice is not simply an 
academic exercise, but an ethical venture. 
However, ethical choices cannot be settled a priori by formalised rules or 
possibly inappropriate assumptions (Pryluck, 2005, p. 195). For Derrida (2002, 
p. 231), it is ethically and politically irresponsible to base any decision (whether in 
filmmaking or film analysis) on previously set rules; if the theoretical analysis of a 
particular situation predetermines the decision, then it is not a decision but the 
mere application of previous knowledge based on a cause-and-effect relationship, 
like pressing a button to turn on a machine. An ethical decision in particular needs 
to be heterogeneous insofar as past knowledge is concerned, using socio-cultural 
norms and individual cognitive schemas in a bricolage manner adapted to the 
situation. As a consequence, ethical issues in this thesis will be discussed if they 
arise during the practice chapters; however, given its spectatorship-focused scope, 
the priority will be given to ethical discussions that have implications for 
spectatorship – that is, primarily on a post-filmic level.  
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It is interesting to note that the documentary practice textbooks mentioned 
in the previous chapter scarcely merit a mention in the discussion on ethics. When 
it comes to dealing with subjects like consent, they prescribe common industry 
practices that, although proven to be efficient working standards, are usually not 
questioned or contextualised in terms of representation. This could be seen as an 
attempt to follow Derrida’s logic, or it could simply be a conscious choice to avoid 
obscuring film practice by adding no more theory than absolutely necessary. It may 
well be both. As Rabiger (2004, p. 247) declares, “[a]ny discussion of ethics makes 
the responsibility of documentary sound very burdensome”.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
In short, the major weakness of theorising audience responses is the lack of actual 
verification. However, an audience research study would be impractical for 
documentary making. The only pragmatic way to critically theorise my practice is a 
theoretical hypothesis that considers the audience’s textual response in relation to 
their blindness-related dispositions – one that is built around postulating a largely 
homogenous and fundamental experiential response to the momentary occurrence 
of low-level filmic elements. This experiential response, which is embodied in the 
film text, does not preclude high-level responses such as interpretation (whether 
polysemic or not); rather, it serves as a foundation for them. However, since a 
theorisation of these high-level responses is problematic when it comes to 
conceptualising film practice, the entire practice component explores spectatorship 
on an experiential level, including the content analysis.   
The next chapter presents the content analysis and its evaluation, which 
directly feeds into the filming and editing practice detailed in the subsequent two 
chapters. Although the following chapter does not involve the activity of 
filmmaking, it should still be regarded as research practice, framing the actual 
documentary practice. It examines spectator dispositions towards disability, and 
lays out what needs to be mapped on the pre-filmic level and eventually mediated 
to the audience on the post-filmic level.  
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Chapter Four: The Framing of Documentary Practice 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Following the methodology in the previous chapter, this chapter uses content 
analysis to investigate spectators’ dispositions regarding blind characters in 
documentary film. This approach, when employed not just as a methodology but as 
an inherent part of the case study, reveals that blindness (and disability in general) 
is framed in a specific socio-cultural way, resulting in filmic stereotypes that in turn 
perpetuate a particular rendition of blind characters. The identification of these 
stereotypes serves as a foundation for the conception of strategies that attempt to 
reduce the sense of otherness. Whereas the previous chapter identified the 
mediation of emic experience as a means of reducing otherness in general, this 
chapter explores what exactly that emic experience should consist of when applied 
to the othering of blind people.  
In line with the funnel structure approach (see Chapter One), the content 
analysis and its implementation as part of my film practice occurred progressively, 
in synchrony with the actual production process. The urge to scrutinise other 
documentaries about blindness emerged during my initial encounters with Terry 
and June. Prompted by the discrepancy between my first-hand experience of the 
characters and my own dispositions as a filmmaker and spectator, fuelled by art, 
literature and media portrayals, I became increasingly aware of my own formulaic, 
textbook approach to their filmic portrayal – an awareness that was further 
deepened by consulting disability studies literature. In effect, my encounters with 
them triggered not only the content analysis, but also the critical analysis of 
documentary filmmaking textbooks which became the impetus for the entire 
methodology.  
First, the chapter presents the content analysis. This consists of a survey of 
films featuring blind characters and identifies common tropes in their narrative and 
aesthetic approaches that follow the formulas laid down in filmmaking textbooks. 
The survey results are framed by insights afforded by disability studies, which 
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confirm that these tropes establish othering stereotypes. Since this thesis is located 
in documentary practice, however, the literature is used primarily to provide 
supporting arguments that relate to the pragmatics of filmmaking and its critical 
framing; it is beyond the scope of this project to engage in a theoretical discourse 
on disability. 
Next, alternative representations of blind characters are suggested by linking 
emic experience to ordinary, everyday experience. This type of emic experience 
needs to be accompanied by an attempt to ‘particularise’ the blind characters in 
order to prevent the universal and totalising mediations, observed in the sample of 
films under investigation in this chapter, which homogenise the experience of blind 
people and thus enable the generation of schematic stereotypes. These insights will 
be used in the subsequent chapters to inform the construction of particular 
methods of pre-filmic and post-filmic mediation.  
 
4.2 Current media representations of blindness 
4.2.1 Sampling 
The films below (table 1) have been selected on the basis of the sampling criteria 
discussed in the previous chapter. They are exclusively audio-visual, time-based 
documentaries, reflecting the field of practice which is the locus of my work.33 34
 
 
Documentary Exhibition/Distribution (selection) 
Window of the Soul (2001) Directed by 
Walter Carvalho and João  Jardim. Brazil. 
Karlovy Vary International Film Festival (2002); Paris 
Brazilian Film Festival (2002); St. Petersburg Message 
to Man Film Festival (2002); Palm Springs 
International Film Festival (2003); Cannes Film 
Festival (2003). Theatrical release in Germany (2004) 
and France (2004) 
                                                             
33 For a comprehensive selection of fiction and non-fiction films portraying disability (including 
examples of blindness), see Beth A. Haller’s website https://mediadisability.wordpress.com/films-tv-
documentaries/.  
34 Although my 2004 documentary, A Touch of Colour, would be a likely candidate for the content 
analysis in terms of stereotypical media representations, I chose not to include it because the 
festivals where it was shown were mainly niche, disability film festivals, attracting the connoisseur or 
amateur rather than a public audience.  
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In the Dark (2004) Directed by Sergey 
Dvortsevoy. Russia. 
International Documentary Film Festival Amsterdam 
(2004); Cracow Film Festival (2004); Rencontres 
Internationales de Cinéma à Paris (2004); European 
Feature Documentary Film Festival – Belgrade 
(2005). Broadcast on Arte France 4, SVT and YLE 
Black Sun (2005) Directed by Gary Tarn. 
USA. 
Toronto International Film Festival (2005); 
Thessaloniki Documentary Festival (2006); 
Transilvania International Film Festival (2006); 
European Feature Documentary Film Festival – 
Belgrade (2007); Wisconsin Film Festival (2007)  
Blindsight (2006) Directed by Lucy Walker. 
UK. 
Toronto International Film Festival (2006); London 
Film Festival (2006); Berlin International Film Festival 
(2007); Thessaloniki Documentary Festival (2007); 
Trento Film Festival (2008); Palm Springs 
International Film Festival (2008); AFI Film Festival 
(2008). Theatrical release in the US (2008) 
Extraordinary People: The Boy who sees 
without Eyes (2007) Directed by Elliot 
McCaffrey. UK. 
Broadcast on Channel 5 
http://www.channel5.com/episode/extraordinary-
people-the-boy-who-sees-without-eyes 
Antoine (2008) Directed by Laura Bari. 
Canada. 
Rencontres Internationales du Documentaire de 
Montréal (2008); Thessaloniki Documentary Festival 
(2010); Reykjavik International Film Festival (2009); 
Vancouver International Film Festival (2009); 
Sheffield International Documentary Film Festival 
(2009); Tribecca Film Festival (2009); Salt Lake City 
Film Festival (2009); Göteborg International Film 
Festival (2010) 
Victory Over Darkness (2008) Directed by 
Donnie Eichar. USA. 
Heartland Film Festival (2008) 
Going Blind (2010) Directed by Joseph 
Lovett. USA. 
Limited theatrical release in the US (2010);   
broadcast on Finnish TV; broadcast on WNYEDT and 
WGVU 
Planet of Snail (2012) Directed by Seung-
Jun Yi. South Korea. 
International Documentary Film Festival Amsterdam 
(2011); Thessaloniki Documentary Festival (2012); 
Tribeca Film Festival (2012); Documenta Madrid 
(2012); Docville (2012); Silverdocs Film Festival 
(2012). Broadcast in Finland and Sweden 
High Ground (2012) Directed by Mike 
Brown. USA. 
Seattle International Film Festival (2012), Newport 
Beach International Film Festival (2012); limited 
theatrical release in the US (2012), on-demand on 
Netflix 
‘Damien’ (2013) The Undateables, Season 
2, episode 3. Directed by Chris 
McLaughlin and Kathryn Tregidgo. UK. 
Broadcast on Channel 4 
http://www.channel4.com/programmes/the-
undateables/videos/all/s2-ep3-damian 
Notes on Blindness (2016) Directed by 
Peter Middleton and James Spinney. UK. 
San Francisco International Film Festival (2016); 
Sheffield International Documentary Film Festival 
(2016); Tribeca Film Festival (2016); Sydney 
International Film Festival (2016); Sundance Film 
Festival (2016). Broadcast on BBC 4 and Arte 
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(2016/7) 
Across Still Water (2015) Directed by Ruth 
Grimberg. UK. 
BFI London Film Festival (2014); Aesthetica Short 
Film Festival (2015); Big Sky Documentary Film 
Festival (2016); London Short Film Festival (2015); 
DocuWest International Film Festival (2015) 
 ‘See the Need’ (2015) RNIB campaign. 
UK.35 
http://www.rnib.org.uk/see 
Twitter (#seetheneed) 
Table 1: Documentaries featuring blindness 
 
The evaluation of the films can be divided across the two categories of 
stereotype that Dyer (2006) identifies for film texts: ‘structural’ (or ‘narrative’) 
stereotypes include the material and ideological organisation of the world depicted, 
as well as the actual plot (p. 358); ‘iconographic’ (or ‘aesthetic’) stereotypes relate 
to visual and aural signs present in the cinematography, sound and editing (p. 
357).36
 
 The following textual analysis highlights these films’ use of narrative and 
aesthetic folk-psychology formulas, which aim to engage the audience with the 
characters by means of empathy, emotion, dramatic narrative arcs and aesthetic 
stimulation. As discussed in Chapter Two, filmmakers’ use of folk-psychological 
filmic treatments resonates with human perception and cognition in real life, and is 
therefore an efficient tool for gauging spectatorship. However, its predominantly 
non-critical use, perpetuating easily recognisable role and event schemas (a key 
recipe for succeeding with a public audience), disregards aspects of social cognition 
and representation that can lead to the stereotyping and othering of particular 
communities. Thus, an analysis of folk-psychological narrative and aesthetic 
strategies, in conjunction with insights from disability studies, should give a good 
overview of spectatorship dispositions in relation to films depicting blindness.  
                                                             
35 These short RNIB films, whose primary aim is to raise awareness and funds for the campaign, are 
considered documentary promos. Hence, they do not strictly conform to my own documentary 
practice. However, as they are deliberately targeted at a wide audience, they are used here as a case 
study in the attempt to identify common stereotypes of blindness in non-fiction audio-visual media. 
36 Arguably, there is a third category of stereotypes, namely the programming and labelling of films. 
This category would explore the ‘ghettoisation’ of films about blindness into disability or pathology-
related strands or festivals, and their signposting through paratexts, such as main titles, trailers and 
synopses, revealing the cognitive categorisation mechanism Macrae and Bodenhausen (2001) 
describe (see Chapter Three). Unfortunately, this category would fall outside the scope of this thesis, 
and would be marginal to the actual conceptualisation of the films.  
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4.2.2 Evaluation of narrative stereotypes 
Blindness and the journey of the ‘supercrip’ 
All of the above films aim to engage the viewer with the emotional world of their 
blind characters (in the folk-psychological manner promulgated in filmmaking 
textbooks); they prompt the audience to understand the characters’ motivations, 
empathise with them, and feel as if they themselves are undertaking the narrative 
journey, in which blindness is the cohesive narrative force that drives the plot. The 
most popular folk-psychological narrative journey is the ‘supercrip’ journey found in 
Blindsight (2006), High Ground (2012) and Victory over Darkness (2008). The ‘super 
cripple’ (or ‘supercrip’), as Colin Barnes (1992, p. 12) explains, is a stereotype that 
assigns super-human, almost magical abilities to disabled people, in order to elicit 
respect from the abled-bodied.  
Blindsight tells the story of six blind Tibetan teenagers attempting to climb a 
mountain in the Himalayas. At the beginning, the film establishes that many 
Tibetans consider blindness a curse, and this immediately sets up the characters’ 
primary narrative goal of overcoming social stigmatisation in their community. The 
seemingly impossible, physical journey represents a parallel, spiritual process of 
transformation, at the end of which the characters feel themselves validated as 
members of society. A very similar storyline occurs in High Ground, where eleven 
war veterans with different mental and physical injuries – one was blinded by a 
bomb – also climb a mountain in the Himalayas. The blind character, Steve Baskis, 
grows increasingly more confident throughout the journey, especially when moving 
through rough terrain. Meanwhile, in Victory over Darkness, the heroic struggle to 
overcome physical impairment and gain social acceptance is performed by five blind 
athletes competing in the ironman triathlon.     
All three plots place the blind characters in specific schematic roles, 
resembling characters in fiction films who have to overcome trauma, exclusion or 
bitterness by undergoing a significant physical or mental transformation (Pointon, 
1997, p. 87). At the narrative’s beginning, the characters are presented through a 
role schema pertaining to either one or a combination of six disability stereotypes 
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often deployed by media: the ‘pitiable and pathetic’, the ‘better-dead’, the ‘bitter 
and self-pitying’, the ‘burden’ and the ‘unable to live a successful life’ (see Barnes, 
1992; Nelson, 1994). Adhering to folk-psychological storytelling formulas, the 
negative role schema progressively and cathartically changes during the journey 
into its positive, binary opposite, the ‘supercrip’ stereotype, and the journey ends 
on an uplifting, inspirational note.   
Blindness and the tragic journey  
Pointon (1997, p. 88) identifies a narrative arc focusing on the tragic progress of 
blindness in the characters, as in Notes on Blindness (2016), Going Blind (2010) and 
Across Still Water (2015). In these films, recently blinded or partially sighted 
characters attempt to come to terms with the inevitable progression towards a 
total loss of vision.  
Notes on Blindness begins with the establishment of loss in general. In the 
first act, the main character, John Hull, describes through a voice-over the physical 
effect of his loss of vision (represented by a myriad of semi-dark and out-of-focus 
shots), especially in relation to no longer being able to see his wife and children yet 
retaining a visual memory of their physical appearance. In the second act, his wife 
explains how his loss of sight impairs their relationship, since his lack of the ability 
to ‘see’ and her lack of the ability ‘to-be-seen’ have a negative impact on their 
affective interpersonal experience. The second act continues with John describing 
his emotional decline, losing himself in “loneliness and nothingness”, and “a sense 
of impending doom”. John’s emotional state is carefully plotted so that it 
progressively gets worse until it reaches its lowest point, where he accepts that 
“there is no escape”. This is the climax of the second act. In the third act, John starts 
to appreciate and rely on his other senses (especially hearing), and begins to come 
to terms with his blindness.    
Similarly, in the first act of Across Still Water, we meet the main character, 
John Chapman, who is losing his vision, as he takes a night-fishing trip, where he 
describes how his visual perception is slowly fading and how much he will miss 
being able to drive. The second act shows his interactions first with his mother and 
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then with a blind friend, who both try to convince him to get a cane and a guide dog 
to help him to maintain his independence and avoid car accidents. In act three, John 
is night-fishing once again; he explains that he has decided to begin training to use 
the cane and is planning to get a guide dog. The film finishes on an optimistic note, 
as John also indicates that he will continue fishing. After landing a large carp, he 
gazes into the darkness and listens to the distant call of a bird, suggesting that his 
aural sense will compensate for his loss of vision.    
Going Blind equally establishes a first act in which the main character (who 
also made the film), Joseph Lovett, expresses his fear of blindness, which in his case 
is caused by glaucoma. Loss of vision is underlined by loss of physical activity, such 
as the ability to ride a bike. During the second act, Joseph meets a variety of visually 
impaired people and explores how they cope with being blind. The third act 
concludes with all the characters looking optimistically into the future and 
describing how they have overcome the obstacles they faced due to their loss of 
vision. This positive development is mirrored by Joseph’s attitude towards the 
future. 
In terms of stereotypical role schemas, the tragic journey documentary 
establishes two sets of binary opposites. At the beginning, the blind character who 
is losing his/her sight is portrayed as either ‘bitter and self-pitying’, a ‘burden’ or 
‘unable to live a successful life’, but these schemas are juxtaposed with the 
character’s formerly ‘normal’, abled self in order to emphasise the tragedy of their 
loss. At the end, the character has converted his/her fear of or bitterness about 
becoming blind into optimism about living a new and different life – once again, the 
plot concludes on a positive, inspirational note. It is the archetypical death and 
rebirth/renewal theme found in numerous Western literary works (see, for 
example, Bloom and Hobby, 2009).  
Spectatorship and narrative 
Narrative arcs, such as the ‘supercrip’ and the ‘tragic journey’, are consciously 
constructed by filmmakers to engage their audience. By carefully selecting what 
events to film, how to film them and in what order to edit them together, 
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filmmakers follow an array of specific narrative rules laid down by folk psychology. 
In Documentary Storytelling, Bernard (2007) declares:  
Telling a story for emotional impact means that the filmmaker is 
structuring the story so that the moments of conflict, climax, and 
resolution – moments of achievement, loss, reversal, etc. – adhere 
as well as possible to the internal rhythms of storytelling. 
Audiences expect that the tension in a story will escalate as the 
story moves toward its conclusion; scenes tend to get shorter, 
action tighter, the stakes higher. (Bernard, 2007, p. 28) 
Like Bernard, de Jong et al. (2012) and Rabiger (2004) propose that a 
documentary narrative should in general follow a three-act plot structure,37
 
 based 
on Aristotle’s Poetics, which establishes a character-led journey from the 
establishment of the problem to be overcome, through a process of surmounting a 
series of obstacles that become increasingly severe, to the climax or confrontation 
that resolves the problem in a way that is emotionally satisfying for the audience. 
The need to portray the progressive build-up of obstacles in order to create 
dramatic tension even appears to justify a certain amount of flexibility when it 
comes to the authenticity of the timing of real-life events. As Bernard (2007, p. 76) 
asserts, the chronology of the plot does not have to adhere to the chronology of the 
real-life story as long as the “important facts of the main underlying chronology” 
remain unchanged. The tension between the character’s aims and his/her ability to 
overcome all the obstacles in their path is seen as a prerequisite if the audience is to 
identify with characters (de Jong et al., 2012, p. 124). This folk-psychological 
approach to narrative structuring ensures that the audience feels they have access 
to the characters’ minds, understanding their thoughts and motivations, 
experiencing corresponding emotions, and empathising with their screen personas. 
 
                                                             
37 Without any scientific basis, Rabiger (2004, p. 80) even suggests that the classic three-act division 
is naturally inherent to every aspect of life, since according to him, human life consists of cycles that 
break down into problem, intensification of complications, climax and resolution. 
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Uplifting treatment 
What is interesting in the ‘supercrip’ and ‘tragic journey’ documentary is the 
combination of two types of journeys: a physical and a spiritual. This is a common 
folk-psychological strategy for character-driven documentaries, as the spiritual 
journey highlights the human motivation that carries the plot forward until 
psychological growth is achieved. However, the spiritual journey is also used to add 
a more uplifting tone to the film and, to a certain extent, compensate for the 
‘misfortune’ of being blind (Pointon, 1997, p. 88). All the films surveyed here exhibit 
a spiritual journey that concludes on a positive note. 
For Charles Riley, the construction of an overall uplifting and positive plot is 
clearly a filmmaking decision based on spectatorship:  
[Content producers] package disability in such a way as to safely 
ensure that the audience feels nobly uplifted, even ethically 
superior, for ‘supporting’ what is in effect a blatantly 
oversweetened version of life with disability as concocted by a 
community that cannot countenance physical imperfection except 
in certain sanctioned and saccharine forms. (Riley, 2005, p. 71)   
This saccharine form is most palpable in Antoine, a documentary about a five-year-
old blind boy. The narrative consists of a blending of Antoine’s real life with the 
imaginary story he creates, in which he plays a private detective trying to solve the 
case of a missing person. The playful plot is injected with poetic imagery of his 
sensory experiences and humorous episodes, and has elicited a plethora of positive 
reviews and comments, such as “[the film is] an inspiration to children and adults 
alike, Antoine’s real and imaginary lives are cleverly intertwined in this debut film, 
creating an homage to human resilience, optimism, and creativity”.38
                                                             
38 This was a review by TriBeCa festival programmer Sara Nodjoumi: 
 The folk-
psychological paradigm demands, of course, that the case Antoine is investigating is 
successfully resolved and he finds the missing person; narrative closure is essential 
for over-sweetened narrative packaging, since open or ambiguous endings may 
https://tribecafilm.com/filmguide/archive/512cee2e1c7d76e046001377-antoine (Accessed: 
15/04/2015)  
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dissipate emotional or ethical elevation. Thus, all the above films establish clear 
initial goals that anticipate a concrete resolution. As documentary filmmaker Jessica 
Yu (cited in Riley, 2005, p. 90) comments, “people want closure ... the hero with a 
disability has to either get better or die. The idea of living with a disability is 
unacceptable.”  
The uplifting narrative is especially used in reality TV documentaries on 
disability, such as the episode featuring Damien, a partially sighted character, in the 
Channel 4 series, The Undateables (2012- ). The general format of the series is 
uplifting and comedic, as demonstrated by its logo (figure 10) and the numerous 
references to the quirkiness of the disabled characters. Damien’s tragic journey of 
searching for a suitable partner is compensated by plenty of upbeat elements, such 
as his humorous interactions with his mother, the jaunty music and his apparently 
constant good mood. By the end of the programme he has a date, which goes well, 
although it remains open whether the pair is going to meet again. Still, in his closing 
interview, Damien expresses his optimism about the future. So, although the 
physical goal has not exactly been reached, the spiritual goal of gaining self-
confidence has, and this closure is presented as almost more satisfying than finding 
an actual partner. 
 
    
Figure 10: The logo of the Channel 4 series, The Undateables (2012- )  
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Fear 
Fear, a universal human emotion, plays an essential role in narratives about blind 
people. The ‘supercrip’ journey presents fear as one of the obstacles to achieving a 
physical and spiritual goal. Equally, the narrative of the tragic journey capitalises 
heavily on fear, as the main driver of the plot relates not to overcoming blindness, 
but to overcoming fear. According to Plantinga (2009a, p. 81), film narratives induce 
fear through paradigm scenarios in which the character’s well-being and safety are 
threatened. These films strategically construct the feeling of fear in relation to the 
loss or forfeit of something, which is portrayed as jeopardising or, at the very least, 
compromising well-being. For the blind person, driving a car, riding a bike, walking 
along the pavement, cooking, maintaining emotional bonds with family members or 
finding a partner (as in The Undateables) are not only discussed but visualised in 
this sense. For instance, Going Blind shows Joseph riding a bike and almost colliding 
with a car, and Across Still Water shows John crossing a road with heavy traffic after 
his mother has voiced concerns that he is taking risks by not using a guide dog. 
Rendering common, everyday actions as life-threatening scenarios evokes a proxy 
fear in the audience – a fear of forfeiting basic skills and the ability to master simple, 
quotidian situations.   
Interestingly, while the plot endings of tragic journeys suggest that the 
screen character has overcome any fears, they do not attempt to dissipate the 
audience’s physical and social fear of blindness, which is presented as real and 
imminent, not as something that may be partly unsubstantiated or even socially 
constructed. Thus, the fear that is projected from the screen characters onto the 
audience prevails beyond the film’s ending. Given that the fear of sight loss is a 
basic human instinct, it serves as a good marker of emotion in all films in this 
survey, and is the most common trope in films about blindness.   
A prime example of the fear factor is the Royal National Institute for the 
Blind’s (RNIB) (2015) recent ‘See the Need’ awareness-raising campaign (figure 11). 
Aimed at addressing the lack of trained sight-loss advisers in the UK, the campaign 
comprises four short promotional documentaries featuring a sighted media 
celebrity (Shirley Bassey, Barbara Windsor, Ross Kemp and Neil Morrissey) 
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expressing how devastated they would feel if they were blind. Although well-
intentioned, the films take the folk-psychological shortcut of establishing a 
conventional fear and pity-laden narrative, with the apparent goal of preventing (or 
alleviating) blindness at all costs. The entire campaign (which does not feature even 
one blind person) results in a negative and simplistic portrayal of blind people, 
reducing their experience to one of pure deficit, and perpetuating the supremacy of 
seeing (Bolt, 2015). Images of disabled people as pitiful, helpless, disabled and 
dependant on ongoing care have been repeatedly used in advertising campaigns to 
attract public support and donations (Rimmerman, 2013, p. 61). 
 
 
Figure 11: RNIB ‘See the Need’ campaign (2015) 
 
Of course, due to our ocular-centric society and the fact that (totally) blind 
people still constitute a minority of the population, it could be argued that a sighted 
audience experiences fear by default when encountering a blind person on screen 
or in real life. However, the problem is that filmmakers capitalise on this fear by 
reinforcing it through narrative and aesthetic means – for example, by focusing the 
narrative predominantly on the condition of being blind, instead of on other, 
unrelated aspects in the blind person’s life.    
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Focus on the condition of blindness 
The titles of the films under scrutiny here immediately reveal their focus. Four titles 
include the word ‘blind’ and six use related metaphors about eyes, perception and 
darkness (for example, Planet of Snail – snails are blind). The title is the first 
encounter an audience has with the film text, whether in paratexts, such as trailers, 
brochures or event programmes, or at the start of a film. The titles of the above 
films potentially precondition viewers to perceive the screen characters solely 
through their blindness rather than other individual personal attributes, and this is 
further reinforced by taglines and film synopses, such as the Heartland film festival 
synopsis of Victory Over Darkness, which it describes as “the triumph of three blind 
individuals who defy both circumstance and boundaries society has imposed on the 
visually impaired”.39
In the same vein, the narratives tend to focus on the characters’ disability, 
omitting other major aspects of their lives. For instance, Notes on Blindness makes 
no reference to John Hull’s distinguished academic career and his books on religious 
education. Going Blind hardly discusses Joseph Lovett’s career as a filmmaker, 
especially the way the filmmaking process has helped him overcome his fear of 
blindness. Across Still Water does dwell on John Chapman’s favourite hobby, night 
fishing, but this directorial choice is most likely related to the pitch-black darkness 
enshrouding the fishing scenes, which serves as a clear metaphor for his 
progression towards blindness. John is prompted to talk in a voice-over about his 
fear of losing his sight. The strong focus on this nocturnal activity severely limits the 
portrayal of John as interacting with other people in different spaces, resulting in 
the audience perceiving him simply as a fisherman who is going blind.  
 It can be assumed that this marketing strategy aims to attract 
an audience by promising they will experience not only a dramatic story, but also 
one that stimulates primordial fears by exhibiting a binary deviation from their most 
precious sensory organ. This is reflected by film titles such as The Boy Who Sees 
Without Eyes, Blindsight and Black Sun.  
                                                             
39 This synopsis can be found on the Heartland Film website: 
http://heartlandfilm.org/movies/victory-over-darkness/ (Accessed: 15/03/2015) 
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The majority of films do not portray the diversity, complexity and ambiguity 
of the individual character traits of the blind person (Schillmeier, 2006; Badia 
Corbella and Sánchez-Guijo Acevedo, 2010), but conveniently stick to blindness for 
the story. Disabled film characters are one-dimensional and function only through 
their impairment; the use of disability as character traits, plot device or atmosphere 
is a lazy shortcut for writers and filmmakers to draw audiences into the story 
(Shakespeare, 1999). Blindness becomes, according to David Mitchell and Sharon 
Snyder (2000, p. 59) a “surface manifestation of internal symptomology” that 
stands for the equally abnormal subjectivity of the individual which serves as the 
driver for folk-psychological, extraordinary plot trajectories. 
 
4.2.3 Evaluation of aesthetic stereotypes 
Blindness as spectacle 
Not all films focus on plot journeys, however. Window of the Soul and Black Sun 
highlight the actual aesthetic perception of blindness. Although they feature blind 
central characters, the episodic structure of both films revolves around the 
phenomenal qualities of visual perception in people with blindness. Window of the 
Soul is an anthology of interviews with nineteen people suffering from different 
kinds and degrees of visual impairment, who comment on their experience of 
perceiving and being perceived. While the film acknowledges a wide range of 
individual character complexities and nuances, all the characters ultimately refer to 
visual perception. Similarly, Black Sun is constructed episodically around the moving 
story of Hugues de Montalembert, a blind artist and filmmaker, who uses expressive 
imagery and poetic narration to reflect on his life without vision and on perception 
in general. These documentaries offer the audience a scopophilic opportunity to 
gaze in wonder and fascination on the gazing process itself. It is a type of 
‘showcasing’, which objectifies blind people as deviant, albeit aesthetic beings, and 
as metaphors for visual perception itself. Blindness has indeed become a metaphor 
for deviance and deficiency in Western art and literature (Barasch, 2001; 
Schillmeier, 2006), and blind people have been metonymised through the 
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fabrication of a wealth of philosophical and poetic meanings around visual 
impairment that recreate them “as figures of speech, the component of a joke or a 
poem” (Rodas, 2009, p. 117). 
This transformation of blindness into an aesthetic spectacle is present in 
most of the films in the survey, even those whose narrative themes are not about 
perception per se. The most significant trope is the folk-psychological attempt to 
approximate the audience’s experience to the emotions and perceptions of the 
characters by visualising the way blind people ‘see’ the world through the use of 
abstract, poetic and sensory imagery, often in the pretence that a scene is filmed 
from a subjective point of view, with shots that appear (spatially) as if filmed 
through the characters’ eyes (figures 12-17). This aesthetically stimulating imagery 
is achieved through distortion, colourisation, soft focus, the use of extreme close-
ups of body parts that atomises aural, tactile and olfactory senses, and the 
chiaroscuro interplay of light and dark – the darkness usually subsumes most of the 
frame. This imagery occurs as recurrent motifs throughout the plots and is by no 
means incidental or accidental. It is usually further underlined by heightened 
sounds that evoke the intensified sensory perception of material surfaces or 
sound40 (for example, in Planet of Snail and Antoine), or distorted sounds or atonal 
music that create an aural metaphor whose degree of abstraction corresponds to 
that of the image (for example, in Notes on Blindness and Black Sun). As a result, the 
characters’ ‘visual’ and non-visual senses are represented as having hyper-real or 
transcendental attributes.41
  
 
                                                             
40 See Chion’s (1994, p. 114) ‘materialising sound indices’. 
41 Experimental films about blindness are especially resourceful in conceiving hyper-real and surreal 
aesthetic treatments. See, for example, Planet of the Blind 
(http://www.cultureunplugged.com/documentary/watch-online/filmedia/play/3306/Planet-of-the-
Blind) and A Shift in Perception (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wzIh2Ky61mQ).  
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Figure 12: Notes on Blindness (2016) 
 
  
Figure 13: Extraordinary people: The Boy Who Sees Without Eyes (2007) 
 
  
  
Figure 14: Window of the Soul (2001) 
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Figure 15: Planet of Snail (2012) 
 
   
   
Figure 16: Antoine (2008) 
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Figure 17: Black Sun (2005) 
Blindness and perception 
Neuroscientific evidence indeed suggests that in the absence of vision, other senses 
work as functional substitutes and are often improved (so-called ‘sensory 
compensation’), meaning that blind people do possess greater acuity in non-visual 
senses than sighted people (Cattaneo and Vecchi, 2011). Furthermore, blind people 
are capable of forming visual imagery that may vary in their degree of clarity and 
abstraction. Nevertheless, the attempt to visualise blind people’s perception in 
documentary film fetishises their bodies and mystifies their perceptions.42
                                                             
42 In post-colonial discourse Homi Bhabha (1983) elaborates on the bodily fetishisation of the other 
as a colonial fantasy of objectification. Although Bhabha’s use of psychoanalytic ideas based on 
Freud and Lacan are parochial and abstract, there are still interesting parallels with othering 
blindness, especially in relation to how colonial identity responds to its cultural, ethnic and bodily 
contrast to the other’s identity, which is simultaneously perceived as ‘difference’ and ‘absence’: 
 This is 
because, firstly, these aesthetic renderings are based on authorial experimentation 
 
[T]he fetish represents the simultaneous play between metaphor as 
substitution (masking absence and difference) and metonymy (which 
contiguously registers the perceived lack). The fetish or stereotype gives access 
to an 'identity' which is predicated as much on mastery and pleasure as it is on 
anxiety and defence, for it is a form of multiple and contradictory belief in its 
recognition of difference and disavowal of it. This conflict of 
pleasure/unpleasure, mastery/defence, knowledge/disavowal, 
absence/presence, has a fundamental significance for colonial discourse. (1983, 
p. 27)   
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rather than scientific data, and secondly, they are diametrically opposed to the way 
a sighted audience experiences their physical world.  
Beate Ochsner and Robert Stock (2013, pp. 3–4) point out that the attempt 
to translate the sensory perception of the disabled body into audio-visual filmic 
terms leads inevitably to portraying blindness as a “different mode of perception 
that is simply marked deviant and not recognized as part of the complex practices 
of seeing”. This kind of imagery exoticises and objectifies blind people, and this 
results in the loss of the screen character’s individual identity and subjective 
experience (Ayisi and Brylla, 2013), turning him/her into a curiosity for the audience 
to look at rather than experience with. Consequently, such filmic attempts to 
visualise blind people’s subjective perception are prone to backfire and end up 
othering them even further.  
Abstracting space 
This aesthetic othering is also elicited by films attempting to heighten the sensory 
experience through non-visual senses by fragmenting the body and its surrounding 
space. For instance, the abundant use of close-ups in Notes on Blindness 
deconstructs and abstracts space. In direct contrast to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of 
‘intentional threads’ (see Chapter Three), the body is unanchored from its space 
and subjective experience is robbed of its situatedness. Consequently, if actions are 
depicted only in close shots without establishing shots, as happens in the above 
films, these actions become disembodied and fetishised, and the audience 
experiences them as pure aesthetics rather than the subjective experience of a 
human agent.   
Spatial anchoring can also be lost if the body on screen is completely 
omitted, as is the case in Black Sun, where we never see the body or face of the 
character but only hear his voice over subjective point-of-view shots. This 
disembodiment also occurs in Notes on Blindness for a large part of the film, and 
like in Black Sun, hearing the real character’s voice without seeing his body 
emphasises the somatic absence; in addition, when the character appears, it is an 
actor, not the actual John Hull. The omission of face and body counteracts the 
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audience’s engagement with the characters in general (Smith, 1994). Due to this 
omission, there is no chance of a material and corporeal encounter between 
spectator and character. The spectator never experiences the ethical implications of 
responsibility for the phenomenological other – as in Levinas’ ethics of the personal 
encounter (see Chapter Three)  – or is prompted to interrogate, for example, 
authorial (or spectatorial) voyeurism, spectacularisation or stereotyping. This 
reduction of self-reflexivity on the part of the audience is also informed by the 
stylised authorship, which by means of artistic virtuosity demonstrates an 
admiration of its own elegance rather than the aim of portraying emic experience. 
The resulting etic experience creates a safety buffer between spectator and 
disabled character – a cushion that absorbs uncomfortable ethical questions on the 
spectator’s and the filmmaker’s part. What the spectator experiences is not a 
mediation of the blind character’s perceptions, but a mediation of what the author 
imagines blind perception to be.  
Darkness 
Another aesthetic trope is darkness, as seen in the images above (figures 12-17) and 
indicated by several of the film titles (Black Sun, In the Dark and Victory over 
Darkness). Blindness is often metonymised through darkness (Rodas, 2009, p. 127), 
and the notion of darkness capitalises on the audience’s primordial fear of loss of 
sight, which is linked to loss of knowledge. This fear can be traced back to 
Enlightenment thought: Michael Schillmeier (2006) observes that Locke’s empiricist 
theories, according to which human knowledge and visual perception are linked, 
and his related references to Plato’s cave, have contributed to the consolidation of 
an ocular-centric paradigm in Western society that has prevailed to this day. 
According to this paradigm, lack of vision indicates a deficiency in perception, with 
the shift from light to dark signifying a descent into a state of epistemological 
ignorance (p. 472). 
Consequently, darkness (or rather the absence of light) has become a 
cognitive metaphor for particular sensations, emotions and meanings, including 
ignorance, insecurity, uncertainty, mystery, evil and fear. Cognitive metaphors are 
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embodied image schemas that render abstract concepts as empirically perceivable 
and shareable data, such as images and sounds (Fahlenbrach, 2008, p. 88). In film 
narratives foregrounding blindness, the audience is conditioned to understand the 
metaphor of darkness on an emotional and semantic level. Another significant 
feature of darkness is its de-spatialisation through a lack of depth cues; the 
temporal dimension of the image is stripped of any visual and spatial events and it 
becomes ‘empty’ time, reminiscent of time spent in incarceration. It is an extreme 
form of disembodiment, with a total loss of Merleau-Ponty’s spatial anchoring. 
Of course, it could be argued that the aesthetic function of the darkness 
motif (or any other distortion of the naturalistic image) is to ideologically attack the 
very notion of ocular-centrism. Hence, this type of film form serves as a ‘counter 
metaphor’ that cripples the spectator’s visual sense and triggers other, non-visual 
senses. I do not share this interpretation, however. It is doubtful that a public 
audience would interpret this counter-ideology as such, especially if it is 
simultaneously immersed in folk-psychological narratives that focus on character 
and emotions. On an affective level, the expressive visual imagery shown in the 
pictures above may be seen to be scopophilic at best, voyeuristic at worst, and 
therefore adhering to ocular-centric practice. Above all, even if a subversion of 
ocular-centrism could be justified through some theoretical acrobatics, it would be 
a purely authorial strategy that forwards etic and backgrounds emic experience.  
 
4.2.4 Interpretation of the content analysis 
Visibility 
The current media landscape suggests that the representation of blindness (and 
disability in general) has increased. For example, when planning the sampling for 
the content analysis, it was noticeable that the films made after 2000 were much 
more numerous than those made before this date. With regards to television, Paul 
Darke (2004, p. 102) suggests that a new emphasis on ‘political correctness’ has 
fostered the higher visibility of disability. However, he also notes that this increase 
has been driven by the pursuit of audience ratings through increasingly sentimental 
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human stories, which allegedly show positive images of disability but in fact 
reinforce negative or stereotypical imagery. As Markotić (2008, p. 7) puts it, 
“disability has been disproportionately underrepresented at the same time as it has 
been excessively displayed”. This display has become largely devoid of political 
significance or any critical reflexivity that would expose the social construction of 
disability (Darke, 2004, p. 102); instead, the focus is on emotional journeys that 
foreground themes such as identity, trauma, bitterness and the struggle for social 
acceptance. 
These recurrent themes may well represent what is an integral part of blind 
people’s lives, but this foregrounding of blindness as a disability results in 
superficial, incomplete and one-sided portrayals. Content producers appear 
unaware of the problem, no doubt because of their apparent lack of interest in 
critically placing their films in a wider media landscape. In their promotional 
materials and interviews, they use terms such as ‘promoting visibility’, ‘raising 
awareness’ or ‘giving a voice to’ in order to deflect accusations of 
misrepresentation. Riley attacks what he calls the ‘visibility argument’, in these 
terms: 
[T]he [film] industry produces movies that touch millions only to 
leave them as smugly ignorant as ever, reinforcing rather than 
challenging stereotypes and … perpetuating the pity syndrome by 
seductively re-presenting endless editions of its own static and 
vacuous, obnoxious, and simplistic versions of people with 
disabilities that perversely do more damage than the invisibility 
they purport to combat. (Riley, 2005, p. 76) 
For this reason, the filmmakers’ intentions (or whether they themselves are 
partially blind or disabled, as in the case of Going Blind) are irrelevant when it 
comes to evaluating media’s impact on how blind people are perceived by a public 
audience on screen and in real life.43
                                                             
43 Appendix 1 provides a case study highlighting production and representation practices in the UK 
television industry in relation to disability. 
 Also, given the homogeneity and frequency of 
narrative and aesthetic tropes in documentaries about blindness, these have to be 
regarded as a body of texts rather than singling out for praise the artistic or social 
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merits of individual films.44
Binary opposites and ableist hegemony 
 For example, it could be argued that films like Notes on 
Blindness, although an emotional and sentimental account that adheres to folk-
psychological narratives and blindness stereotypes, nonetheless attempts to reflect 
the key transition in John Hull’s life from being sighted to becoming blind – albeit, at 
the expense of representing other aspects in John’s life, rendering it a very limited, 
schematic account. The accompanying fear of the unknown and the ultimate 
acceptance of his impairment are poetically described by Hull himself in a voice-
over (using original audio tapes), which aligns well, thematically and aesthetically, 
with the audio-visual poetry deployed by the filmmakers. However, the use of the 
aforementioned stereotypes, such as limiting the film to the theme of blindness 
both literally and metaphorically (the disability, for example, is represented in terms 
of a religious redemption), makes clear that the filmmakers’ primary aim was to tell 
a narratively and visually engaging story; critical reflections about how that might 
contribute to social attitudes towards blindness appear to be absent. Consequently, 
the question that is most pertinent to spectatorship dispositions does not concern 
how blindness or the blind individual are represented in singular examples, but how 
the recurrent use of particular tropes has ossified a generic negative portrayal of 
blind people in mass consciousness, affecting the social cognition of blind 
individuals in both the media and in real life.  
Folk-psychological narrative formulas often operate through binary opposites (for 
example, the ‘reversal’ or ‘turning point’) to express dramatic development. 
However, filmic portrayals of disability, particularly blindness, seem to be even 
more prone to narrative and aesthetic binary opposites, such as blind/sighted, 
dark/light, abled/disabled, normal/deviant, tragic/comic, low/high, 
                                                             
44 Several of the films in the survey do indeed have good intentions, aiming to raise social awareness 
of blindness and blind people, offering information on their websites, and enabling online donations. 
See, for example, the websites of Across Still Water (http://acrossstillwater.com/), Blindsight 
(http://www.blindsightthemovie.com) and Going Blind (http://goingblindmovie.com). Interestingly, 
most of the information provided relates to explaining the exact visual impairment of the characters 
from a medical perspective, which, once again, relegates blindness to the realm of the deviant and 
pathological. 
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fearful/courageous and victim/hero.45
Similarly, especially in terms of aesthetics, blind people are portrayed as 
deviant, creating a direct antithesis to the abled-bodied norm in society. Disability 
thus creates a convenient other for the self-affirmation of the able-bodied. 
Comparing oneself with others is one of the most fundamental and ubiquitous of all 
human tendencies, helping reinforce a feeling of identity (Guimond, 2006, p. 33). 
With blindness in film, this social comparison is performed by the filmmaker and 
projected onto the spectator. This ‘ableist’ ideology operates through medical and 
psychological regimes that emphasise the loss or lack of a particular ability and 
reinforce the dichotomies, mentioned above, that separate ‘us’ from ‘them’ 
(Markotić, 2008, p. 7). Riley (2005, p. 9) accuses the media of being complicit in 
ascribing these binary roles through compressing difference into particular symbols 
and categories, which reinforce stereotypes that amplify the normality of an ableist 
domination over the disabled community. 
 In binary systems, as John Hartley (2002, 
p. 19) explains, meaning is generated by opposition, and any ambiguity is an offence 
that is actively suppressed. As an example, he cites how news often structures the 
world as ‘us’ versus ‘them’; anything indeterminate is taboo. In relation to 
blindness, one of these taboos is the general lack of portrayals of partial blindness 
in documentary films. With the exception of Window of the Soul, all the films in the 
survey focus either on completely blind characters or characters who are on a sure 
path to becoming completely blind. Even in the The Undateables, Damien, who is 
partially sighted, is introduced by the narrator as “virtually blind”.  
Stereotypes 
Stereotypes embedded in and perceived through film narratives, and stereotypes in 
the social cognition of real life give rise to and reinforce each other, and make use 
of the same cognitive faculties in our brains (see Chapters Two and Three). Dyer 
(2006, p. 355) explains that stereotypes are attached to those who are excluded by 
the normative rules of society, while social types are attached to those that 
                                                             
45 Barasch (2001) identifies additional binary opposites in art and fiction narratives, such as 
knowledge/ignorance and good/evil. 
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normative rules are designed for. The binary of stereotypes/social types creates and 
maintains a boundary against the ‘excluded’, one that needs to be clearly 
delineated by keeping stereotypes “fixed, clear-cut and unalterable”, while the 
‘included’, the social types, are “open-ended, more provisional, more flexible, to 
create the sense of freedom, choice, self-definition for those within the boundaries 
of normalcy” (p. 355). The rigidity and perseverance of stereotypes is particularly 
evident in the tragic and ‘supercrip’ narrative schema. Barasch (2001, p. 147) 
illustrates how these two stereotypes have been consistently used in art and 
literature throughout history: the blind person as an unfortunate who has been 
deprived of humanity’s most precious gift, and the blind person as possessing a 
mysterious link with a supernatural reality. Thus, stereotypes that are based on 
simplistic folk-psychological schemas automatically transcend medium specificity. 
As Henry Bacon (2011, p. 42) points out, stock characters “exist in a ready-made 
form in a shared cultural sphere”; their few but significant character traits, 
embodied in a certain text, enable the audience to immediately recognise the 
character type and explain certain types of behaviour.  
Whereas dissemination, frequency and consistency are major aspects of 
stereotype formation, Alexis Tan et al. (2010) also identify ‘valence’, ‘realism’ and 
‘believability’. Valence is the receiver’s evaluation of an event they have witnessed 
or participated in as positive or negative (p. 572), while realism and believability 
refer to how true to life and believable the information is (p. 578). If perceived as 
real and believable, positive media portrayals lead to positive stereotyping and 
negative ones to negative stereotypes.  
With regard to blindness, the content analysis in this research has shown 
that ableist dichotomies in general attach a negative valence to the disabled person 
(bitter, fearful, disabled, socially shunned, for example). In other words, it is very 
unlikely the audience would aspire to be blind. They may be inspired by the 
narrative depictions of perseverance or strength, but not by the actual disability, 
the primary narrative identifier for blind characters. In terms of realism, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, documentaries – as opposed to fiction – are perceived 
to be true to life, unless the audience has reason to believe otherwise. Thus, a 
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public audience is likely to perceive blind people in the way they are constructed by 
the documentary narrative, without testing the authenticity of the portrayal 
through further research. In terms of believability, the sources of the film survey 
vary considerably. For instance, Channel 4’s more entertaining The Undateables 
may be regarded with more distrust than Joseph Lovett’s more factual Going Blind, 
especially since Lovett himself appears in the film as both the main visually impaired 
screen character and the filmmaker. However, as Gallagher and Zahavi (2008, p. 85) 
argue, we are prone to remember the information itself rather than the source – 
due to “impaired source memory” we may read a story in a dubious magazine but 
several months later we may have forgotten the source yet still remember the 
information, which makes us more inclined to believe the story. 
While the valence of the blind screen character is negative, uplifting 
narrative journeys and especially their positive conclusions have a positive valence. 
However, this positive valence, which relates to the spectator’s mood and emotions 
by the end of the film, may have an adverse effect on critical reflection. 
Bodenhausen et al. (1994) point out that positive moods and emotions (as opposed 
to neutral or negative emotions) can result in a higher probability of applying 
stereotypes to other social groups. People who are generally content, such as the 
viewer who has just experienced an inspiring and uplifting narrative that does not 
leave any room for ambiguity about the outcome, are less likely to recognise 
individual differences within a stereotyped group, relying more on generic and 
totalising schematic knowledge. 
All in all, while all the films scrutinised here aim to use narrative and 
aesthetic strategies to mediate emic experience, they actually achieve the opposite 
by using recurrent, fixed and universalist stereotypes that may engage the spectator 
emotionally in a dramatic plot but distance him/her from the individual screen 
character. The blind character is mystified, exoticised, objectified and patronised, 
and inevitably becomes the other.  
However, according to Gordon Moskowitz (2005, pp. 481–482), stereotype-
inconsistent information can undermine non-critical confidence in schematic 
knowledge and potentially lead to the reconfiguration of stereotypes. Inconsistency 
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does not have to be counter-stereotypic but can simply be inconsistent with the 
expectations of the perceiver. In other words, in order to undo established 
blindness stereotypes, a documentary does not have to openly subvert or expose 
them; it may suffice to offer alternative portrayals that are not binary opposites of 
stereotypical portrayals but merely a portrayal inconsistent with previous ones, due 
to the introduction of an element of ambiguity, for example. Because of the 
prevalent othering of blind people through coherent, fixed and universal 
stereotypes, it can be assumed that the spectators’ dispositions in relation to 
blindness are fairly homogenous. Hence, attempting to bypass these stereotypes by 
offering alternatives based on ‘informed’ emic experience should result in a 
homogenous audience response, especially in light of post-filmically targeting the 
audience through the mediation of embodied experiences rather than hermeneutic 
assumptions (see Chapter Three). 
 
4.3 Alternative representations 
4.3.1 The ‘everyday’  
Although Seung-Jun Yi’s Planet of Snail (2011) occasionally uses aesthetic 
stereotypes, it is very different to the other films surveyed here in terms of 
narrative structure and overall use of style. It depicts the ordinary, everyday life of 
Young-Chan, a young, deaf-blind man, and his wife, Soon-Ho, who has dwarfism. 
The film focuses on their intimate connection and haptic communication (figure 18), 
interspersed with poetic voice-overs from the main character who reflects on his 
existence, and it indicates that Young-Chan’s poetry, which he writes and recites, is 
one of his day-to-day activities, and has not been created solely for the purposes of 
the film. 
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Figure 18: Planet of Snail (2011) – connection and communication 
 
The key strategy the film employs to bypass stereotypes is a focus on the 
everyday.46
It is rare to see blind characters undertaking everyday tasks in films, such as 
housework or shopping (Badia Corbella and Sánchez-Guijo Acevedo, 2010, p. 76). 
The general lack of the ordinary and the mundane is summed up by blind therapist 
Tasha Chemel (n.d.), who argues that “instead of focusing on the ordinary, society 
chooses the extraordinary in blind people, imposing upon them a need to 
overcome, to inspire and stand as shining examples of the extraordinary power of 
the human spirit”. This focus on the extraordinary demonstrates the ableist 
 Instead of an intricate folk-psychological narrative formula, the plot 
structure consists of a bricolage of mostly unconnected fragments of everyday life, 
revolving around particular moments (such as changing a light bulb or washing the 
dishes) in which the character’s personalities emerge through their interactions 
with each other and with their physical space. This episodic plot structure deflects 
any character trajectories and role schemas, and highlights the ordinariness of their 
everyday lives. Their disability is neither rendered as spectacle, nor is it normalised. 
We see ordinary people, performing ordinary activities, albeit with extraordinary 
bodies. 
                                                             
46 As Highmore (2011, p. 2) establishes that the terms ‘everyday’ and ‘ordinary/ordinariness’ can be 
taken to be synonymous, this thesis follows suit and uses these terms interchangeably, though at 
times, contextually. For example, ‘everyday’ may be more appropriate in contexts that relate to time 
and ‘ordinary’ in contexts that refer to space and objects. 
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formation of stereotypes that emphasise deviance from what is deemed ‘normal’ or 
‘ordinary’ (Dyer’s ‘social types’). 
The everyday of screen characters is often perceived to be inherent to 
documentary. John Ellis (2007, p. 59) believes that “documentary revels in the 
ordinary, the unconsidered detail or the mundane [and] a love for the contingent, 
that which just chanced to happen”. Unfortunately, this is a common 
misconception, especially if the schematic narrative formulas propagated by 
textbooks and identified in the films surveyed here is taken into consideration. 
These formulas emphasise the extraordinary, the heroic and the tragic, and actually 
defy the contingent by imposing predictable plot journeys; chance occurrences are 
banished if they are deemed to undermine the coherence of the plot. Even if Ellis is 
merely referring to the gathering of filmic material in the everyday lives of the 
characters at the pre-filmic level, this everydayness is sacrificed on a post-filmic 
level during post-production for immersive, folk-psychological narratives that 
eliminate the ordinary.  
The filmmakers of most of the films surveyed may simply assume that pre-
filmic ordinariness is automatically mediated into the post-filmic, and the 
deployment of narrative formulas is merely a strategy aimed at engaging the 
audience while mediating emic, everyday experience. This assumption is also 
reflected in Ellis’s (and many other documentary scholars’) failure to distinguish 
between the pre-filmic and post-filmic context in his statement, thus highlighting 
the importance of the two-level mediation model presented in Chapter Three. The 
mediation of the characters’ everyday requires particular attention on the pre-filmic 
and the post-filmic level, as the following two chapters demonstrate. First, 
however, the notion of the ‘everyday’ needs further elaboration.   
For phenomenologists, the everyday constitutes the ‘life-world’ – the “world 
we ordinarily take for granted, the pre-scientific, experientially given world that we 
are familiar with and never call into question” (Overgaard and Zahavi, 2009, p. 97). 
Consequently, ordinary activities can reveal insights into the normal texture of 
characters’ individual and social life, creating an embodied, momentary experience 
for the spectator; that is, a mediated emic experience. The mediation of everyday, 
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emic experience can result in deconstructing or ‘un-othering’ the otherness of the 
previously stereotyped blind person. For example, the light bulb changing sequence 
in Planet of Snail (figure 19) embodies the characters’ synergy as a couple through 
the accomplishment of an ordinary task, which is only made possible by conjoining 
complementary skills and abilities – Young-Chan is able to reach the lamp and Soon-
Ho is able to direct him. Although both characters’ disabilities are evident, the 
ordinariness of the scene and the affective chemistry between them form the emic 
experience of this moment. In addition, since this scene is not embedded in a larger 
plot journey that focuses on their impairment, his deaf-blindness and her dwarfism 
appear as ordinary (in the context of their world), which is the case in almost every 
other scene in the film. 
 
 
Figure 19: Planet of Snail (2011) – changing a light bulb 
 
The strength of this film lies not merely on its focus on individual everyday 
events, but on the everyday as an entire narrative experience, without overlaying a 
heroic or tragic plot journey that would counteract the sense of the quotidian and 
ordinary. This ensures that the characters remain multi-layered and nuanced, 
instead of slipping into simplistic, schematic roles. This is a crucial observation if 
Planet of Snail to compared with Sergey Dvortsevoy’s In the Dark (2004), which tells 
the story of an elderly retired blind man and his only companion, a white cat (figure 
20). He spends most of his time at home, making string bags that he offers to 
passers-by on the street. He patiently spends hours disentangling the yarn, while his 
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cat keeps stealing, hiding and unravelling the wool. Every scene focuses on the 
material, everyday moment, and the observational, unstylised aesthetics mediate to 
the spectator a strong spatial and temporal sense of this man’s emic experience.  
 
 
Figure 20: In the Dark (2004) 
 
Nevertheless, these ordinary moments are embedded in a clear three-act 
plot structure depicting the futility of the activity. The first act shows the character 
elaborately making the bags; in the second, he tries to sell them on the street 
without success; and in the third act, he weeps as he stores away the tools and 
materials used in the first act. The narrative is based on the established tragic 
trajectory discussed earlier, although here the reason is not because the character 
is becoming blind, but because he is trying to cope with apparent loneliness, which, 
by implication, is the result of his disability and age. A negative valence of 
bitterness, loneliness and pity infuses the film; the correlation of negative 
stereotypes of age and disability reinforces the role schema of the tragic figure that 
has become a fossilised part of the audience’s schematic array of tools of 
interpretation. It is unfortunate that, as opposed to Planet of Snail, the filmmaker 
has omitted any other everyday activities, such as cooking or shopping, and focused 
instead on three ordinary activities that have a clear function within the given plot 
structure and inadvertently contribute to yet another othering portrayal of 
blindness. Still, the film resists the usual stereotypical structure of an uplifting mood 
and does not conclude on a positive note. While the character remains ultimately 
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tragic, the overall mood conveyed to the audience is ambiguous, oscillating 
between comedy and tragedy, especially when the cat steals the wool. The tragic, 
low-key ending as he stores away the materials in a resigned manner avoids the 
last-minute injection of some physical or transcendental optimism, thus appearing 
less extraordinary than the films discussed further above. 
In conclusion, the aim of my documentaries about Terry and June is not only 
to capture everyday events, but to actually mediate the general everydayness of the 
two characters to the audience both on a scene-by-scene level and on a narrative 
one. Disability scholars (for example, Schillmeier, 2007; Zhang and Haller, 2013) 
have suggested portraying disability through the ordinary as a possible corrective to 
othering stereotypes. For a filmmaker trained to adhere to folk-psychological 
narratives that highlight extraordinariness as a means of reaching a wide audience, 
it may be disconcerting to abandon a tried-and-tested strategy. After all, the lack of 
a clear plot structure and clear character roles induces a fear of randomness and 
chaos in producers, directors and especially editors, who wrongly assume that lack 
of structure equals lack of character, and thus lack of audience engagement. 
However, as Clifford Geertz reminds us: 
Looking at the ordinary in places where it takes unaccustomed 
forms brings out not … the arbitrariness of human behaviour but 
the degree to which its meaning varies according to the pattern of 
life by which it is informed. (Geertz, 1973, p. 14) 
Like Geertz, Bondebjerg (2014, pp. 3–4) believes that mediating the 
everyday reduces otherness, especially in documentary film, which portrays reality 
with greater authenticity than fiction and therefore helps form our understanding 
of global narratives and cosmopolitan imaginaries. Bondebjerg explains that 
documentaries have the capacity to bring us close to the everyday realities of 
“distant and strange others”, creating “identification and empathy by showing us 
that people who may seem to be very different from us have universal, human 
dimensions, despite cultural or other differences” (p. 4). However, it could be 
argued that universal human stories are an intrinsic attribute of folk-psychological 
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narratives that aim to elicit an emotional audience experience through global event 
and role schemas. But the universality of the everyday should not be confused with 
the universality of characters: your ‘everyday’ may be very different to my 
‘everyday’, but I can experience it as your ‘everyday’, nonetheless. This is where the 
difference between otherness and alterity becomes a crucial distinction. 
 
4.3.2 Alterity 
Geertz (1973, p. 14) argues that “understanding a people’s culture exposes their 
normalness without reducing their particularity”. This is the main paradigm of my 
emic approach, which aims to mediate the “particular ordinariness” of the subject 
without resorting to universal descriptions. As Markotić (2012) puts it when 
describing the everyday ablution scenes of the main quadriplegic character in Joe 
Moulins’ Citizen Sam (2006),47
 ‘Otherness’ in this thesis is understood in a hegemonic context in which the 
other is socially stereotyped and thus universalised, whereas ‘alterity’ denotes the 
phenomenological other – anyone we face, other than ourselves, who must remain 
particularised. Sarah Cooper (cited in Nash, 2011, pp. 232–233) argues that 
documentary films have privileged universal arguments or generalisations over 
individual difference or particularity in a “tendency to situate the particular in terms 
of broader social and political issues”, and this actually limits audiences’ knowledge. 
Renov (2004, p. 148) also argues that documentary has tended to turn ‘subjects’ 
into ‘objects of knowledge’ through an “acquisitive, totalizing quest for knowledge”. 
This universalisation through the use of othering stereotypes may not be intended 
(Riley, 2005; Rimmerman, 2013) but it is still a latent form of domination and a 
 the audience sees the actions of a “’regular’ guy, 
performing ‘regular’ activities albeit with an ‘irregular’ body”. In contrast to 
stereotypical representations, the ordinariness of the activity preserves what Kate 
Nash (2011, p. 232) calls, with reference to Levinas, the ‘alterity’ of the other, while 
preventing actual otherness. 
                                                             
47 In a similar way to In the Dark, Citizen Sam portrays a variety of everyday domestic activities; yet, 
they are part of a stereotypical ‘supercrip’ plot structure, in which the main character successfully 
campaigns, against all the odds, to become mayor of Vancouver.  
 
 
118 
direct result of folk-psychological narrative formulas that seek to reveal characters’ 
motivations and emotions through the pursuit of a particular narrative goal. 
Universal human narratives are prone to stereotyping certain social and cultural 
groups, due to the use of the binary of social types and stereotypes that generates 
their universality. Particularising a character through emphasising their alterity is 
therefore a further prerequisite for undoing stereotypes 
According to Nash (2011, p. 234), the acknowledgment of alterity is only 
possible if a documentary focuses on the complex and particular, while 
simultaneously allowing contradiction and admitting the limits of its knowledge. As 
she puts it, “where the fact of close observation prevents the spectator from 
adopting an all-seeing position, where the images speak of doubt, uncertainty, and 
plurality of meaning, the alterity of the other can persist” (pp. 237-238). A focus on 
emic everyday experience is not enough to reduce otherness and emphasise 
alterity. This is particularly true of In the Dark, where everyday events are woven 
into a plot structure that leaves little room for uncertainty or doubt in terms of 
character motivation: the man makes bags in order to keep himself occupied and 
overcome the apparent rigidity and emptiness of his life. Planet of Snail, on the 
other hand, presents a variety of often disconnected everyday scenes, some more 
ordinary than others, and some exposing the disability more than others. This 
leaves open ends, creates ambiguity concerning how much Soon-Ho considers 
Young-Chan a burden, and even casts some doubt as to whether the main 
characters are performing their loving relationship for the camera.  
According to Kathleen Stewart (2007, pp. 2–5), the ordinary is a good vehicle 
for alterity, as it is inherently plural and ambiguous, an assemblage of disparate 
scenes that escape definition, rationalisation, classification or even symbolic 
signification. Ben Highmore (2011, p. 1) describes the everyday as the 
“accumulation of ‘small things’ that constitute a more expansive but hard to 
register ‘big thing’”. The everyday is vague and ambiguous, as it is “as much 
characterised by confusion as clarity, as much by simultaneity and complexity as 
discrete and separable motifs” (p. 2). Ambiguity, as already mentioned, represents 
an offence to binary opposites, since it cannot be categorised into one or the other 
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binary (Hartley, 2002, p. 19); it can simultaneously belong to both or to neither, or it 
can oscillate between them. A concrete example in Planet of Snail is the main 
character’s experience of being deaf-blind. At times, he accepts his disability with 
humour, at other times he bitterly laments its restrictions, and yet at another time 
he highlights its extraordinariness by comparing himself to an astronaut. This 
ambivalence potentially transcends the positive or negative valences of ossified role 
schemas, and of disability itself.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The content analysis in this chapter has demonstrated the persistence of fixed 
stereotypes that Walter Lippmann and Homi Bhabha describe in Chapter One. It has 
shown that the stark difference between non-blind and blind people is 
predominantly responsible for a plethora of othering stereotypes that maintain a 
firm boundary between these two communities. These othering stereotypes are 
maintained and perpetuated through an interaction of social schemas and narrative 
schemas. Whilst the social schemas non-blind people hold about blind people can 
be deemed hegemonic at their core, the narrative schemas that appear in 
documentary making textbooks and, correspondingly, in the discussed films, are not 
inherently hegemonic. Applying these folk-psychological narrative schemas to non-
blind characters or topics unrelated to disability, may well yield non-hegemonic 
results. It is, however, the particular configuration of social and narrative 
stereotypes identified in this chapter that contributes to the continuous othering of 
blindness. 
But, it needs to be conceded that this othering process has by now become 
an autonomous global phenomenon, for which no individual filmmaker or film can 
be condemned. In terms of the filmmakers, this chapter has highlighted the positive 
intentions of most directors of the films analysed to contribute to the well-being 
and social inclusion of blind people. For instance, Notes on Blindness has been 
distributed with three different audio description tracks, catering for a variety of 
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preferences and abilities within the blind community to experience the film.48 As 
part of their outreach programme, the filmmakers have even produced an 
immersive virtual reality project based on John Hull’s sensory and psychological 
experience of blindness.49
 In terms of the actual films, especially Black Sun, In the Dark and Notes on 
Blindness have distinct merit in that they provide the spectator with a riveting 
narrative and aesthetic experience that pushes the boundaries of filmic storytelling. 
Although Black Sun’s and Notes on Blindness’s attempts to mediate emic experience 
are highly problematic, they nonetheless excel in establishing an immersive 
appropriation to the sensorial and psychological experiences of the characters in 
relation to their disability. In contrast, In the Dark dispenses with aesthetic 
experimentation in favour of observing minute domestic and everyday actions 
linked to the process and outcome of bag-making, which brings the audience 
emotionally close to the character’s persona. All three films succeed at 
experientially involving the audience through concentrating on a particular and 
iconic facet of their characters’ lives. It is, however, exactly this concentration that 
becomes precarious for the representation of blindness. From this perspective, one 
would wish that these films’ characters were not blind, but then their well-crafted 
narrative unity, which coheres the disability with the story’s themes and the 
spectatorial experience, would indubitably perish. 
  
 Although, from a filmmaking perspective, the objective is usually to create 
such narrative coherence and concentrated audience engagement, the alternative 
strategy I propose is a collage of related and unrelated emic everyday experiences 
that mediate the alterity of blind characters without having to focus on the 
disability or constructing extraordinary characters and plot journeys. The disability 
itself is neither foregrounded nor relegated to the background, it is simply there as 
part of the characters’ everyday life. The table below (table 2) summarises the 
insights gained in this chapter and serves as a general guideline for the following 
two chapters. 
                                                             
48 See http://www.notesonblindness.co.uk/accessibility/ 
49 See http://www.notesonblindness.co.uk/vr/ 
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The Other  The Alter  
primarily portrayed as extraordinary primarily portrayed as ordinary 
etic experience emic experience 
object of (our) knowledge  subject of (their) experience  
collective difference: us – them individual difference: me – him/her  
universality  particularity  
certainty / binary opposites ambiguity 
clear narrative journey  narrative episodes 
plot-driven character/moment-focused 
aesthetics simulate sensory perception  aesthetics mediate embodied experience 
audio-visual poetry corporeal schemas and spatial anchoring 
Table 2: The Other vs. the Alter 
 
For Highmore (2011, p. 42), the everyday is a form of living out experience through 
expressive actions. This “aesthetics of the everyday” is a relational zone where 
experience and expression mediate through spatiality and temporality. While the 
previous chapter emphasised the importance of embodied experience, materiality 
and temporality for pre-filmically mapping and post-filmically capturing emic 
experience, this chapter has provided the particular critical framing necessary to 
approach emic experience in relation to the everyday experience and alterity of 
blind characters, using Planet of Snail as a case study for mediating ordinariness.   
However, whereas Planet of Snail is an observational documentary (Nash 
applies her theory of alterity to observational documentaries only), the everyday is 
not limited to the pro-filmic present but can include the ‘past everyday’, or even the 
ordinariness of the filmmaking process (if that process significantly shapes the 
characters’ everyday experience). The concept of the everyday is complex and 
slippery. Consequently, instead of searching for a definition, it is more useful to 
explore its “grammar, its patterns of association, its form of connection and 
disconnection” (Highmore, 2011, p. 2), a task the following two chapters undertake  
by means of concrete pre-filmic and post-filmic examples. This pragmatic approach 
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is in tune with the cognitive approach to ‘documentary’ (see Chapter Two), and the 
phenomenological approach to ‘experience’, both of which abstain from offering 
theoretical definitions, focusing instead on empirical descriptions of structures and 
mechanisms in relation to human experience. 
Unlike the top-down approach of folk-psychological narratives, in which 
themes, role schemas and event schemas dominate post-filmic decisions about 
cinematography, editing and narrative structuring, my approach is a bottom-up 
one, whereby themes and character portraits organically emerge from a range of 
everyday encounters. This is aligned with the aim of using embodied experience as 
a broadly consistent foundation for spectatorship. Thus, Chapter Five presents 
methods for mediating emic everyday experience through ordinary materialities, 
such as body, space and objects. The ordinary is mediated in the present moment 
through pre-filmic and post-filmic methods that focus on aesthetics – the raw 
material of the narrative. Chapter Six, on the other hand, discusses how these raw 
materials come together in order to mediate emic everyday experience through 
ordinary temporalities on a narrative level. Here, the ordinary is mediated through 
the temporal continuum of the audience watching the film from beginning to end. 
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Chapter Five: Ordinary Materialities 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to achieve the mediation of everyday emic50
Materiality inherently mediates. Firstly, it mediates between the elusive 
concept of ‘self’ or ‘identity’ and the world around us; it is only through material 
engagement that individuals have the opportunity to articulate aspects of identity 
on a personal, cultural and emotional level (Woodward, 2007, p. 135). Secondly, 
materiality mediates information, emotions, ideas and impressions between people 
(Dant, 1999, p. 153), and this intersubjective exchange can either occur 
synchronically or diachronically, and can take place in the same space or across 
spaces. Our corporeal interaction with objects anchors our memories, expresses our 
affects, upholds relationships, conveys meanings and provokes new ideas. 
 experience, the following 
chapter focuses on ordinary materialities. Schillmeier (2010, pp. 122–123) 
advocates that the disability researcher concentrate on ordinary material practices, 
since these affirm their complex, multi-layered experiences, and shifts the 
perception of disability from a given individual or social fact to an outcome of 
historically specific, embodied human and non-human configurations. The concept 
of materiality is a good starting point for ordinary experience. According to 
Christopher Tilley et al. (2006, p. 3), “[m]ateriality refers to the fleshy, corporeal and 
physical, as opposed to spiritual, ideal and value-laden aspects of human existence”. 
As such, materiality can include anything from tools, decorative objects, buildings, 
rooms and food to plants, animals and human bodies. 
Jennifer Barker’s (2009, p. 20) interpretation of Merlau-Ponty’s concept of 
the ‘chiasm’51
                                                             
50 Henceforth, the term ‘emic’ will be largely omitted as the previous two chapters have established 
that, in relation to my documentaries, mediated experience has to be inherently emic in order to 
avoid stereotypical portrayals of blind people. 
 considers materiality to be a primordial state in which we, and all 
objects, are immersed in a relation of reversibility – what we touch simultaneously 
touches us. Building on Hegel’s and Marx’s dialectical theories, scholars of material 
51 See Merleau-Ponty (1968, pp. 130–155) 
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culture have described the concept of ‘objectification’ as the dialectical relationship 
between things and people. For instance, Highmore (2011, p. 58) explains that 
things “affect us, entice us, accompany us, extend us, [and] assist us”, while we 
“make them, break them, adjust them, accredit them with meaning, join them 
together, [and] discard them”. Tilley (2006, p. 61), meanwhile, explains that 
subjects and objects “form part of each other while not collapsing into or being 
subsumed into the other ... the ontological relationship between the two embodies 
this contradiction or ambiguity: same and different, constituted and constituting”.  
This ambiguity is a good accompanying paradigm for the mediation of 
alterity and avoidance of stereotypical binaries. As Daniel Miller (2010, pp. 54–56) 
asserts, objectification overcomes dualisms such as animate/inanimate, 
subject/object and active/passive. It can even transcend valence-based binaries. 
However, objects themselves are inherently ambiguous; for example, Miller 
explains that commodities are not good or bad in themselves, but their potential 
effect on the consumer entails both the risk of oppression and the promise of 
autonomy (pp. 62-63). Another ambiguity inherent to objects is their simultaneous 
representation of generality and particularity (Brown, 2001; Highmore, 2011). Their 
generality means they are part of a larger whole, such as the totality of objects in a 
domestic space, the sum of a toolset or collection, the material exchange of a 
consumerist society, or the output of production practices; their particularity 
consists in their ability to elicit, for example, a sense of familiarity, sentimentality, 
nostalgia, possessiveness or aesthetic appreciation.  
Thus, objects feature throughout both my films, which mediate what Jean 
Baudrillard (2005, p. 92) terms a ‘private totality’. For Baudrillard, a subject 
constructs and maintains his/her own world through a collection of possessed 
things. These are everyday objects in which we invest feelings and emotions, 
abstracting them from their mere utilitarian function and bringing them into a 
personal relationship with us. However, while Baudrillard draws a binary division 
between possessed and utilised objects, the case studies in this chapter 
demonstrate that particular everyday objects can be both, and this ambivalence 
provides fertile ground for mediating objectification through embodied experience.  
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Lastly, objects have to be treated in relation to embodied experience. As 
Chapter Three argues, embodied experiences are primarily corporeal phenomena 
that do not evoke an indexical relationship to the real world, and they may or may 
not yield symbolic meanings and elicit audience interpretation. If objects are to be 
mediated as ‘objectified’ embodiments of their characters, the filmic focus needs to 
be on the material presence of the moment, as Kracauer (1960) suggests (see 
Chapter Three), instead of interpellating them into folk-psychological narrative roles 
that illustrate motivation and emotion in relation to a plot trajectory.  
The following case studies are based on material encounters triggered by 
particular objects. Pre-filmic and post-filmic methods are signposted; the former is 
based for the most part on anthropological-phenomenological models and the 
latter is mainly framed by cognitive models. As this thesis pursues a spectatorship-
focused (not filmmaker-focused) approach, the pre-filmic methods do not 
reflexively discuss my authorial creative process but focus instead on the 
production of phenomenological data through mapping the character’s everyday 
experience, which is then ‘naturalised’ on the post-filmic level through their 
mediation to the audience. 
 
5.2 The evocative object  
5.2.1 Pre-filmic methods 
In her anthology, Evocative Objects (2011), Sherry Turkle asks thirty-four people to 
choose an object and write about its associations, explaining that this will bring to 
the fore hidden layers that go beyond its utility. Turkle’s experiment reveals the 
nature of the possessed and subjectively experienced object through a bricolage of 
ideas, emotions, descriptions, gestures, intonations and expressions. In the same 
way, I asked Terry and June to each choose an object and talk about it in front of 
the camera as they were holding it. I did not give them any directions as to what to 
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say or how to handle the objects. Terry chose an old paintbrush,52 while June chose 
a small piece of marble53
 
 (figures 21-22). 
  
Figure 21: Scene: ‘The Brush’ 
 
  
Figure 22: Scene: ‘The Marble Stone’ 
Two modes of material being 
The cultural value of objects lies in the narratives and performances they draw from 
their possessors. In turn, the “effective performance of any identity relies on 
engagements with, and presentations of, objects” (Woodward, 2007, p. 151). The 
character’s performances in this case, however, are a direct result of the encounter 
between us: the performances are clearly elicited by my intervention and the 
presence of the camera, and the actual grammar of these performances is 
mappable through Miles Richardson’s (1982) ‘two modes of being’ in relation to 
materiality. In one mode, when absorbed in responding to others and unconsciously 
focusing on the task at hand, we experience the world around us as a given fact; in 
the other, when we are detached from the task at hand and conscious of our 
                                                             
52 Scene: ‘The Brush’ – 26:30 (henceforth, this 4-digit number identifies the timecode in the 
accompanying QuickTime files in minutes:seconds) 
53 Scene: ‘The Marble Stone’ – 32:29 
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responses to others, we experience the world as a construct (p. 421). Richardson 
points out that our “ability to shift modes of being poses critical questions about 
the relationship between our existence and the material world in which we exist”, 
since materiality is constitutive for our being-in-the-world (pp. 421-422).   
Given that Terry and June are asked to perform an unusual action with an 
ordinary object, their initial state is one of self-conscious awareness of the situation. 
The constructed nature of this encounter prompts each of them to consciously 
highlight the attributes and functions of the brush (painting) and the stone 
(doorstop), which engenders a shift into reflexive consciousness for the first time. 
For example, Terry notices that the brush’s head is loose and can be detached, and 
he discovers a physical hazard when he puts the brush behind his ear and almost 
pokes himself in the eye (see below). On the other hand, when June recounts her 
family tradition of passing the stone from generation to generation, she becomes 
aware that it will probably be passed on to her daughter after she dies. However, 
several times, both characters slip into an implicit, automated mode of being as 
they become absorbed in the situation, and instead of recounting, they either re-
enact or reflect. For instance, Terry re-enacts different painting manoeuvres, 
revealing the variety of corporeal schemas he uses when painting (figure 23). June, 
whose body language is more reserved than Terry’s, wonders to herself whether 
the stone came from a bombed church on the road outside her grandparents’ 
house. 
 
 
Figure 23: Painting manoeuvres 
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The ambiguity caused by the co-existence of both modes is perhaps most 
palpable when they touch and feel the objects, Terry scratching through layers of 
paint, and June feeling the dents she caused when she kicked the stone as a child 
(figure 24). This elicits further reactions and reflections, embodying the concept of 
objectification – they touch the objects and the objects touch them. They are 
immersed in this situation, yet they also self-consciously perform. Commenting on 
and experiencing the objects’ haptic features while describing (and, in Terry’s case, 
enacting) their utilitarian character embodies Tim Dant’s (1999, pp. 169–161) 
theory that ordinary objects can have a practical function, yet can also result in an 
aesthetic and pleasurable experience in terms of their physical form. The fact of 
being blind may even reinforce the evocative haptic nature of the objects.   
 
  
Figure 24: Touching the objects 
The biographical object 
Interestingly, both of the chosen objects are biographical and evoke a variety of 
memories in the characters. According to Violette Morin (1969, pp. 135–138), a 
biographical object mediates for its subject on three levels: (1) on the temporal 
level, the object becomes old and worn; (2) on the spatial level, it anchors the 
owner to a particular space and time; and (3) on the level of the owner/consumer, 
the object helps form the user’s identity and everyday experience as part of a 
“narrative process of self-definition” (Hoskins, 1998, p. 8). 
On the first level, the brush and the stone are both battered, chipped and 
dented; they reflect the age of the characters and the different layers of their 
history – a fact Terry comments on when he scratches through the layers of paint 
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that have incrementally covered the brush’s handle over the years, as does June, 
who recounts anecdotes relating to the stone’s dents and misshapen aspect. 
Morin’s second level is revealed through the way Terry’s brush anchors him, 
spatially, to the very spot where he paints (his bedroom/studio). This is reinforced 
when he selects the brush from the other painting tools next to him, and when he is 
seen painting in the same space in other scenes. June’s spatial anchoring reveals 
that she first removes the stone from a storage space before presenting it, in a 
different room, as a former doorstop. Unlike Terry’s brush, the utilitarian role and 
spatial connection of the stone is more transient: it is no longer a doorstop, but a 
stored item.   
Both scenes also reveal the existence of Morin’s third level concerning the 
narrative process of self-definition. Terry talks about the history of the brush in 
connection with his own history; for example, he recalls where and when he bought 
it, mentioning that this was in his ‘seeing days’ and admitting to not remembering 
what it is made of, although he thinks it is probably squirrel hair. Then he continues 
to talk about how he uses the brush during the painting process, and what it means 
to him in the present; he even anthropomorphises the brush by twice referring to it 
as a ‘mate’ and commenting that it is “a bit wobbly, but aren’t we all?”, implying the 
agency and identity of the brush in relation to himself. In a similarly chronological, 
yet emotionally more detached fashion, June recounts personal anecdotes in 
relation to the stone from over three generations – for example, how it served as 
doorstop for the toilet in her parents’ house in order to allow her elderly father to 
enter the room with his walking frame rather than struggle to negotiate the door. 
On all three of Morin’s levels, the everyday is mediated through a mix of anecdotes 
of the past and present, ranging from ordinary usage to familial memories. 
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5.2.2 Post-filmic methods 
Character engagement 
Murray Smith’s (1994, p. 35) cognitive model establishes three levels of character 
engagement: recognition, alignment and allegiance. The first two levels are directly 
relevant to this research.54
‘Alignment’ describes the spectator’s access to the character’s actions, 
knowledge and feelings (Smith, 1994, p. 41). Smith distinguishes between alignment 
through ‘spatial attachment’ and ‘subjective access’, the former granting access to 
the character’s physical space, and the latter access to the character’s psychological 
disposition. In terms of spatial attachment, the main cinematographic strategy I 
employed was filming Terry and June in medium shots which emphasise as much as 
possible of their upper bodies (Terry was kneeling and June sitting, so the lower 
body was of little interest) to allow recognition, but also show enough of the 
surrounding environment to anchor the subject in space, thus aligning the audience 
with their current location. In addition, the medium shots emphasise ‘peripersonal 
space’, which is essential to aligning the audience with the character’s interaction 
with the objects.  Peripersonal space refers to the space surrounding our bodies, in 
which objects can be grasped and manipulated, and which is therefore the “theatre 
of our interactions with objects” (Brozzoli et al., 2012, p. 449). The brain processes 
objects in our peripersonal space more thoroughly and involves more modalities of 
sensory information than it does with objects located in our extrapersonal space, 
 ‘Recognition’ depends on a visual representation of the 
face and body (p. 36), providing the spectator with continuous, recognisable 
representations of the character. For this reason, the films needed a variety of 
close-ups showing Terry’s and June’s faces and hands. However, in order to prevent 
spatial fragmentation and abstraction (see the previous chapter), and maintain 
recognition, shots of the overall body, including the face, were more significant. 
Plantinga (2013, p. 101) suggests that mirror neurons enable the spectator to 
comprehend faces and bodies in action, thus allowing us to “understand and 
respond affectively to human events and behaviour”.  
                                                             
54 Smith’s ‘allegiance’ relates to moral evaluation and social interpretation, and is thus not relevant 
to the bottom-up approach to spectatorship employed here (see Chapter Three).  
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which is the space beyond peripersonal space. In other words, our senses (for 
example, vision, audition, olfaction, touch, prorprioception) are more stimulated by 
objects within our peripersonal space. Furthermore, peripersonal space is mapped 
by the brain’s motor programs that enable us to interact with objects within that 
space (Gallese and Guerra, 2012, p. 186). 
As part of a pre-filmic strategy, Terry and June were asked to position 
themselves in peripersonal proximity to the objects (that is, to hold them), instead 
of talking about them at a distance. This resulted in both characters not just holding 
the objects, but also interacting with them, and this material interaction is post-
filmically mediated through a medium shot that brings the characters into close 
proximity to the audience (figure 25), stimulating their senses and motor neurons. A 
wide shot would emphasise extrapersonal space and reduce the audience’s sensory 
modalities, while close-ups would spatially and temporally separate the object or 
the subject. There are comparably few close-ups in either scene, and those there 
are mainly show Terry’s and June’s hands performing certain actions as they 
comment on the object, such as when the brush’s head comes off. However, these 
few close-ups are insert shots; that is, they are preceded and succeeded by medium 
shots.  
 
  
Figure 25: Medium shots 
 
The medium shots also emphasise objectification. Verbal communication, 
facial expressions, body language and interaction with the object all happen as part 
of the same spatio-temporal continuum. Since upper-body gestures are linked to 
expressing emotions and articulating thoughts (Beattie, 2004, p. 1), a static medium 
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shot reveals the subjectivity of both characters. Terry’s is expressive and playful; his 
natural gesticulations in combination with the static medium shot display his body 
and the brush from a plethora of different angles and positions, while June’s is more 
reserved and stiff. The spectator’s sense of spatio-temporal attachment is also 
induced by invisible elliptical editing, which uses continuity cuts to hide any obvious 
time ellipses and maintain the coherence of the present moment (by using 
occasional insert shots and continuity of sound, for example). Similarly, there are no 
cutaways to other spaces or timelines. 
In terms of ‘subjective access’, Terry’s bedroom is small and congested, a 
fact Terry complains about on several occasions. This experience is mediated by 
forgoing any wider shots that would reveal the entire room, and only using shots 
where Terry’s body (or parts of it) fills the frame. The camera remains in the same 
static position throughout the scene, giving the perspective that best shows the 
material clutter surrounding him (figure 25). In this way, the audience’s sense of 
space is restricted and congested, mirroring Terry’s experience of his domestic 
space.  
Bracketing 
Miller (2010, p. 51) explains that ordinary objects are peripheral and ‘blindingly 
obvious’; that is, we are ‘blind’ to their presence. Thus, my pre-filmic and post-filmic 
emphasis on ordinary objects brackets them from their everyday life and results in 
Terry and June slipping back and forth into Richardson’s (1982) self-conscious mode 
of being. Post-filmically, the narrative and aesthetic emphasis on the brush and the 
stone places the audience in an anamorphic position that highlights their 
ordinariness by making them temporarily extraordinary – yet another ambivalence, 
reminiscent of Louis Delluc’s concept of ‘photogénie’. According to Kristin 
Thompson and David Bordwell (2003, p. 91), photogénie distinguishes the film shot 
from the actual object; that is, the process of filming “lends an object a new 
expressiveness by giving the viewer a fresh perception of it” even though the shot is 
an iconic representation of the object. The camera framing already isolates 
(brackets) objects from their environment, and in the tradition of photogénie, 
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mediates a realm beyond everyday experience. However, I would argue that in my 
films that realm is not beyond the everyday, but is a mediated everyday.   
The bracketing in both scenes is reinforced by showing Terry and June 
displacing the objects from their ordinary position at the beginning of each scene 
and replacing them at the end (figure 26). This strategy also mediates the brush’s 
ambivalence of being both a collective and a particular object, as it is visibly 
elevated from being one tool among many others to temporarily being an evocative 
possession. For the stone, this scene-bracketing reveals it as part of a totality of 
items that do not quite fit in their dedicated storage space, thus mediating its 
historical change from a (possible) fragment of a bombed church, to a doorstop, to 
ultimately a sentimental item that has forfeited its utilitarian function and has 
become a mere possession, casually stored in remote corner. 
 
  
  
Figure 26: Displacing and replacing objects 
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5.3 The historical object 
5.3.1 Pre-filmic methods 
Historicity 
June’s back garden is home to the last remaining piece of the town’s medieval wall 
(figure 27). Since June moved to Harwich in 2009, the wall has experienced a 
significant transition in identity, not only in terms its own role in history, but also 
through June’s actions and her resulting perception of it. The historicity of objects 
exists as a relational phenomenon arising from the interaction between object and 
human actor (Jalas, 2009, p. 203). In phenomenological thought, ‘historicity’ is a 
concept that something or somebody has developed through history, as opposed to 
the belief that something is natural, essential or universal. Drawing on the work of 
Wilhelm Dilthey, David Carr (1991, p. 4) argues that as human beings we are 
intertwined with history, and therefore we are in history as we are in the world: it 
serves as the horizon and background for our everyday experience. 
 
 
Figure 27: The wall 
 
For Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 95), historicity is embodied in the dialectic of 
the ‘habitual body’ and the ‘body-in-the-moment’. The habitual body is the 
‘sedimentation’ of past experiences, so it is in essence the historical body, whereas 
the in-the-moment (or actual) body relates to its corporeal existence in the present 
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(Smyth, 2013, p. 30). Merleau-Ponty refers only to the human body, but his model 
can be extended to include any material body – such as a wall. Since the in-the-
moment body is unique and cannot be repeated (as is experience in general – see 
Chapter Three), and the historical body adds sediments with every moment, 
materiality (whether human or not) is in constant flux. This validates the 
assumption that fixed stereotypes evoke the other by default, since the non-
universal and transient ‘alter’ is closer to our inherent historicity as transient beings. 
As Tobin Siebers (2008, p. 92) puts it in relation to disability, the concept of the 
human, as well as the human being him/herself, is a work in progress and does not 
involve fixed definitions. 
In the case of June and the wall, there are four levels of historicity operating 
simultaneously: firstly, the historicity of the wall, which spans several centuries; 
secondly, the historicity of June in relation to the wall; thirdly, my historicity and 
that of the filmmaking process which spans the past three years; and fourthly, the 
historicity of the audience watching the film. Throughout history, the wall has 
adopted a range of identities that are to a certain extent assimilated into Junes’ 
own historicity, which is mediated through the objectification between her and the 
wall observed on the pre-filmic level. These identities include the wall as the 
fortification of a medieval town, a literary inspiration, a friend, an object of 
custodianship, a garden wall, a backdrop and a nuisance. This sedimentation of 
transient identities also occurs in the scene with the piece of marble, where June 
recounts how the stone has been part of four different homes and three 
generations, a fact that is visually reflected by close-ups of the stone, showing 
June’s hands touching its layered surface. 
Material proximity 
In relation to Smith’s (1994) spatial and subjective alignment, as well as to the 
concept of objectification, I deliberately chose to avoid a conventional interview 
situation, where June would comfortably sit indoors, talking about the wall, 
illustrated by cutaways of it. Apart from disembodying her voice, this would have 
resulted in a clear geographical distinction between shots of the subject talking in 
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one space and cutaways of the object in another, which would fail to mediate the 
notion of objectification. As a consequence, all these encounters with June took 
place in material proximity to the wall. 
With regards to the peripersonal space (mentioned above), this pre-filmic 
strategy allows her body to naturally mediate the historical dimension of the 
objectification between June and the wall through the way she moves in relation to 
it and through her ‘idiolect’ – the voice that characterises an individual through 
tones, word-choices and distinctive phraseology (Paget and Roscoe, 2006). Because 
the idiolect is situated – that is, determined by external (interaction with different 
people and objects) and internal circumstances (such as mood and well-being) – it 
anchors the character in a particular space and time. For example, June’s idiolect 
when talking about the wall crumbling sounds concerned, while her idiolect when 
talking about its rebuilding sounds content. The post-filmic variations of her 
idiolects that accompany all the wall scenes embody her historicity in relation to the 
wall. As Edward Branigan (1989, p. 315) suggests, it is in this way that sound is 
perceived and evaluated within a discourse. The combination of momentary sounds 
and sounds that are evaluated narratively, especially when occurring in similar 
situations, means that the spectator must actively search, discriminate and 
remember variations of sound motifs (p. 317). 
 
5.3.2 Post-filmic methods 
Conceptual blending 
The post-filmic aim is to mediate a ‘blend’ of historical identities in relation to June 
and the wall. Conceptual blending, according to Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner 
(2003, p. 57), is a basic cognitive operation that results in new meaning and global 
insight, as well as being a fundamental feature of everyday life that allows us to 
manipulate a diffuse range of meanings. It involves the construction of a partial 
match between two (or more) input mental spaces into a novel blended mental 
space (p. 58). The partial match constitutes schematic attributes that both inputs 
share, but it is only when they blend that a new structure develops, which 
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nonetheless remains connected to the inputs (p. 59). In a sense, the blended space 
is ambivalent, lying somewhere between the ‘sum’ of discreet elements and a new 
conceptual structure.  
Conceptual blending is essentially the principle behind Sergei Eisenstein’s 
(1949, pp. 82–83) dialectical montage, in particular his method of ‘intellectual 
montage’, in which conflicting elements are juxtaposed in order to create a novel, 
intellectual synthesis. Eisenstein’s ‘montage’ is an efficient post-filmic method for 
achieving conceptual blending, but the inputs need not be antithetical to each 
other, they just have to be different enough yet linked by a common denominator. 
This makes conceptual blending induced through montage an excellent post-filmic 
metaphor for objectification, which is based on the relationship between animate 
and inanimate materialities, the common denominator being ‘action’ and 
‘perception’. The input mental spaces for conceptual blending can also be 
diachronic, which also makes it a good metaphor for historicity.     
What follows is an outline of the four scenes that feature the wall, which 
technically makes it a narrative motif. Motifs will be discussed in detail in the next 
chapter, but for now it is important to examine different conceptual blending 
strategies in each scene, the aim of which is to elicit an audience experience of 
historicity through juxtaposing the transient historical identities of the wall and 
those of June. By promoting alterity, this strategy prevents fixed meanings for both 
of these ‘characters’ and mediates Merleau-Ponty’s dialectic of the historical and 
the in-the-moment body. In addition, given that the wall is a narrative motif, the 
spectator’s own historicity during the viewing process is part of the conceptual 
blending process.     
Scene ‘The Wall 1’:55
                                                             
55 08:24 
 June introduces the wall by picking up pieces of rubble 
dislodged from the wall and replacing them, all the while talking about its history 
and materiality, mentioning how it inspired her to start writing and expressing 
concern about its deterioration as a result of the weather. This is followed by a 
short segment of June with her first book, The Wall, commenting on the cover 
photo and the stories (figure 28). This scene blends the different historical identities 
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of the wall by mediating it as the wall of a former medieval town, a literary 
inspiration, a friend and an object of custodianship. The blending is a result of 
June’s different accounts and idiolects, but it is most prominently embodied in the 
juxtaposition of June in the garden interacting with the wall with June in the study 
interacting with the book and talking about its cover. Adding another layer of 
history to the actuality in her study, she recounts how she asked David, her partner, 
to photograph only part of the wall for the cover photo. Being blind, she can 
imagine the wall in its former, complete state, so she wanted the picture to evoke 
the gestalt of the entire wall in the reader’s mind. The coherence of the momentary 
material experience is maintained by refraining from intercutting between the two 
locations, keeping them as two discrete yet related episodic encounters within the 
same scene. This blends not only the several different identities of the wall with 
those of June, but also reflexively reveals two pre-filmic encounters within the 
history of the filmmaking process, since the majority of the other scenes are based 
on single pre-filmic encounters. 
 
  
Figure 28: Scene: ‘The Wall 1’ 
 
Scene ‘The Wall 2’:56
                                                             
56 19:57 
 June is sitting in the garden near the wall, enjoying the 
warm summer’s sun (figure 29). She recounts an anecdote about the time she 
considered displaying the wall to the public as part of the local annual ‘Secret 
Garden’ event. In the end, she changed her mind. Again, two historical events 
blend; the wall’s present and its past, which elicited its present, remain as part of 
June’s private space. This blends the wall’s identities as an object of custodianship 
and as a former medieval town wall, which is no longer a fortification but a ‘secret’ 
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attraction. The attractive qualities of the wall and the garden are visualised through 
close-ups of wildlife (spiders, flies, plants), and the wall adopts a further identity as 
a micro-habitat (see figure 29, below). 
 
  
Figure 29: Scene: ‘The Wall 2’ 
 
Scene ‘The Wall 3’: 57
                                                             
57 26:19 
 June, sitting in the garden, presents the newly 
refurbished wall (figure 30, below), which is illustrated through a montage of close-
ups of the wall. Then, June’s voice gives way to an actress’s, reading from the first 
chapter in June’s book, The Wall (figure 30). This tells the story of Freya, a 
thirteenth-century merchant’s daughter, who confides in the wall, telling it about 
her arranged marriage. Several historical timelines and identities are blended here. 
The refurbished wall is a sedimentation of both the original and the derelict wall; 
Freya’s voice further evokes its original historical identity (in its complete state in a 
public space) and its identity as a friend; in addition, her fictional voice evokes the 
wall’s identity as simultaneously a literary inspiration and an inspiration for June’s 
identity as a writer. This second part of the scene reveals the wall’s filmic identity, 
overtly rendered and bracketed by the filmmaker. This is reinforced by the 
ambivalent blending of present and past everyday as the actress’s voice overlaps 
with the sounds of the film’s present-day location. This is an obvious shift from 
previous representations of the wall, in which June was corporeally interacting with 
it in a coherent spatio-temporal continuum. For a brief moment, the wall becomes 
part of the film’s historicity. 
 
 
140 
Filmically bracketing the wall also relates to a certain separation that June 
and the wall have undergone since the first scene. June acknowledges, in the first 
part of this scene, that since its refurbishment she touches the wall much less, given 
that there are no more crumbling pieces to put back in place. This lack of 
interaction is shown through the wide shots where she merely ‘looks’ at but does 
not interact with it. The wall’s identity as a garden wall is sedimented onto its 
previous identities and it shifts into the background of the story, mediated through 
the shot’s composition which places the wall in the background. When the wall 
adopts its filmic identity, all the spectator experiences are filmic artefacts: close-ups 
and the actress’s voice-over. Shots of June are completely omitted. This temporarily 
etic experience evokes June’s affective separation from the wall.   
 
  
Voice-over (Freya): “She ran onwards, up the street between the market-goers and into a 
narrow lane beside the wall. ... Its nooks and crannies made it look friendly to her. ... She had 
always told it her troubles and indeed the few joys she had had. It was her only real friend.” 
Figure 30: Scene: ‘The Wall 3’ 
 
Scene ‘The Wall 4’:58
                                                             
58 36:46 
 June is sitting in her garden, interacting with her cat 
and her dog (figure 31), and talking about how the wall is responsible for the damp 
in the living room. She explains that the wall appears to be part of the exterior wall 
of the house itself, and the porous rock channels the water into the house, as 
illustrated by a corresponding shot (figure 32). Interestingly, June’s idiolect has a 
concerned undertone, reminiscent of the first scene, only now she is not concerned 
at the wall’s deterioration but at the fact it is causing damp and incurring costs, a 
historical development which the audience can only infer. The fact that June plays 
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with her pets and does not interact with or even ‘look’ at the wall is revealing 
insofar as it shows that the wall has been relegated to being a garden wall, a tacit, 
utilitarian object, with its former identities mere memories. Post-filmically, this is 
mediated by the mise-en-scène: the garden bench that was previously positioned 
perpendicularly to the wall is now facing away from it, placing the wall behind June. 
This is emphasised by the camera perspective that places the wall once again in the 
compositional background. In addition, since the shots are static and the audience’s 
visual perception is not focused by any plot-related tasks, the motion in the area 
where June interacts with her pets attracts the gaze, marginalising the wall even 
further (see Smith and Mital, 2013). Overall, the audience experiences the wall as 
peripheral to the present moment, since, apart from its identity as a cost-incurring 
nuisance, the wall is not part of any conceptual blending. This is editorially 
reinforced by the almost complete absence of individual shots of the wall, unlike 
the previous scenes. 
 
  
Figure 31: Scene: ‘The Wall 4’ 
 
 
Figure 32: Dampness 
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The two-shot 
A crucial post-filmic tactic used to mediate corporeal proximity and objectification is 
the two-shot in different size variations (figures 33-35), especially in the first scene, 
which mediates the wall’s identities that are most intimate to June. Two-shots show 
two characters within the same frame, without resorting to the shot-reverse-shot 
cluster. At its basis, the two-shot works through the gestalt law of proximity: stimuli 
that are closer together are perceived as groups, while stimuli that are not close 
appear to be separate (Sternberg and Sternberg, 2012, p. 115). The two-shot 
emphasises proximity through bracketing two subjects from the wider scene, 
creating a ‘homo-spatiality’ in which entities inhabit the same space-time 
coordinates, becoming a unified entity (Carroll, 1996, p. 214). In this case, the two 
entities are June and the wall. 
 
 
Figure 33: The wall as a friend 
 
 
Figure 34: The wall as an object of custodianship 
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Figure 35: The wall as a garden wall 
 
A single shot that homo-spatially and homo-temporally frames the 
perceiving character and the perceived object, results in a strong, embodied, 
cognitive metaphor for perception as an act of contact between both entities 
(Coëgnarts and Kravanja, 2015, pp. 225–227). Thus, in the tradition of 
objectification, perception does not favour the perceiver over the perceived; rather, 
it constitutes a relational locus of mediation. It is paramount to emphasise the 
combination between homo-spatiality and homo-temporality, which means that 
the two characters are neither spatially separated by cuts (for example, reaction 
shots and point-of-view shots), nor temporally separated by camera pans (for 
example, from a close-up of June’s face to a close-up of her hands touching the 
wall) or zooms. Similarly, the use of split screen or superimposition may also be 
homogenous in terms of space and time, but it would call attention to the film as an 
authorial artefact, resulting in an etic experience. 
The integrity of the two-shot also mediates June’s spatial anchoring within 
the general space, but also in relation to the wall. The spectator’s cognitive load is 
focused on June’s ‘diagnostic’ sensory features that “enable an organism to 
perceptually recognize the identity, shape, location, and affordances of objects and 
events in the environment” (Carroll and Seeley, 2013, p. 62). The audience 
experiences the ‘diagnosticity’ between the two ‘characters’ – their embodied 
dispositions to interact with each other through speech, approach, turns, ‘looks’ 
and touch. June’s diagnosticity, which is emphasised by the varying shot sizes of the 
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two-shot, also mediates the different identities of the wall, such as friend (figure 
33), object of custodianship (figure 34) and garden wall (figure 35). 
Consequently, there is an intentional limitation of close-ups in the first wall 
scene, not least because they would fragment and abstract the space, as discussed 
in the previous chapter. The few close-ups (figure 36) mediate the materiality of the 
wall, showing rocks, fissures and moss, and one shot of June touching these. 
However, these close shots are preceded and succeeded by a majority of wider two-
shots, so the overall audience experience is informed by the two-shots. Conversely, 
the use of close-ups and lack of two-shots in the second part of the third scene has 
the reverse effect of breaking the unity between June and the wall. In the last 
scene, the shots do feature both ‘characters’, but because of the lack of corporeal 
interaction and the wall’s situation in the background, the shots are not two-shots 
as such, since June is foregrounded and she attracts the gaze through her 
movements (interacting with her pets). In these shots, there is still a certain homo-
spatiality, but the wall constitutes its periphery. 
 
  
 
Figure 36: Close-ups 
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5.4 The domestic space 
5.4.1 Pre-filmic methods 
The home 
According to Dant (1999, p. 60), “[a]s well as being a material entity itself, the house 
is a locus for material culture, a meeting point for people and things, in which social 
relationships and material relationships are almost indistinguishable because both 
are bound together in the routine practice of everyday life”. The home may offer 
the best display for Baudrillard’s ‘private totality’, as it holds the collection of 
possessed, but also utilised, objects. Through this collection of ordinary things, 
which the collector can see, touch, hear and smell, the home as a space becomes a 
place of intimacy, whereby the locus of intimacy is not inside us but evoked through 
experiencing the collection (Tuan, 1977, p. 144). 
However, the concept of home is not straightforward. For instance, David 
Morley (2000) highlights the semantic heterogeneity of the concept by discussing 
the home as a construct based on individual and collective identity, media and 
mobility, including not only dwelling spaces, but also, among other things, 
communities, localities and territorialities. Mary Douglas (1991, p. 289) defines 
home as a space under control, where control delineates the ability to establish and 
temporally maintain a certain structure or appearance. Morley’s and Douglas’s 
definitions are useful, especially since the idea of home needs to be tailored to the 
everyday experience of the individual characters. For instance, Terry rarely leaves 
his domestic space, not even to explore the small park behind his house, although 
he loves nature, especially trees. During my encounters with him both inside and 
outside his domestic space, I noticed that this hermitic life style is a result of his 
perception of the ‘outside’ world as beyond his control. Inside, the totality of 
objects has a particular structure that allows Terry to easily navigate around the 
flat. 
In contrast to Terry’s small apartment, June lives in a bigger home, which 
has resulted in her spatial awareness being more honed and flexible when it comes 
to novel material situations. For example, in every wall scene, the garden has a 
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different arrangement of the bench, flower pots and other objects, and each time 
June appears to master the change in spatial structure. Her spatial acuity also shows 
when she moves through Harwich, her small home town, which, unlike Terry’s noisy 
urban environment, has relatively little traffic and where the noises of sea, birds, 
people, boats and cars are moderate enough to be distinguishable and not merely a 
cacophony. Hence, June’s concept of home expands beyond her actual house. This 
is manifest in her profound historical knowledge of Harwich (which she displays in 
several scenes) and through the fact that she has bought additional properties in 
the town: a second house (for guests or to rent out) and two beach huts. June’s 
extended experience of home is also post-filmically mediated by showing a variety 
of scenes with June taking place in local public places, whereas all the scenes with 
Terry and Pam are located in their tiny flat.   
Disability and the home 
The decision concerning which domestic activities to film was not only dictated by 
everyday life, but also by issues of representation, since this project aims to neither 
normalise nor exoticise disability. If all post-filmic encounters showed Terry or June 
performing domestic activities that highlight the fact they are inhibited by their 
disability, then the audience would experience them as other. Conversely, if all 
encounters intentionally obscured their disability, then it would deny an essential 
factor of emic experience. For this reason, I chose to film activities that offer a 
balance between these two poles, one that relates to the characters’ own 
consciousness of their bodies. According to Rob Imrie (2004, p. 751), in everyday 
domestic life, the body tends to disappear from consciousness – until it asserts itself 
through pain, disease or bodily dysfunction, when the impaired body becomes 
conscious and is “experienced ‘as-alien-being-in-the-world’”, especially during 
embodied encounters with spatial norms that cater primarily for non-disabled 
people.  
Examples of the conscious and alienated body are seen when Pam describes 
an illustration of a painting to Terry, leading his finger over the page to give him a 
haptic sense of the composition (figure 37), and when Terry accidently bumps into 
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my camera, dropping his cigarette. June, meanwhile, is shown several times being 
guided by David as they walk through Harwich (figure 38), instead of walking on her 
own with a stick (which she could do, but would find more difficult). Furthermore, 
in several outdoor scenes, David gives June descriptions of specific objects in the 
environment, such as the position of sailing boats (figure 39).  
 
 
Figure 37: Terry being body-conscious 
 
 
Figure 38: David guiding June 
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Figure 39: David describing objects in the environment for June 
 
Examples of the unconscious body – when the disability is not consciously 
perceived as an inhibitor – occur when Terry is preparing the plasticine for his 
painting (figure 40) and June is knitting (figure 41). However, numerous other 
scenes, such as June putting away the dishes (figure 42), show an oscillation 
between Imrie’s two bodily states, reinforcing the notion of the disabled body as an 
ordinary part of the two characters’ everyday lives. 
 
 
Figure 40: Preparing plasticine 
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Figure 41: Knitting 
 
 
Figure 42: Putting away dishes 
 
5.4.2 Post-filmic methods 
The Rückenfigur 
The mediation of the characters as an objectified part of their domestic material 
totality is conceptualised through the motif of the Rückenfigur (back figure), a trope 
found in several paintings, in which characters seem to merge with their 
surroundings, creating one material unity, especially if the colour or luminosity of 
space and bodies match (figure 43). 
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The Art of Painting 
(J. Vermeer, 1665 – 1668) 
 
Man at his Desk 
(G. F. Kersting, 1811) 
Woman at a Window 
(C. D. Friedrich, 1822) 
 
 
 
Looking Back 
(Michael King, n.d.) 
 
Girl in the Kitchen 
(Anne Ancher, 1886) 
Sunlight in the Blue Room 
(Anne Ancher, 1891) 
  
Man and Woman Contemplating the Moon 
(C. D. Friedrich, 1824) 
Summer Evening on Skagen Southern Beach 
with Anna Ancher and Marie Krøyer 
(P. S. Krøyer, 1893) 
 
Figure 43: Rückenfigur 
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Willi Wolfradts (cited in Sugiyama, 2009, p. 6), referring to Caspar David 
Friedrich’s Rückenfigur paintings, identifies a reciprocity of two elements: the 
landscape (or space) and the human being. The back figure within the space 
manifests the consonance between the Weltseele (‘world soul’ or anima mundi) and 
Einzelseele (individual soul). For Herbert Von Einem (cited in Sugiyama, 2009, p. 6), 
the human being and the space exist in reference to each other, and are creatures 
of the ‘whole’. The anima mundi concept both writers allude to has a parallel in the 
anthropological concept of objectification, where the boundaries between animate 
and inanimate are transcended and objects are seen as embodiments of their 
human possessors/perceivers/producers/users, and vice versa. Arguably, in this 
context, and in relation to the back shot scenes in my films, the back figure evokes 
an engagement with the anima mundi materialis.  
Below are examples of back shots (figure 44), in which the characters’ 
bodies ‘objectify’ the surrounding space, placing June and Terry as part of their very 
possessed ‘private totalities’. Note that most back-shot filming was carried out 
when characters wore clothes that, due to their colour and luminosity, seemed to 
merge with their environment. Also, these scenes were carefully framed so that the 
audience not only sees the main character’s back, but also the surrounding clutter 
of objects. According to James Cutting and Kacie Armstrong (2016, p. 896), this 
background clutter can be defined as “structured ground against which a figure 
appears”, and it can be measured by, among other things, the salience of image 
features and the relative number of edges in the image. To increase the clutter 
around the bodies, my back shots augment the density of the features and edges in 
the surrounding space, which is a result of mise-en-scène (busy spaces), shot size 
(wider shots that increase clutter), 59  focal length (deep focus that increases 
clutter)60
  
 and framing (congested foregrounds that frame characters and place 
them in mid-ground). 
                                                             
59 See Cutting and Armstrong (2016) 
60 See Cutting and Armstrong (2016) 
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June making coffee June and David at the beach hut 
  
 
Terry painting 
 
Terry and Pam solving a crossword 
  
Figure 44: Back shots of Terry and June 
 
Cluttering my back shots was a deliberate strategy as it impedes object 
identification (Cutting and Armstrong, 2016; Levi, 2008). In this way, bodies and 
body movements appear to merge with the material environment, and this is 
emphasised by the choice of back shots displaying a high affinity (in terms of colour 
and luminosity) between the characters and the space, as well as by the omission of 
faces, which would distract the spectator’s gaze away from the overall space. 
Generally, film scenes provide the audience with ‘frontality’, in order to guide the 
viewer’s attention to facial expressions (Bordwell and Thompson, 2008, p. 152), 
eliciting an affective response (Plantinga, 1999, p. 240). However, in the back shot, 
the body is robbed of its subjective identity and itself becomes part of the 
characters’ private totality of material possessions, thus mediating objectification 
and the situatedness of the moment. Nevertheless, with regards to Plantinga’s 
(1999) and Smith’s (1994) empathy theories, which highlight the importance of 
facial recognition, too many back shots in the films would inevitably ‘other’ the 
characters. Therefore, all of these shots appear later in the narrative, when the 
audience has already become familiar with the characters’ different facial 
expressions. 
 
 
153 
The wide static long take 
To sustain the experience of objectification, most back shots are wide and static, 
and last for a long duration (this is sometimes referred to as a ‘tableau shot’); 
hence, it is a locus where the pre-filmic and post-filmic inextricably merge. For 
example, in one scene, Terry makes tea and then sits down to have a chat with Pam 
about moving to a bigger home61
 
 (figure 45). 
  
Figure 45: Terry and Pam talking about a bigger home 
 
The shot shows Pam’s back and inhibits Terry’s frontality. Pre-filmically, the long 
take’s advantage lies in the fact that the characters were not distracted by my 
moving around, trying to get the best perspectives; they engaged in conversations 
that naturally flowed from one topic to another, sometimes with clear associations, 
sometimes randomly, but ultimately focusing on how little space they have and 
how they need to move to a bigger flat. The topic of their conversation is efficiently 
mediated through the long take of the cluttered space, which leaves little room for 
moving or even sitting. Terry’s negative experience of his home is mediated through 
using visual cluttering techniques (identified above) throughout the film, not only in 
back shots. With reference to Smith’s (1994) character engagement model, 
mentioned above, this creates a spectatorial spatial alignment between the 
spectator and Terry, which embodies subjective access to Terry’s feelings about his 
home. 
The wide static long take also emphasises the everyday oscillation between 
body-consciousness and body-unconsciousness with regards to disability. Terry 
                                                             
61 Scene: ‘Bigger Home’ - 06:22 
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moves fairly ably through the flat, but in some instances he subtly touches pieces of 
furniture and other objects (such as the kitchen towel – see figure 45) to navigate 
his way around. As in Miller’s interpretation of objectification, it could be argued 
that the autonomy and agency of material space determines Terry’s movements 
through ‘bodily affordances’.62
Furthermore, the audience’s gaze is not only prone to perceive material 
space, but it also becomes spectatorially divergent. Tim Smith (2013, p. 183) shows 
that the wider, the longer and the more static a shot, the more dispersed and less 
clustered the gaze as it scans the screen, especially if there is an absence of human 
faces and the visual composition or plot does not direct the gaze to specific areas. 
This endogenous control of the gaze is determined by the spectator’s subjectivity 
(desires), and it results in a less predictable and more subjective focal attention 
(Hasson et al., 2008; Smith, 2013). In other words, the lack of narrative and 
aesthetic cues or stimuli, and the focus on the present moment, creates an 
attentional ambiguity that prompts the viewer’s gaze to roam idiosyncratically 
around the entire image until it comes to rest on a preferred point (possibly Terry or 
Pam).  
 As Miller (2001, p. 4) observes, the home is not only 
the product of human agency, but it is an agent itself.  
 
 
Figure 46: Scene: ‘Conceptual Art’ 
 
                                                             
62 For an explanation of Gibson’s (1986) ‘affordance theory’, see Chapter Three 
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The agency of the space also apparently prompts Terry and Pam to discuss 
‘space’, without any cues from me; they discuss the amount of rooms they need to 
accommodate Terry’s paintings and Pam’s books. In another scene63
Using the wide static long take, with its lack of insert shots or other vantage 
points, in combination with a clear denial of frontality, is also an embodiment of 
MacDougall’s deep reflexivity (see Chapter Three), a tableau vivant that exposes an 
audience to the post-filmic act of bracketing this encounter through the camera 
frame. Contradicting André Bazin’s theory of experiencing diegetic realism through 
the long take, Peter Wollen (cited in Hill and Gibson, 1998, pp. 28–29) identifies the 
long take as a mannerist, Brechtian tableau dramaturgy, where duration becomes 
an overt stylistic feature, which is reinforced if the camera is static. In addition, the 
departure from the spectatorially expected continuity editing (or at least from 
invisible elliptical cuts to compress time) is in itself reflexive (Nichols, 2001, p. 128). 
This results in the spectator experiencing the camera as an embodiment not only of 
the apparatus, but also of the filmmaker him/herself. As Nichols (1991, p. 85) puts 
it, “the camera becomes more than an anthropomorphic symbol and locus. It 
becomes the physical embodiment of the human being behind it.” Jay Ruby (2005, 
 (figure 46) they 
discuss conceptual art. Pam reads Terry a newspaper article about a large boat that 
was scuttled as part of an artistic performance; Terry, not impressed, sarcastically 
proposes his own idea of conceptual art: a film camera fixed at the bottom of a 
toilet. Terry’s imaginary art object carries several innuendos. Apart from the 
scatological reference to the quality and value of conceptual art (which Terry 
detests), there is a clear reference to the camera that is filming him, and the 
audience itself. His frequently sarcastic remarks exhibit his love-hate relationship 
with the camera, but also his performance for the audience, which will be further 
discussed in the next chapter. It is also interesting that he juxtaposes the camera, 
the most ordinary object in the filming process, and the toilet, one of the most 
ordinary objects in a home. Thus, Terry brackets and conceptually blends two of the 
most ‘blindingly obvious’ objects (to use Miller’s earlier reference) within their own 
private totalities, the pro-filmic and the filmic. 
                                                             
63 Scene: ‘Conceptual Art’ - 29:18 
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p. 35) argues that filmmakers have an ethical obligation to be reflexive, but 
although a more conspicuous, ‘non-deep’ reflexivity would mediate etic experience, 
the long, static back shot provides an ambivalence where the emic and etic are 
temporarily blended.  
Cross-cutting 
June’s extended home is explored in a montage sequence that depicts Harwich and 
Walthamstow in London, where June used to live before moving.64
 
 Binary opposites 
in terms of visuals and sounds are used to mediate June’s motivation for moving out 
of London, and the peace and inspiration she has found in Harwich, resulting in a 
traditional intellectual montage in Eisenstein’s tradition (figure 47). For example, all 
the wide shots of London depict busy streets, emphasising the crowds and lack of 
depth and space through the visual composition. By contrast, the Harwich wide 
shots emphasise space and depth. The soundscape is also diametrically opposed: 
London’s cacophony of traffic and people is juxtaposed with Harwich’s subtle 
sounds of the sea, the voices of individual pedestrians and the sound of occasional 
cars. The common denominator of this conceptual blending is June’s voice-over, 
which briefly explains her move from London to Harwich.   
  
Figure 47: Scene: ‘From London to Harwich’ 
 
Although this strategy adheres to folk-psychological narrative formulas in its 
use of binary opposites (urban/rural, land/sea, confusion/tranquillity) to mediate 
June’s reasons for moving, these opposites do not relate to June’s disability but 
                                                             
64 Scene: ‘From London to Harwich’ – 11:41 
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compare everyday life in London, as lived and recounted by June, and everyday life 
in Harwich, as lived by her now and as experienced through the film. Further, these 
opposites, according to the theory of conceptual blending, merge into a new 
ambivalent mental space, in which their opposition transcends into a new, everyday 
for June – a sedimented everyday, whose past layers have triggered her affinity 
towards Harwich as an extended home. Similar to the first two wall scenes, this 
montage sequence blends different historical identities of June, and embodies a 
filmic bracketing that makes the spectator experience the film artefact, though on 
an emic level. As with the long take, it is a form of deep reflexivity that mediates the 
mediation of emic experience.   
Still life 
Another post-filmic strategy to mediate the everydayness of the domestic interior is 
inspired by still-life paintings. A montage of filmed shots of inanimate objects and 
spaces in Terry’s65 and June’s66
  
 homes without the bodily presence of the characters 
occurs in one scene in each film respectively, giving an overview of their very 
distinct domestic spaces (figure 48). As Terry is a painter, there is an entire scene in 
his film called ‘Still Life’, which resembles a montage of still-life motifs. On the other 
hand, the shots of June’s home are part of the London-Harwich scene, and they 
include still-life shots of her extended home (Harwich), as well as her actual house. 
                                                             
65 Scene: ‘Still Life’ – 13:00 
66 Scene: ‘From London to Harwich’ – 12:49 
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Terry – Scene: ‘Still Life’ 
   
   
   
 
June – Scene: ‘From London to Harwich’ 
   
   
   
Figure 48: Still lives 
 
The main purpose of these scenes is for the spectator to experience material 
artefacts as, in Baudrillard’s term, a ‘collection’ of tools and possessions. It would 
seem that this strategy goes against emic experience and the concept of 
objectification. However, the depicted spaces and objects in these scenes are not 
completely divorced from their human counterparts, since they occur in the middle 
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of the films, after Terry and June have been established in terms of facial and bodily 
recognition and anchored in their respective domestic spaces. The spectator 
perceives these objects as constituting the characters’ private totality, which is 
reinforced by several of the spaces and objects, such as the brush and the stone, 
appearing in other scenes. All the shots show the objects at rest, enabling the 
audience to connect to the “thingly actuality” of these ordinary things (Highmore, 
2011, p. 59). 
The still lives also stress the material affordances of their domestic space. As 
mentioned previously, affordances constitute the relations between an organism 
and an object that affords the opportunity for that organism to perform an action. 
Affordance involves the action-readiness of the organism, as well as the physical 
qualities of the objects. The still-life scenes mediate the physical qualities of the 
space in relation to spatial motility, inferring whether potential action-readinesses 
for characters would call the disabled body into consciousness or not. For instance, 
in Terry’s small flat, the material clutter results in low affordances in terms of body 
movement, which is exemplified in other scenes where Terry has to touch objects in 
order to navigate. Overall, this aligns with Terry’s frequent consciousness of his 
disabled body, experiencing it as ‘alien-being-in-the-world’, to use Imrie’s term. This 
is embodied by numerous on-camera references to being blind, which is further 
discussed in the next chapter. Conversely, in June’s house, the large spaces result in 
high body-movement affordance, which can be experienced, for example, in the 
coffee-making scene. This aligns with the fact that she makes almost no on-camera 
references about her blindness, mediating her disabled body as an implicit, not 
alienating, part of her everyday life.  
In a similar way to the previous tableau shots, the still-life aesthetic conjures 
up the private totality of everyday things, mediating ordinariness and a diversity of 
particular character traits through the depiction of a plethora of particular objects 
and spaces. These are captured through a range of shot sizes (wide shots, medium 
shots, close-ups), in order to prevent the fragmentation of space and to anchor 
particular objects into a larger space. The still-life aesthetic is another form of filmic 
bracketing that is deeply reflexive, especially since non-diegetic sound is used in 
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both cases. Terry’s sequence is overlaid with a piece of music, the significance of 
which will be discussed in the next chapter, and June’s sequence is overlaid with an 
actress’s voice-over quoting related passages from her autobiography. Hence, this 
authorial bracketing works not only on an aesthetic level, but also on a narrative 
level, since these are very rare but prominent instances of the use of non-diegetic 
sound – at the same time, however, the ordinariness of the things themselves is 
mediated. Ordinary objects which are usually relegated to the periphery, escaping 
the viewer’s visual awareness as they are ‘blindingly obvious’, are foregrounded. 
This places the audience in an anamorphic position that ambiguously highlights the 
objects’ ordinariness by making them extraordinary. It could be even argued that, 
through the reflexive bracketing techniques mentioned earlier, the spectator has a 
metacognitive experience, becoming aware of the way he/she generally ignores 
ordinary, vernacular objects and spaces.  
 
5.5 The intersubjective object 
5.5.1 Pre-filmic methods 
Objects also mediate intersubjectively between people (Dant, 1999). Søren 
Overgaard and Dan Zahavi (2009) deem intersubjectivity the foundation of social 
reality (p. 93), which can be investigated through one subject’s experiential access 
to another (p. 101). In the scene ‘June and David’,67
                                                             
67 21:46 
 for example, June explains the 
meaning of the Claddagh rings she and David are wearing, and how these rings 
symbolise their deep connection, while David listens (figure 49). The rings have 
several functions in relation to intersubjective mediation. Firstly, they function as a 
symbolic code: as signifiers they communicate their meaning to others, performing 
a quasi-social task (Woodward, 2007, p. 58). They stand for June’s and David’s 
commitment to and affection towards each other, which is brought the fore when 
June consciously talks about their relationship, thus entering into Richardson’s self-
conscious mode of being. However, the rings do not only signify their relationship 
but also its status – as June explains, if the crown looks upward, the woman is not 
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available, if it looks downward, she is either widowed or has fallen out with her 
partner. David’s facial and bodily reactions embody the momentary and historical 
intersubjectivity elicited by the rings. The rings’ symbolism is not established by the 
film in order to be interpreted by the audience, but is expressed by June as part of 
her emic experience.  
 
  
Figure 49: June’s and David’s rings 
 
Further, the rings embody the couple’s relationship aesthetically. In the 
context of consumption practices, objects express the individual’s own stylistic 
preferences and signify socio-economic status (Woodward, 2007, pp. 113–114). 
June mentions that “cheap and nasty ones” are available, but she and David bought 
theirs at a quality jewellery shop and did not even enquire about the price before 
purchasing them, which surprised the shop assistant as they are made of expensive 
Irish gold. Thus, the aesthetic quality of the gold mediates June’s and David’s socio-
economic status, as well as the strength of their bond. My personal impression 
during that encounter was that June mentions the rings’ economic and material 
value because she wants to express their commitment to each other and not her 
social status, although the rings clearly embody both. In addition, the fact that June 
talks about this intimate relationship in a public space – the local pier – mediates 
her experience of the home, which extends beyond the wall of her house into the 
town itself. 
In another example (Scene: ‘Terry’68
                                                             
68 00:04 
), Pam describes an illustration of a 
painting in an art book to Terry, an everyday activity they undertake to maintain his 
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visual memory (figure 50). The book is primarily an intersubjective mediator rather 
than a signifier: it mediates an intimate moment of trust, in which Terry fully relies 
on Pam’s verbal cues to create a mental representation of the painting. This 
simulacrum is painstakingly created through a series of repetitive question and 
answers, haptic interactions (for example, Pam leading Terry’s finger over the page 
in order to spatially grasp the composition) and moments of silence in which Terry 
attempts to mentally complete the simulacrum. The book does not just mediate 
between the couple in terms of communication, but also in terms of affective 
corporeality, prompting them to touch each other’s hands and sit close to one 
another, embodying the closeness of their relationship. 
 
  
Figure 50: Pam describing a painting to Terry 
 
However, the book also embodies Terry’s fading visual memory and the 
extent of his dependence on Pam; he is not able to acquire the visual knowledge by 
himself and needs Pam to act as a mediator. This is manifest through Pam’s verbal 
and tactile attempts to transfer that knowledge from the book to Terry. In this 
sense, both the book and Pam are mediating agents, while Terry is the receiver of 
that mediation, being clearly at an epistemological disadvantage. However, overall 
in the film, Terry is not disadvantaged, since Pam’s act of verbal description is only 
an ordinary, but not essential, part of his everyday life. Rather than an act that helps 
him fulfil more basic needs such as making tea (which indeed he does on his own in 
another scene), it is a moment of social reality, in which each character has 
experiential access to the other.   
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5.5.2 Post-filmic methods 
Repetitions and camera framing 
The above scene involves several structural repetitions and circularities in order to 
mediate Pam’s effort to describe the painting to Terry, and his effort to visualise it. 
The conventional editing process is usually supposed to simplify scenes by creating 
a logical progression and omitting non-relevant or repeated plot points. In this 
scene, however, I do exactly the opposite. For example, Terry keeps asking about 
the direction of the river in the painting as he tries to recreate the visual 
perspective in his mind. At the end of the scene, it is still not clear whether he can 
properly visualise it or not. 
In terms of framing, the scene also uses a variety of two-shots that mediates 
the intersubjectivity of both characters, but these two-shots also include close-ups 
that show both their hands and the book (figure 51). The wider shots mediate 
bodily intersubjectivity, while the close shots mediate haptic intersubjectivity. 
 
  
  
Figure 51: Two-shots of Terry and Pam 
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Mood 
The main post-filmic strategy for the ring scene, which took place on the local pier, 
is the mediation of a certain mood that relates to the warm and intimate 
relationship between June and David, as well as to the aesthetic qualities of the 
rings. According to Greg Smith (2003, p. 38), a “mood is a preparatory state in which 
one is seeking an opportunity to express a particular emotion”. Moods are states of 
expectancies that make us open to cues that will elicit emotions, and these states 
encourage us “to evaluate the environment in a mood-congruent fashion” (p. 38). 
On the one hand, we may be at home on a dark, rainy day, for example, but if our 
mood is positive, we are bound to perceive environmental cues, such as the sound 
of the rain against the window, as equally joyful sensory stimuli that contribute to 
how we feel. If, on the other hand, we are in a melancholy mood, we may perceive 
the same sound as a form of Chinese water torture. A mood sustains the evaluation 
of and openness towards emotive cues, but a series of emotive cues are necessary 
to maintain the mood – mood and emotion sustain each other (p. 42).  
The emotive cues in the ring scene include a variety of shots of June and 
David walking arm-in-arm to the pier, the sea, the sunset, and June and David sitting 
together, with their bodies reflecting the warm sunlight (figure 52). In conjunction 
with June’s description of the rings, these shots create a calm, warm, intimate 
mood that not only mediates their relationship, but also the materiality of the rings 
in terms of their golden, lustrous surfaces. Smith calls these emotive cues, ‘emotion 
markers’, which engage the viewer and through aesthetic cues prompt a brief burst 
of emotion (joy, for example) not linked to narrative themes or plot development 
(p. 44). This is a crucial strategy in several other scenes, since my films aim to 
prevent the formation of folk-psychological narrative formulas in which emotion is 
based on the appraisal of narrative scenarios; instead, they elicit momentary 
emotions, for which Smith’s mood-cue approach is an efficient method – it also 
represents a cognitive model that can address audience experience beyond mere 
cognition (see Chapter Two).  
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Figure 52: Emotion markers 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The above examples of mediating everyday emic experience have shown that filmic 
mediation inherently blends screen characters’, the filmmaker’s and the spectator’s 
experience. Thus, mediating the everyday operates on an oscillating boundary 
between simultaneously observing and bracketing the ordinary. The mediated 
everyday is both ordinary and extraordinary at one and the same time, whereby the 
extraordinariness could be regarded as the post-filmic ordinary – a deep reflexivity 
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that, to a certain degree, permeates both films to different degrees. Consequently, 
as with the emic experience of a blind person, the everyday cannot be immediated 
(conveyed without mediation); the spectator experiences it as a pre-filmically and 
post-filmically transformed version. However, the researcher should perhaps not 
strive to mediate the actual everyday, but everydayness (Highmore, 2002b, pp. 24–
28), and this sense of the everyday needs spectatorship as an essential part of its 
construction. The next chapter explores this spectatorial construction through 
narrative strategies.  
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Chapter Six: Ordinary Temporalities 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Whereas the previous chapter was concerned with ordinary material experiences in 
the moment, the focus of this chapter is on mapping and capturing the temporal 
aspects of accumulated everyday experience as manifested in the totality of 
individual pre-filmic and post-filmic encounters. Accumulated everyday experience 
is the essence of Pierre Bourdieu’s (1990, p. 53) concept of ‘habitus’, which he 
defines as a system of implicit dispositions that generate and organise ordinary, 
everyday practices. The habitus is both structured and structuring: it is structured by 
the individual’s historicity of dispositions and experiences, and is structuring 
because it determines present and future practices, including perceptions, 
appreciations, beliefs and representations (pp. 53-58). The habitus is a structure 
that is “systematically ordered rather than random or unpatterned” (Maton, 2008, 
p. 51).  
Mapping the habitus is essential for mediating the temporality of 
everydayness. However, given that my filmic mediation simultaneously entails 
observation and bracketing, the mediation of Terry’s and June’s respective habitus 
requires the consideration of my own filmmaking habitus. Furthermore, the post-
filmic mediation of everyday temporalities needs to relate to the viewing habitus of 
the spectator, which is geared with the narrative habitus that depends on their 
accumulation of experience and knowledge during the viewing of the film. As 
MacDougall (1998, p. 81) confirms, “film is cumulative, in the sense that it builds up 
understandings through an accretion of scenes, often bringing a particular pattern 
to the surface retrospectively in a moment of crystallization”. Thus, the narrative 
structures the experiences of the characters into a film-temporal structure, and 
simultaneously structures the audience’s experience. These two structuring 
processes need to be aligned in order to mediate everyday time.  
Analysing literary narratives, Mikhail Bakhtin (1981, p. 248) describes 
everyday time as simple, crude, viscous time, which “drags itself slowly through 
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space”; it is mostly used as ancillary, background time that hosts cyclical sequences 
that serve as a contrast to non-cyclical sequences that are “charged with energy and 
event”. Similarly, Richard Kilborn and John Izod (1997, p. 69) argue that the 
normality of the everyday in documentary narratives can be seen as “periods of 
dead time”’, devoid of narrative significance but showing how people get on “with 
what we take to be their normal lives”. This dead, viscous time is not always cyclical, 
however. As Ellis (2007, p. 59) reminds us, the ordinary also includes “the 
contingent, that which just chanced to happen”. The everyday layer of random and 
unpredictable appears contrary to the habit and routine of the systematic habitus 
and to Bakhtin’s notion of cyclicality. In fact, the everyday is all of these: it is a 
constant stream of “relations, scenes, contingencies and emergences” (Stewart, 
2007, p. 2), and its different rhythms, moods and feelings are constantly in flux 
(Highmore, 2011, p. 1). Everydayness therefore needs to be mediated as repetitive 
and cyclical, but also as chaotic, random, evolving and unpredictable, and it is the 
task of the narrative habitus to achieve this.  
As this chapter focuses particularly on the narrative and viewing habitus, 
most case studies are elaborated on a post-filmic rather than a pre-filmic level, and 
relate not only to narrative structuring, but also to the structuring of individual 
scenes in relation to their impact on the entire narrative. As previously, pre-filmic 
and post-filmic methods are signposted as such. 
 
6.2 The narrative fragment 
6.2.1 Pre-filmic methods 
Database filmmaking 
The characters’ and my own circumstances had a considerable impact on the films 
and the filmmaking process. My filming time with Terry and June was limited, due 
to their age (June especially found the filming physically draining after a few hours), 
an understandable reluctance on their part to have their privacy invaded for more 
than a day at a time, and my teaching and other research commitments. The one-
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day shooting periods with long breaks in-between made the characters feel more 
comfortable and ready to participate. Parallel to these sporadic encounters, I wrote 
several publications and gave conference presentations about this project, and this 
entailed editing a range of scenes to demonstrate my methodology. As it was 
impossible to finalise the narrative before the end of shooting, each edited scene 
corresponded to a specific encounter with Terry or June, rendering each scene a 
self-contained fragment of their lives.  
This method relates to Wyn Mason’s (2012, p. 144) concept of ‘database 
filmmaking’, in which he adapts Lev Manovich’s concept of the ‘database cinema’ to 
the filmmaking process. Mason describes it as the compilation of a raw-material 
database that informs the final post-production process without the pre-fabrication 
of a scripted narrative. This kind of practice allows the celebration of visual artistry 
and the focus on subjective experience within the moment, rather than one that is 
confined to top-down narrative practices where images or scenes have clear 
narrative functions (p. 144, p. 150). This bottom-up approach, in which the narrative 
is shaped by selecting encounters from a database, is an efficient technique to 
mediate embodied experience within the moment and avoid the formation of folk-
psychological plot journeys. This is also illustrated by my initial conceptualisation of 
individual scenes (the ‘raw materials’) in Chapter Five – the derivation of the 
narrative conceptualisation in this chapter.  
In addition, database filmmaking relieved me of the pressure to devise plot 
journeys that would dictate what to film, and resulted in the collection of a 
multitude of unrelated encounters, or encounters that only partially cover larger 
developments. This means that gaps and ambiguities automatically arise in the films 
that prevent totalised or schematic character portrayals, inherently mediating 
alterity. Both pre-filmically and post-filmically, this phenomenon manifests itself 
through singular encounters that defy a coherent contextualisation, and recurrent 
encounters (for example, between June and the wall) that imply a larger 
development, yet seemingly start in medias res, are open-ended or exhibit large 
gaps that create ambiguity. 
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6.2.2 Post-filmic methods 
The narrative episode69
Database filmmaking results in ‘mosaic narratives’, in which the “whole is not 
organized as a narrative but more poetically, as a mosaic; only the parts have a 
diegetic unity” (Nichols, 1981, p. 211) . Smith (2007) analyses the way this type of 
narrative structure is used as an alternative to folk-psychological narratives in the 
documentary, The Aristocrats (2005), a film in which the same joke is repeatedly 
performed and interpreted by different comedians. He observes that its episodic 
structure focuses on self-enclosed fragments, each of which are singular moments 
that highlight the performative act itself without setting up any character 
development or cause-and-effect (or question-and-answer) chains, thus 
undermining any narrative impulse towards forward progression or the infamous 
‘narrative arc’ (pp. 87-88).  
 and the everyday 
Narrative ‘episoding’ enables the mediation of everydayness, embodied 
experience and alterity – the main ingredients that make up the self. According to 
Harvie Ferguson (2009, pp. 156–157), the self in contemporary everyday life is a 
fragmented project in the process of constant transformation and shaped by 
disconnection and discontinuity; everyday life is the arena of this fragmentation, in 
which all fragments appear without any established priority.70
                                                             
69 For the sake of practical simplicity, the terms ‘episode’ and ‘fragment’ will be used 
interchangeably, since different theorists have used one or the other to describe the same concept –
a small part pertaining to a bigger whole yet existing on its own (see, for example, Highmore, 2002a, 
pp. 33–44). 
 Not surprisingly, the 
fragment has become the favourite literary trope for mediating ordinary experience 
(p. 155). For instance, anthropologist Kathleen Stewart’s Ordinary Affects (2007, 
p. 5) mediates the everydayness of her ethnographic accounts in the US by 
structuring the book as an “assemblage of disparate scenes that pull the course of 
the book into a tangle of trajectories, connections, and disjunctures”. As Highmore 
comments (2011, p. 8), Stewart offers no explicit academic theory or methodology, 
70 For a sociological elaboration of the contemporary everyday as an accumulation of fragments, see 
Highmore’s (2002a, pp. 33–44) discussion of Georg Simmel. 
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but her experiential and episodic field-diary-like narration makes the reader alert to 
his/her own ordinary surroundings. 
Examples of two films that resemble Stewart’s narrative strategy (and have 
inspired my work) are Jørgen Leth’s 66 Scenes from America (1982) and François 
Girard’s Thirty-two Short Films about Glenn Gould (1993). Leth’s documentary is a 
collage of sixty-six tableau scenes that, although apparently structured in a random 
fashion, result in a coherent, emblematic picture of ordinariness in the US (figure 
53). Girard’s film is a mosaic of fragments about the pianist Glenn Gould’s life, 
consisting of dramatised, documentary, animated and experimental segments that 
collectively mediate Gould’s idiosyncratic character as emic ordinary experience 
(figure 54). Both films use a variety of fragmenting strategies that mediate 
ordinariness and a sense of alterity through the creation of gaps and ambiguities. 
 
   
   
   
Figure 53: Jørgen Leth’s 66 Scenes from America (1982) 
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Figure 54: François Girard’s Thirty-two Short Films about Glenn Gould (1993) 
Creating the fragment 
Most scenes in Terry’s and June’s films resemble self-contained short films that 
possess two common denominators. The first is that almost every scene apparently 
takes place in real time, in order to focus on momentary experience. This is 
achieved through long takes and continuity editing, using invisible elliptical cuts (see 
Chapter Five) to create the illusion of real time when larger pro-filmic events had to 
be edited to under four minutes – the maximum duration of any scene is three-and-
a-half minutes, a heuristic choice to prevent the spectator from losing attention or 
interest. The second common denominator is that most scenes start and finish in 
medias res: the viewers do not know how they got to a specific starting point, nor 
do they know why the scene finishes at a particular moment. The resulting 
openness and ambiguity counteract any expectation of totalised knowledge in 
terms of Terry’s and June’s character traits, family and social relationships, their 
motivations for larger actions, or the outcomes of implied journeys. Fragmenting 
Terry and June preserves their alterity and prevents them from becoming folk-
psychological stock characters.   
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For instance, in the scene where Terry and Pam discuss the size of their flat 
and whether to move to a new home71
 
 (figure 55), the discussion starts almost 
randomly; it is neither based on any previous event, nor any exposition about their 
living circumstances. The discussion also implies that they have talked about it 
before, which reveals the sedimentation of past experience and embodies their 
shared habitus. The scene, which is never used again in the narrative, finishes in an 
open-ended way, without any concrete decisions. In addition, the topic is never 
discussed again, so by the end of the film the spectator has to infer that they have 
still not moved home, though the reasons why are unclear. 
 
Figure 55: Scene: ‘Bigger Home’ 
 
Similarly, in June’s film, one fragment starts with an interview where she 
recounts a past episode with her daughter, followed by an archive shot and on-
screen quotation from June’s autobiography72
 
 (figure 56). However, the viewers 
have not heard about her daughter before, nor will they ever hear about her again. 
Also, this particular interview does not recur in the narrative, which, as with Terry’s 
scene, makes it an inchoate moment clearly extracted from a longer conversation or 
set-up.  
 
                                                             
71 Scene: ‘Bigger Home’ – 06:22 
72 Scene: ‘June and Theresa’ – 14:42 
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Figure 56: Scene: ‘June and Theresa’ 
 
The inference of a larger invisible context, what Kracauer (1960, p. 251) calls 
the ‘flow of life’, is essential to the mediation of the everyday. Episodic encounters 
emerge from this context, and then disappear. For Kracauer, the cinematic quality 
of a narrative episode in relation to the materiality of everyday life depends on the 
permeability of that ‘flow of life’ within it (p. 254). The more it appears to the 
viewer that a fragment has emerged from that invisible everyday continuum, the 
more the viewer experiences the elusive flow of the post-filmic everyday without 
empirically perceiving it – the flow is explicitly implied. The deliberate omission of 
context, prompting the spectator to infer the flow of everyday life, coupled with the 
database filmmaking that results in a lack of formulaic plot structures, is a further 
form of MacDougall’s ‘deep reflexivity’ (see Chapter Three), in which the etic and 
emic overtly and ambiguously blend. 
This reflexivity is reinforced by the visual designation of fragments (figure 
57), which exposes the deliberate ‘structuring structure’ of the narrative habitus. 
Manovich (2007, p. 57) calls this narrative layer, ‘meta-text’ – it embodies the 
database by mediating to the spectator the filmmaker’s experience of a banal, 
mechanical cataloguing of selected fragments. Both 66 Scenes and Thirty-two Short 
Films use meta-text to catalogue their fragments, the former through Leth’s voice 
and the latter through the use of white text on a black background. The reason for 
choosing Girard’s aesthetic is because white, generic text on black is an ordinary 
cataloguing strategy used in film assemblies, where scenes to be used are collated 
in the timeline and temporarily consigned simple captions by the editor to facilitate 
quick identification and ordering. Using this banal and frugal aesthetic method in 
the final film (usually, these captions are removed in the rough-cut stage) mediates 
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a sense of ‘work-in-progress’ or an inchoate bricolage, key attributes of the ordinary 
everyday (Stewart, 2007; Ferguson, 2009; Highmore, 2011).  
 
  
  
  
Figure 57: The titling of fragments 
 
This meta-textual titling technique is also reminiscent of a diary or field 
journal of my pre-filmic encounters. Ferguson (2009, p. 164) observes that the diary 
is the literary form of everydayness. The (seemingly) disordered positioning of 
events turn the diary into a recording device that “eschews meaning, explanation, 
intention and self-hood”, and the chronological “sequence of days provides a 
semblance of order in a world made incoherent by the non-identical and 
incomprehensible” events of everyday life (p. 165). This resembles the chronology 
of the spectator’s viewing experience, which is guided by the meta-text that 
provides a semblance of order in the fragmented mosaic of Terry’s and June’s 
everyday lives. The ambiguous overlapping of formal guiding, bracketing and emic-
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embodied experience reflects Henri Lefebvre’s (2004, p. 9) notion of the rhythm  of 
everyday life as a synergy between “rational, numerical, quantitative and qualitative 
rhythms” (dictated, for example, by clock time, calendar time, language and social 
conventions) and the “natural rhythms of the body” (for example, respiration, 
thirst, energy, fatigue, dexterity). 
However, these title inserts also counteract the formation of visual, aural, 
metaphorical or temporal links73
Dividing the narrative into discrete episodes also resembles the way we 
process the everyday on a neurocognitive level. Making sense of the fluctuating and 
overabundant flow of everyday life requires the separation of longer activities into 
small segments that are specific and defined yet remain part of a longer sequential 
flow (Tversky et al., 2008, p. 436). This ‘event segmentation’ operates through the 
cognitive recognition of event boundaries, which are “points of perceptual and 
conceptual changes” that bracket events of relative stability (Swallow et al., 2009, 
p. 236). In my films, this stability is accomplished by ensuring, editorially, that most 
episodes are coherent in space, time, film style and general theme; ‘themes’ in this 
context are not abstract ideas, but are literally embodied through objects or words, 
and identified by literal titles (see figures 55-57, above). 
 between episodes, which shifts the spectator’s 
focus away from formalist plot structures towards experiencing the moment of the 
fragment. Overall, this slows down the time experienced by the viewer, 
approximating to Kilborn and Izod’s (1997) notion of ‘dead time’. Time appears to 
slowly unfold in real time within the individual episodes, especially in the still-life 
episodes discussed in the previous chapter, while the distinguishing titles 
completely lack pro-filmic time, making the audience temporarily aware of viewing 
time or ‘filmmaking time’. The viscous, enervated time of the everyday that Bakhtin 
(1981) describes is elevated from its usual place in the background to occupy the 
foreground, and conversely, any dramatic, event-laden time is relegated to oblivion. 
 
                                                             
73 Bordwell calls these links ‘scene hooks’ and establishes an elaborate taxonomy for mainstream 
films (see: http://www.davidbordwell.net/essays/hook.php). Having been alerted to them, I 
deliberately chose to avoid any scene hooks. 
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Juxtaposing episodes 
According to the model of ‘event segmentation’, however, emulating everyday 
cognitive perception requires not only coherence within the individual episodes, but 
the juxtaposition of disparate episodes. The paradoxical aim is to use systematic 
principles to mediate a “Brownian motion of everyday life; a chaotic jumble of 
fragmented and free improvisation” (Ferguson, 2009, p. 183). Thus, the chaotic and 
stochastic nature of the everyday can be mediated by creating contrast between 
episodes and avoiding cause-effect links. Creating contrast, of course, runs the risk 
of suggesting binary opposites, resulting in an intellectual, Soviet-style montage 
that elicits abstract ideas or infers plot developments. However, reducing the 
amount of common denominators also reduces the possibility of blending (see the 
discussion on conceptual blending in Chapter Five). In other words, if neighbouring 
episodes differ on many various levels, such as length, theme, character’s clothing, 
weather, film aesthetics, rhythm or mood, the juxtaposition will embody 
randomness rather than elicit dialectical meaning. This effect is further aided by the 
title inserts, which disrupt temporal and aesthetic links. 
One example of this can be found in the still-life scene74 in Terry’s film, 
which is followed by the scene in the writers’ club, which takes place at night and 
starts with Terry being driven to the meeting75
                                                             
74 Scene: ‘Still Life’ – 13:00 
 (figure 58). The still-life sequence is 
composed of static shots of objects during daytime. Due to the cluttered shots that 
mediate Terry’s resentment of the lack of space in his small flat, the mood is 
neutral, even sombre. Still-life shots punctuate the significance of ordinary life by 
temporarily suspending the everyday flow, resulting in a ‘glitch’ in the unity of the 
practices and spaces in which we are currently immersed (Stewart, 2007, p. 19). 
This literal ‘dead time’ potentially triggers divergent reflections in the spectator, 
such as speculation about the objects in the scene or absent characters, self-
reflection, symbolic interpretation, metaphorical associations, anticipation of future 
scenes or recollection of past ones. It represents a spectatorial space in which to 
experience and ponder. By contrast, the writers’ club scene is a highly dynamic and 
75 Scene: ‘Writer’s Club – 15:22 
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verbally busy one, involving a range of bodies and idiolects, and a positive mood, 
due to the constant humorous interchanges. The audience collectively experiences 
the characters’ conversations without being given time to reflect or interpret. In 
addition, the filmic style contrasts the obviously hand-held shots in this scene with 
the static tripod shots in the previous one. Further contrasts include the time of 
day, the difference in the domestic spaces and the themes – non-material literary 
stories as opposed to domestic materiality. The juxtaposition between these two 
episodes is an embodiment of the everyday fluctuation between flow and arrest 
(Stewart, 2007, p. 19), and even if the spectator does make associative links, the 
experiential foundation rests primarily in the mediated ordinariness embodied 
through contrast and the lack of causal progression. 
 
Scene: ‘Still Life’ Scene: ‘Writers’ Club 1’ 
  
  
Figure 58: Juxtaposing Terry’s episodes 
 
Juxtaposing different film aesthetics inherently involves the juxtaposition of 
different epistemologies and ontologies. For example, in June’s film, the scene with 
the piece of marble76
                                                             
76 Scene: ‘The Marble Stone’ – 32:29 
 is followed by a montage of newspaper shots about June’s 
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public persona77 and by the final wall scene78 (figure 59). Of course, these scenes 
have different themes, different spaces (indoors – virtual – outdoors) and no 
tangible causal links, but added to this, the modes of audience address also vary 
significantly. The first scene is essentially an interview, in which June directly 
addresses the filmmaker and the spectator – June is the interlocutor. The second 
scene is an archive montage in which the filmmaker directly addresses the spectator 
– June is a pictorial representation. The third scene is an observational one, in which 
the filmmaker is backgrounded and June is given space to speak and to perform 
everyday activities – June is a social79
 
 actor.   
Scene: ‘The Marble Stone’ Scene: ‘Public Figure’ 
  
Scene: ‘The Wall 4’ 
 
Figure 59: Juxtaposing June’s episodes 
 
The oscillation between different documentary modes of address reflects 
the uniqueness of each moment and the frequent randomness and contingent 
nature of the everyday; the audience does not know what mode of address comes 
next. In addition, it counteracts the coherence of potential folk-psychological plot 
                                                             
77 Scene: ‘Public Figure’ – 36:11 
78 Scene: ‘The Wall 4’ – 36:46 
79 The term ‘social’ is here extended to include the actuality of material interaction in relation to the 
concept of objectification. 
 
 
180 
trajectories and the formation of generic documentary modes. These generic 
modes, as described by Nichols (2001), Ward (2005) and Bondebjerg (2014), rely on 
the spectator’s deployment of film-textual schemas to make coherent sense of the 
documentary. The constant change in modes of address prevents or reconfigures 
schematic cognition, and this is potentially conducive to reconfiguring blindness 
stereotypes. This hypothesis is supported by the episodic structure itself. Narrative 
comprehension relies on the activation of two types of past knowledge structures: 
‘generic knowledge’ and ‘episodic knowledge’ (Grasser et al., 2002, p. 244). Generic 
knowledge is based on schematic scripts and stereotypes, both of which are 
informed by the past consumption of folk-psychological narratives, while episodic 
knowledge is based on individual episodes experienced in the past at a particular 
time and place. Hence, a narrative made up of unique, momentary experiences, 
without a generic plot structure, activates episodic knowledge and impedes the 
activation of generic knowledge. It also adds episodic knowledge devoid of 
stereotypes to the spectator’s knowledge structure, and may inform how they view 
documentary films on the subject in the future. 
 
6.3 The narrative bracket 
6.3.1 The post-filmic beginning 
The contract and the alter 
Film beginnings and endings are liminal points that bracket the narrative and 
viewing habitus. The beginning comprises the ‘contract’ the audience makes with 
the film; they ‘agree’ to work at parsing the plot exposition in order to acquire 
knowledge about the traits, qualities and interrelationships of the screen characters 
(Smith, 2003, p. 144). This activity of parsing involves comparing filmic cues with in-
built cognitive schemas (Bondebjerg, 1994, p. 75), which provide a frame of 
reference against which later developments can be measured (Bordwell, 1989b, 
pp. 189–190). Since the narrative beginning primes spectatorship and interacts with 
 
 
181 
the spectatorial dispositions explored in Chapter Four, it is here where the 
establishment of everydayness, emic experience and alterity needs to take place.   
Both films start by introducing the characters’ names: ‘June’ and ‘Terry’,80
The title is followed by a shot that reveals the main character’s body and the 
space where the first post-filmic encounter occurs: June’s book presentation (figure 
60) and Terry being guided by Pam to imagine the painting she is describing (figure 
61). Besides the name, the body is the second form of unity that constructs self-
identity in everyday life (Ferguson, 2009, p. 80). The body constitutes a unity and 
reality of its own, providing a counterpoint to the fragmentary flux and arbitrariness 
of the everyday (p. 93).
 
respectively. The names are the titles of the films and, at the same time, the titles of 
the first fragments. Because everyday experience is inherently fragmented, the 
name provides one of two unifying models that can be used to construct self-
identity in everyday life (Ferguson, 2009, p. 80). The name does not just describe or 
signify us, it is us (p. 81), which is the reason why some of the fragments repeat the 
characters’ names throughout the films; even if the audience fails to remember 
them, the aim is not retention but the initial mediation of particularity, and thus 
alterity. 
81
                                                             
80 I have decided to use only first names (instead of full names) in order to establish in the audience a 
more informal and personal first impression of the characters. 
 Soon, shots of faces and hands follow; these are major 
constituents of Smith’s (1994) first level of character engagement, ‘recognition’ (see 
Chapter Five), mediating the embodied particularity of both characters. In order to 
not overemphasise their eyes and thus their disability, the facial shots are medium 
close-ups, but the material interaction of their hands soon establishes their 
blindness beyond doubt. Experiencing the body, hands and especially the face 
constitutes the embodied encounter of the spectator with the alter – an alter who 
can never be fully grasped by the sighted audience. This encounter, in Levinas’ 
(1989) terms, ‘indebts’ the audience with a certain ethical responsibility, one that 
may encourage critical questioning in terms of narrative and aesthetic 
representation, which would not be the case if body and space were abstracted. 
81 Ferguson (2009, p. 93) clarifies that while the body provides a natural unity for self-identity, this 
does not imply that it is not subject to historical change; rather, that its ‘unity’ is unaffected by such 
change. 
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Figure 60: Book presentation 
 
  
 
Figure 61: Pam describing a painting to Terry 
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Character exposition 
Both scenes set up the characters’ major passions, writing and painting, and they 
establish their partners as supportive companions. Although their blindness is 
clearly established, it does not provide the impetus for a plot trajectory, and it is 
neither aesthetically nor thematically ‘spectalised’, nor is it normalised in relation to 
ableist norms; it is simply introduced as an emically ordinary, inherent trait of each 
characters’ body, which interacts with space, objects and other subjects. June 
moves with relative ease through the spacious, public environment of the art 
gallery. She is not overly dependent on her partner, David, and she speaks to the 
audience. This establishes June’s public persona and her comfortable spatial grip of 
non-domestic spaces, as mediated in other scenes. Terry, by contrast, is presented 
as firmly anchored to his small domestic space; he never appears in a public space, 
and he does not interact with the general public, a trait that is seen throughout the 
film. Both scenes also mediate the characters’ relationship with their blindness. In 
the scene in which June’s presents her book, her disability is peripheral, almost 
incidental, because June mainly experiences it as such. In the painting-description 
scene, Terry’s disability is more apparent, particularly as he is often conscious of it, 
especially when it inhibits him.  
Thus, character exposition in both beginning scenes is emically experiential, 
not informational. For instance, June’s comprehensive and deliberate exposition of 
her life post-filmically mediates her somewhat ambiguous personality – overly 
formal, yet open, approachable and willing to reveal personal information, 
characteristics that also emerge in other scenes. This post-filmic choice of showing 
June eagerly talking about herself matches my pre-filmic experience of spending 
time with her, while Terry, on the other hand, tended to avoid speaking about his 
personal life, resulting in very laconic on-camera responses. Consequently, I decided 
to post-filmically omit these responses in several scenes (especially in his interview 
scene), as they would not mediate his persona. Hence, in the beginning scene of his 
film, Terry does not talk much, and the scene makes no reference to his personal 
life.   
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Moreover, as they omit the wider context, both scenes start and end in 
medias res and do not provide any premise or ‘inciting incident’ for a potential plot 
journey. Even if June’s scene includes an overabundance of informational exposition 
during her speech, that speech is directed pre-filmically to the audience at her book 
presentation, and mediates June’s agility as a public speaker. In addition, the 
information she provides is incomplete and serves no apparent narrative purpose 
other than revealing her career as a teacher, trainer and disability consultant, which 
has no particular plot function in the film. It does, however, prime the spectator to 
perceive her not as an old, insignificant woman, who spends time in her garden, 
walking through Harwich or doing mundane tasks, but as a VIP in her local 
community, as well as in the disability legislation community. Unfortunately, due to 
confidentiality, I was not able to film her giving legal advice or consultancy, and due 
to her age, she has largely stopped giving disability-awareness training. Thus, the 
exposition of these facts adds to her alterity, especially since these successful, 
public identities seem incongruent with the ‘homely’ identity mediated throughout 
the film. 
Spectator dispositions 
The intertextual dimension of the contract between documentary and spectator 
addresses spectator dispositions in relation to schematic expectations and 
comparisons with other films or cultural products (Bondebjerg, 1994, p. 28). Bearing 
in mind the need to avoid the stereotypical portrayals outlined in Chapter Four, my 
narrative beginning does not fulfil the viewer’s schematic expectations about films 
depicting blind people, and this will probably result in an initial clash between the 
narrative habitus and that of the viewer. However, the viewer’s habitus is likely to 
be reconfigured in the first five-to-ten minutes once he/she recognises the 
fragmented, non-plot-driven, ambiguous narrative structure as the film’s modus 
operandi. This potentially results in an initial self-reflexive experience; the viewer 
becomes aware of their own schematic viewing habitus and the necessity to 
reconfigure it.  
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This ‘political reflexivity’ relates to unexpected modes of representation. 
Nichols (2001, p. 130)  elaborates that political reflexivity provokes awareness of 
the representation of social organisation and the assumptions that support it, 
framing localised experience with a wider socio-cultural experience and 
incorporating the spectator as a reflective social actor. This (temporary) socio-
cultural awareness, reinforced by the inconsistency in stereotypical representation, 
may even prompt the audience to question and reconfigure ossified stereotypes. 
However, since my films aim not to subvert but rather to transcend stereotypes, the 
political reflexivity is bound to give way to Mac Dougall’s deep reflexivity once the 
contract between film and audience is established and the film form remains 
consistent in its pursuit of mediating emic experience. 
 
6.3.2 The post-filmic ending 
Openness and ambiguity 
Like beginnings, endings are a threshold between the spectator’s viewing habitus 
and his/her ordinary habitus. Folk-psychological narratives make this sense of 
liminality as smooth as possible by tightly and plausibly integrating their endings 
into the overall plot structure, offering formal, thematic and diegetic closure (Brylla, 
2004). Since an episodic narrative does not complete or conclude any character 
journey or argument, its ending is formally abrupt and ambiguous because it stands 
in competition with numerous other internal episode endings (Christen, 2002, 
p. 50). 66 Scenes and Thirty-two Short Films aim to compensate for this ambiguity 
by clearly signposting their endings through aesthetically and thematically 
paralleling the beginning fragment in terms of aesthetics, address and theme 
(American iconicity and Gould’s reclusive character, respectively) (figure 62).   
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66 Scenes from America (1982) – American iconicity 
  
Thirty Two Short Films about Glenn Gould (1994) – Gould, the recluse 
  
Figure 62: Beginning and ending in 66 Scenes and Thirty Two Short Films 
 
However, my aim is to avert a comfortable transition between viewing and 
ordinary real-life habitus by deliberately leaving the ending as open as possible, as 
open narratives “celebrate the uncertainty of knowledge and the contingency and 
incompleteness of real life” (Neupert, 1995, p. 80). Thus, the experience of alterity 
and of everydayness may overlap with the spectator’s own everydayness. It is as if 
the apparent lack of an ending fails to end the contract established at the beginning 
and prompts the expectation of further episodes beyond the ending, fostering the 
consolidation of episodic, instead of generic, knowledge. The deflection of generic 
knowledge is also due to the fact that an abrupt, ambiguous ending does not fulfil 
the expectation of a conventional film closure. The spectator therefore is likely to 
experience a second moment of political reflexivity, triggering a critical socio-
cultural awareness that may lead to a reconfiguration of stereotypes that will retain 
its impact beyond the artefactual ending. After all, open endings result in the 
spectator’s narrative comprehension process continuing beyond the film’s viewing, 
in order to complete the interpretation of the narrative events (Neupert, 1995, 
pp. 180–181).  
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The endings 
Terry’s final scene portrays one of his regular cigarette breaks82
 
 (figure 63). He 
smokes, talks to Pam about how smoking helps reduce his stress, and finally gets up 
to wash his hands. This scene again captures Terry’s bodily experience and 
affordance in relation to space, showing him sitting in his favourite position and 
favourite spot, and filming him crossing the living room to reach the kitchen.  
 
Figure 63: Scene: ‘Fag Break 3’ 
 
This last scene ends suddenly in the middle of Terry most likely going to 
wash his hands (the action ends before it properly begins). This abruptness is 
reinforced by Pam turning her head towards Terry immediately before the final cut 
to black. In terms of continuity editing and frontality, when a character turns her 
head, especially if that results in the character turning her back to the camera, this 
primes the viewer to expect a succeeding shot matching her eye line, or at least 
providing a vantage point that underlines what she is looking at (in editing terms, 
the turn of the head and the expected cut to a point-of-view shot is referred to as a 
‘beat’). Thus, it ambivalently competes with the numerous other scene endings that 
also occurred in medias res. It is an ordinary ending within the overall narrative 
habitus, but it is extraordinary because it is the narrative’s ultimate ending. It 
resembles most of the other scene endings, and this modus operandi has 
established a narrative schema that conditions the spectator to expect yet another 
narrative fragment after this scene’s ending; however, no other scene comes. 
                                                             
82 Scene: ‘Fag Break 3’ – 45:57 
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Instead of seeing the usual intertitle for the next scene after a short break of black 
screen, the audience sees the closing credits. The fact that this ending randomly 
happens to be the ending of the final scene establishes its difference in terms of the 
spectator’s experience; in that moment, he/she abruptly crosses a space of 
liminality.  
June’s final scene shows her putting away the dishes83
 
 (figure 64). As in 
Terry’s case, this scene captures her bodily experience in relation to her space, and 
depicts an everyday routine/ritual that is stimulating for her as it involves bodily 
movement, touch and the perception of the rhythmic sounds of crockery and 
cutlery being stowed away, all of which produce a sensorial concert for June and 
the spectator. These diverse interactions with household items of different 
materials, affordances and sounds mediates one last time June’s strong anchoring 
to her quiet home in Harwich, which is paralleled by the lack of external, urban 
noise. It serves also as a reference to June’s earlier poem about enjoying the silence 
and ‘owning’ the most mundane household sounds (in the ‘From London to 
Harwich’ scene). It is also revealing that this last scene shows her in her home and 
has no indication of whether she will move on or move away, work outside Harwich 
or travel. As June writes in her autobiography, Beginning at the End (My Harwich 
Patchwork), Harwich is the place where she hopes to spend the ‘autumn of her life’. 
 
Figure 64: Scene: ‘Dishes’ 
 
                                                             
83 Scene: ‘Dishes’ – 42:55 
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The scene ends as she is putting away the cutlery, creating the same sense 
of open-endedness, suddenness and ambiguity described in Terry’s case. However, 
putting away the dishes appears more mundane than Terry smoking, and it is 
certainly a task the majority of viewers could relate to. Thus, June’s final scene 
represents perhaps the most ordinary task in her entire film, which makes the 
spectator’s transition from the film-viewing habitus to his/her real-life habitus more 
permeable. It is a deliberate anti-climax that has neither any particular formal or 
thematic significance, nor does it reveal any interesting facts about June.   
In both films, the end scenes are deliberately devised in a way that avoids 
any of the formal, thematic or story cues that narrative formulas usually use to 
induce a sense of closure, such as doors closing, the characters walking away from 
the camera, sunsets, significant quotes, authorial address or emotional intensity.84
 
 
In both cases, there is a general uncertainty about how the characters’ lives will 
progress, especially since the fate of the wall and the painting (these two narrative 
motifs will be discussed later) are left as unresolved as other issues referred to, such 
as Terry and Pam moving to a bigger home. Furthermore, as Thomas Christen 
(2002, p. 50) explains, film narratives that focus on momentary experience (for 
example, situational comedies or episodic films) create closure by providing a focal 
end-point that provides some kind of extraordinary experience. In cognitive terms, 
the unsurpassable extraordinariness of the final scene enables the logical 
termination of the narrative contract and the transition back into the real world. In 
order to avoid this kind of climax, Terry’s and June’s endings are deliberately kept as 
ordinary as possible, leaving the more extraordinary scenes (for example, June’s 
book presentation and Terry’s writers’ club meeting) in the middle of the narrative. 
Lastly, unlike in 66 Scenes and Thirty-two Short Films, my endings are deliberately as 
disparate as possible to the beginnings, avoiding similarities, as well as binary 
differences. This lack of bracketing further deflects the audience’s sense of closure 
and suggests the continuation of everyday flow from the viewing habitus into that 
of the real world. 
                                                             
84 For a comprehensive analysis of different formal and diegetic ending cues, see Christen (2002). 
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6.4 The cyclical event 
6.4.1 Pre-filmic methods 
Everyday rituals 
Whereas the juxtaposition of consecutive narrative episodes mediates the 
contingent fluctuation of the everyday, the overall narrative also needs to mediate 
Bakhtin’s notion of its cyclical repetitiveness. This aspect of the everyday reveals the 
mechanisms of Bourdieu’s habitus, as its cyclical nature involves habits, routines 
and practices. Using the database-filmmaking approach, I filmed a plethora of 
cyclical activities, and in postproduction – my pre-filmic encounter with the 
database – it was necessary to discern activities that could be used as discrete 
narrative fragments to portray cyclicality and, at the same time, emic experience. 
The criterion was that fragments had to efficiently mediate everydayness and emic 
experience to a public audience. As with the choice of objects that are 
simultaneously utilised and possessed in Chapter Five, I found that the ambivalence 
between utilitarian and ritualistic activities fulfilled this criterion. 
Anthropological philosopher Frits Staal (1979, p. 9) offers a good model for 
distinguishing between everyday routines, which are result-oriented, and rituals, 
which are process-oriented. Everyday routines allow for spontaneous improvisation 
(bricolage), whereas rituals strictly adhere to precise rules which govern their form. 
Although Staal’s dichotomy does not consider the nuances of ordinary events (his 
notion of ritual predominantly relates to Vedic rituals), his model is helpful in 
discerning activities that are both utilitarian and ritualistic, and hence could be 
called ‘everyday ritual’.85 For example, June’s regular trip to witness the arrival of 
the Stena Line ferry86
                                                             
85 Michel de Certeau’s The Practice of Everyday Life (1984) extensively discusses ‘everyday rituals’ in 
terms of individualisation, creativity and practice. 
 (figure 65), with the goal of hearing it as it enters the estuary, 
is a regular, ordinary activity, but it is also a ritualistic experience for her, governed 
by specific rules – she always stands on almost the same spot on the same pier, 
even though Harwich offers other aural and visual vantage points. For June, it is 
simultaneously an ordinary moment, in which she spends time with David, 
86 Scene: ‘Stena Line 1’ – 02:51 
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stimulates her aural sense and takes some physical exercise, and an extraordinary 
moment that provides her with an experiential pleasure within the moment that is 
not necessarily related to the results. It is a moment she eagerly anticipates. 
 
Scene: ‘Stena Line 1’ Scene: ‘Pouring Whisky’ 
  
  
Figure 65: Everyday rituals 
 
Another example is Terry pouring a whisky and then drinking it87
                                                             
87 Scene: ‘Pouring Whiskey’ – 31:02 
 (figure 65). 
Terry himself regards this activity as a ritual, since he performs it according to 
specific rules: it has to be night (after 7pm); it can only be one specific label; it has 
to be mixed with ice and ginger ale in a particular ratio; it has to be in a whisky 
glass; and he has to drink it sitting in the living room, facing his computer. All these 
self-imposed rules are independent of any symbolic meanings but they result in a 
degree of pleasurable self-absorption (Staal, 1979, p. 3) and resemble a 
performance. In rituals, the act of performing is the “deliberate, self-conscious 
‘doing’” of an action while communicating it on multiple sensory levels (visual 
imagery, dramatic sounds and tactile stimulation, for example), rendering the action 
a demonstration that clearly distinguishes it from an ordinary routine (Bell, 1997, 
p. 160). Terry performs for himself, but being aware of the camera, he also 
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performs for the audience. This may not be obvious in the moment, but his 
constant comments addressed to the filmmaker and the audience (as in his 
suggestion in the previous chapter of placing a camera in the toilet as a conceptual 
artwork) are a narrative motif that structures Terry’s post-filmic persona, which is 
discussed later.  
Another criterion for distinguishing everyday rituals from purely utilitarian 
routines is that rituals do not have conspicuous causes and do not fulfil basic, de-
individualised needs (Staal, 1979; de Certeau, 1984; Bell, 1997). For example, Terry 
washing his hands and Terry smoking (figure 66) both appear to be mundane 
routines he follows after painting. However, washing fulfils the goal of removing dirt 
and thus being able to touch other things, whereas smoking is a hedonistic activity 
triggered by Terry’s individual need to smoke in the same position after each 
painting session. Thus, it is only the smoking that efficiently mediates emic 
experience, since it is process-driven and satisfies a purely subjective need rather 
than fulfilling a basic one, which is why the smoking is shown in discrete fragments 
and as a narrative motif, whilst the hand-washing is incidental part of a painting 
scene.  
 
Terry washing hands Scene: Fag Break 1 
  
Figure 66: Routine vs. everyday ritual 
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6.4.2 Post-filmic methods 
Inferred cyclicality 
Although many of the narrative fragments represent cyclical everyday rituals, only a 
few are actually repeated, since the aim is to represent a character mosaic 
consisting of a variety of facets in the characters’ everyday lives. However, although 
the method of narrative fragmentation is not sufficient to infer the cyclical nature of 
these one-off moments, especially if their uniqueness is highlighted, everyday 
repetitive and routinised knowledge becomes embodied through our body’s 
interaction with everyday objects (Tilley, 2006, p. 64). Thus, in accordance with 
Merleau-Ponty’s corporeal schema (see Chapter Three), cyclicality can be inferred 
through the emphasis on embodied knowledge accumulated through the repetitive 
material interaction within a cyclical situation. A concrete example is the scene 
where June writes on her computer88
 
 (figure 67). 
  
  
Figure 67: Scene: ‘Writing’ 
 
This scene shows June’s body or parts of her body through a variety of 
different shot sizes and angles – shots of her seated comfortably in the chair in her 
                                                             
88 Scene: ‘Writing’ – 18:23 
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office, with her fingers moving swiftly over the keyboard and her facial expressions 
revealing her reactions. This mediates her skilful grip on the material environment; 
she is comfortably geared towards the task at hand. This bodily know-how is 
reinforced by omitting shots of the computer screen until the end of the scene, 
when the screen is shown switched off. Like June, the audience experiences the 
interaction with the computer only through the tactility of her fingers; the aural, 
robotic feedback of the screen-reading software; June’s facially expressive 
feedback; and her relaxed body. The ocular-centric expectation of a cut from June’s 
reaction shot to her point-of-view (POV) shot remains unsatisfied until the end, thus 
mediating embodied interaction through senses other than vision, and focusing on 
the routinised dexterity of her entire body. As a result of withholding the shot of the 
screen until the end, the audience may experience a certain political reflexivity, 
questioning conventional viewing and editing habits engendered by the reaction-
POV-shot cluster. However, even is this does not take place, on a more basic 
spectatorship level, the typing, facial expressions and software voice that describes 
every key stroke result in the spatial inference of what happens on the computer 
screen as if the spectators themselves were writing. 
The benefit of inferring cyclicality through the post-filmic emphasis of a 
corporeal schema is that pre-knowledge through narrative exposition is not 
necessary. Although the audience knows that June is a writer, because it was 
mentioned several times earlier, and although the scene literally starts in medias res 
in the story June is writing, implying that she was working on it before, the main 
mediator for routinisation is the bodily know-how. Hence, single, decontextualised 
scenes like Terry drinking whisky, Terry and Pam solving a crossword (in which 
know-how is mediated through their idiolects), and June making coffee and knitting 
(figure 68) are perceived as cyclical everyday rituals.  
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Scene: ‘Pouring Whisky’ Scene: ‘Crossword’ 
  
Scene: ‘Making Coffee’ Scene: ‘Knitting’ 
  
Figure 68: Single, cyclical scenes 
The narrative motif 
Post-filmically, repeated everyday rituals become narrative motifs. Situation-
focused motifs, such as Terry’s painting process (figure 73), were selected from the 
pre-filmic database on the basis of their efficiency in mediating emic everyday 
experience and alterity through the ambivalence between utilitarian routine and 
experiential ritual mentioned earlier. Object-focused motifs, such as June’s wall 
(figure 72), were selected on the basis that they not only mediate different and 
comparably ambiguous historicities, but also the ambivalence between used and 
possessed object, emphasising the audience’s experience of alterity and 
objectification.  
Narrative motifs provide the pleasure of ‘cognitive play’ (Plantinga, 2009a, 
p. 21). The recognition and processing of motifs is grounded in hard-wired 
perceptual-cognitive attributes that enable us to make sense of our environment by 
orientation that is based on the discovery of new information that fits into 
schematic patterns. The audio-visual discovery of a piece of information, person, 
object or space that refers to an earlier counterpart, and the potential recognition 
of a story or thematic significance in these references, represents a pleasurable 
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cognitive stimulation (p. 24). Thus, motifs embody accumulated spectatorial 
knowledge and the very historicity of the viewing habitus, in which momentary 
knowledge is added to the accumulation of past knowledge.  
Motifs are important for episodic narratives that do not follow conventional 
plots. According to Peter Wuss (2009, pp. 70–79), these films use ‘topic lines’ based 
on the repetition and variation of aesthetically or thematically similar structures, 
encouraging the viewer to develop latent expectations about certain configurations 
of stimuli – a necessary prerequisite for narrative coherence in episodic films. In my 
films, this latent narrative coherence acts as a natural emic glue, which offsets the 
etic, meta-textual titles, and reinforces the temporal gestalt of the narrative habitus 
by compensating for the deliberate lack of links between consecutive episodes. This 
enhances the viewing habitus of a public audience. However, in order to prevent 
the formation of links while still providing narrative coherence, all motifs are evenly 
distributed across the narrative and are at least two episodes apart. This natural 
distribution reinforces the ordinariness of cyclical events by allowing them to 
sporadically emerge and disappear from the everyday flow, seemingly at random. 
This strategy is especially important for Terry’s painting process, as an 
overemphasis on a blind person painting could easily slip into spectacle; by 
rendering this everyday ritual ordinary it becomes simply another facet in Terry’s 
everyday life. 
Three types of narrative motifs can be distinguished as either repetitive, 
transformative or teleological. 89
                                                             
89 These motif types are loosely based on Grodal’s (1999, p. 61ff) three modes of high-level human 
arousal, which he applies to the spectatorial engagement with screen characters in relation to their 
actions within the narrative: telic mode (goal-oriented actions), paratelic mode (non-goal-oriented 
actions) and autonomic mode (reaction to external circumstances).  
 Repetitive motifs depict an event that recurs 
without an implied chronology or progression; transformative motifs depict a 
significant development in the character’s life that is not goal-driven, but is, rather, 
affected by external circumstances; and teleological motifs depict goal-driven 
developments, in which characters strive to achieve a material or immaterial goal. 
The intertwining of different motif strands that mediate momentary or longitudinal 
experiences (or both) reflects the variety of differing rhythms and patterns inherent 
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in everyday life (Lefebvre, 2004; Stewart, 2007; Highmore, 2011). Of course, these 
three types of motif can appear in conjunction or even overlap, but distinguishing 
them conceptually sheds light on spectatorship. 
The repetitive motif – contrast 
The repetitive motif of both June’s Stena Line scenes90 91
 
 (figures 69 and 70) is 
neither developmental nor does it reveal the temporal order or frequency of, or the 
gaps between, the events. However, it constitutes an important everyday ritual that 
is repetitive yet unique in its momentary experience, an inherent ambivalence of 
the everyday (Ferguson, 2009; Highmore, 2011). The uniqueness of the moment is 
primarily achieved through aesthetic contrast, which emerges from the seasonal 
difference of summer versus winter, as manifest in the colours, textures, clothing 
and body language. However, this contrast is enhanced by certain emotion markers, 
discussed in the previous chapter, that evoke the warm, tranquil mood in the 
summer scene and the cold, windy, harsher mood in the winter scene.  
  
  
Figure 69: Scene: ‘Stena Line 1’ 
 
                                                             
90 Scene: ‘Stena Line 1’ – 02:51 
91 Scene: ‘Stena Line 2’ – 31:06 
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Figure 70: Scene: ‘Stena Line 2’ 
 
However, the contrast can also be seen in the way the film style renders 
June’s perception of the ferry, and in authorial reflexivity. In the summer scene, a 
long static take and deliberate camera framing ensures that a long time passes 
between the moment the audience sees June and David on the pier, looking in the 
direction of the ferry, and the moment the ferry actually enters the frame and the 
audience sees and hears it – which is also the moment June hears it for the first 
time. This technique transposes June’s emic experience onto the audience by 
focusing on her perspective, rather than reproducing that of a sighted person. 
Clearly, David sees and comments on the ferry long before it can be heard, but the 
spectator is deliberately denied his ocular-centric point of view, which could 
potentially trigger a sense of authorial reflexivity, since films usually offer vantage 
points of view. Conversely, the winter scene uses the conventional reaction-shot-
POV-shot cluster, which enables the spectator to see the ferry before June hears it. 
The spectator’s schematic expectations in terms of film style are satisfied, and thus 
the scene feels less reflexive.   
June uses the pier in both scenes to get close to the ferry’s trajectory, but in 
a later scene it also offers June a more direct pleasurable experience, when she and 
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David have a drink in the cafe on the pier92
  
 (figure 71). This pleasant experience is 
clearly mediated through reaction shots that reveal June’s facial expressions as she 
hears the conversations and footsteps of people around her, and the sounds of the 
bobbing boats, the sea washing against the wooden pier beams, the seagulls and 
the wind. The pier serves as a material interface to a variety of sensory stimuli, 
which firmly anchors her to this object. However, as far as June is concerned, its 
identity is transient: the first time the audience sees the pier in the summer scene, 
it appears to be purely utilitarian; the second time, in the cafe scene, it becomes (in 
Baudrillard’s terms) an object of possession in which June invests emotionally; and 
the third time, in the winter scene, it can be perceived as both utilitarian and an 
object June possesses emotionally. Similarly, the identity of June’s dog, who 
appears twice in the film, is also transient. In this scene, the dog is in the 
background. As she is becoming bored and slightly restive, David takes her for a 
walk and removes her from the scene. In the last wall scene, however, when the 
dog enters the garden, she becomes the focus of attention in the foreground, 
pushing the wall motif further into the background. All these overlapping motifs are 
good examples of the complexity and transformative nature of everyday rhythms 
and narrative topic lines, which result in the constant renegotiation of material 
identities. 
                                                             
92 Scene: ‘Coffee on the Pier’ – 16:47 
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Figure 71: Scene: ‘Coffee on the Pier’ 
The transformative motif – historicity 
The transformative motif essentially mediates historicity. The wall, discussed in 
Chapter Five in terms of June’s historicity, is a typical example (figure 72): it 
mediates a significant development in her life, embodied through its transient 
material dispositions and June’s corresponding feelings and actions, but June does 
not actively pursue this development – that is, it is not teleological. Instead, it 
emerges through historical circumstances: June discovers the wall when she buys 
the house; the wall inspires her to write a short story; the wall deteriorates; June is 
in a financial position to have it rebuilt; the wall absorbs rain water that cause damp 
to spread indoors. This development clearly indicates a chronology, but it does not 
have a larger goal or seek a concrete result, especially not one set by June. Rather, 
she has to occasionally set mini-goals in reaction to these developments, such as 
rebuilding the wall or preventing the damp. However, the wall’s historical 
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development has considerably transformed June’s life, and this is manifested in the 
film through a shift from embodied interaction to embodied distance. 
 
Scene: ‘The Wall 1’ Scene: ‘The Wall 2’ 
  
Scene: ‘The Wall 3’ Scene: ‘The Wall 4’ 
  
Figure 72: The wall – the transformative motif 
 
In accordance with the notion of everydayness as incomplete and ‘on-
flowing’, and of alterity as fragmentary, ambiguous and open-ended, the wall motif 
has no closure. Its fate in relation to the dampness it creates is as open as June’s 
distance towards it. It remains uncertain as to whether the damp problem has been 
fixed, whether the wall has to be removed, or whether June has ceased to regard 
the wall as a friend and object of custodianship.  
The teleological painting motif – improvisation and failure 
Terry’s painting process is the only teleological motif in the films (figure 73). In 
principle, each teleological motif element is unique as each element is a 
progressively transformed version of the previous one, focused on the final result 
envisaged by the character. However, plot trajectories have a tendency of shifting 
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the experiential focus from the moment to the actual progression and the goal, and 
are therefore prone to schematising the character.  
 
Scene: ‘Painting 1’ – rolling plasticine Scene: ‘Painting 2’ – signature 
  
Scene: ‘Painting 3’ – applying plasticine Scene: ‘Painting 4’ – texture and hair 
  
Scene: ‘Painting 5’ – applying paint 
 
Figure 73: The painting process – the teleological motif 
 
In order to deflect attention from the finished painting and the process, the 
post-filmic emphasis was placed on Terry’s embodied bricolage approach of 
improvisations and failures, moments that would usually be excluded in 
documentary narratives. Embodied knowledge, the habitus of people who engage 
in manual labour, is mostly acquired by trial and error (Dant, 2004, p. 43). Several 
moments reveal Terry’s embodied knowledge, acquired through his past 
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experiences of trial and error, such as when he creates the moon93
 
 (figure 74): he 
first places a chunk of hard plasticine between his thigh and his calf to warm it up 
and make it malleable; he keeps checking it – all the while, working on another 
piece of plasticine – until he thinks it is ready; he then uses a plastic cup to form the 
moon, which he sticks onto the canvas. These seemingly peripheral and incidental 
moments of material interaction do not significantly advance the painting process 
but are essential to mediate Terry’s implicit co-ordination of what he perceives and 
how he responds. Perception and action are the major mechanisms for sedimented 
corporeal knowledge, which disposes the agent to respond in ordinary ways to 
ordinary situations (Crossley, 2001, p. 110). These ordinary reactions are 
improvisations consolidated through trial and error, such as when Terry uses his 
own body and everyday objects as tools, a particular configuration that mediates his 
unique material interaction with the moon.  
  
  
Figure 74: Creating the moon 
 
A major element of bricolage and the everyday, bestowing the moment with 
a unique quality and counteracting the formation of schematic characters, is the 
randomness of failure. The everyday is interspersed with disjunctures, disruptions, 
                                                             
93 Scene: ‘Painting 3’ – 19:22 
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interferences and the work of repair, which reveal its elasticity (Trentmann, 2009, 
p. 69). Embodied knowledge has to be readjusted in the moment in order to deal 
with sudden disruptions and failures, and this leads either to a bricolage approach 
of repair or to a suspension of the task. These unexpected moments highlight the 
uniqueness of the moments and the alterity of the body, since the body needs to 
temporarily deviate from its usual schema.  
Also, repair or suspension result in time appearing more viscous and devoid 
of energy, as Bakhtin puts it, thus mediating everyday time. For example, Terry 
complains several times about the plasticine being too warm and soft (revealing the 
time of the year when these scenes were shot), and in several instances, he 
struggles to separate the sticky plasticine stripes from one another, and it sticks to 
his fingers instead of the canvas or he finds it difficult to mould it properly94 95
 
 
(figure 75). All these moments stretch time by forcing Terry to repeat unsuccessful 
attempts, culminating in one instance where he has to abort the process, which is 
taken, post-filmically, as a cue to end the scene. This narrative disruption, which 
leaves the scene in medias res, is this time induced by Terry himself. 
  
 
Figure 75: Sticky plasticine 
                                                             
94 Scene: ‘Painting 3’ – 19:22 
95 Scene: ‘Painting 4’ – 33:25 
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Documentaries often tend to exclude disruptions and failures, concerned 
that it could either undermine the characters or create moments of dead time that 
disrupt the flow and structure of the plot trajectories. My films, by contrast, 
celebrate failure as an essential attribute of everydayness and alterity, portraying 
non-schematic, complex characters, precisely because it slows time down and 
focuses the spectator’s experience of momentary material interactions and the 
agency of spaces and objects.  
Unexpected failures, disruptions and repeatedly unsuccessful attempts 
occur in several other scenes, such as June’s book presentation.96 Only two guests 
are present, but the fact that many more were expected is indicated by the empty 
chairs, the guests’ distance to June’s table and the numerous empty cups and 
glasses (figure 76). In a different scene, the dog interrupts her explanation of how 
the wall causes damp in the house by running into the scene and jumping on her 
lap97
  
 (figure 77). Apart from the plasticine-related disruptions, Terry’s film depicts 
these types of moments in the scenes when Pam, for example, repeatedly and 
perhaps unsuccessfully tries to describe an illustration of a painting to Terry 
(‘Terry’), when I interrupt him to ask him to turn the music off before he starts 
preparing the painting (‘Painting 1’), and when he twice attempts to light his 
cigarette (‘Fag Break 1’). Thus, the topic lines of improvisations, disruptions and 
failures become repetitive motifs in themselves. 
                                                             
96 Scene: ‘June’ – 00:04 
97 Scene: ‘The Wall 4’ – 36:46  
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Figure 76: Book presentation 
 
 
Figure 77: The dog interrupts June 
 
Another strategy for preventing the painting process from turning into a 
formulaic plot, instead mediating ordinariness and alterity, is the omission of 
context. Although the scene starts near the beginning of the actual painting 
process, it is not clear why or for whom Terry is painting this picture, nor what it will 
depict. Thus, like a longitudinal fragment, it starts and also finishes in medias res. 
The spectator never sees the finished painting, so it is uncertain whether Terry 
completes it or where it will end up – the still-life sequence of Terry’s home shows 
paintings hung on the walls but also stowed away in corners and even dumped in 
the garden. Any of these locations could represent its ultimate fate.  
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In addition, since the painting process has not ended, there is no implication 
of a character journey – that is, whether Terry feels satisfaction (heroic success) or 
frustration (tragic failure) at the end result. As painting is part of his everyday, Terry 
would most likely feel neither, which was the case for the picture he painted for my 
filming in 2004. However, due to folk-psychological thinking patterns, if the 
spectator sees the finished painting, he/she is likely to project these emotions onto 
Terry. The open-ended teleological painting motif thus frustrates the spectator on 
several levels, especially since they expect an end-product. At the most, the 
paintings seen hanging in Terry’s home during the film and the last painting scene 
give a certain hint about the visual quality of the finished painting. Withholding a 
glimpse of the final painting may have an additional advantage in terms of 
spectatorship: the spectator is exempt from making an aesthetic judgement about 
the painting, potentially escaping the uncomfortable dilemma of having to decide 
on a benchmark of quality and likeability which will inevitably be informed by the 
fact that Terry is blind. This reflects Terry’s own attitude towards his paintings: he 
mentions in parts of his interview not included in the film (mainly in order not to 
overemphasise painting as a predominant narrative theme) that he does not regard 
them as aesthetic objects but as ordinary things he creates without the necessity 
(and ability) to visually judge them. Hence, his comment about throwing away 
paintings that do not ‘behave’ (‘Fag Break 1’) relates purely to his tactile 
interactions with them during the creation process, not the visual aesthetics of the 
end product.  
Overall, the painting process is subsumed by the everyday flow as randomly 
as it emerged, and this is underlined by the fact that the painting scenes are not 
used as beginning and end scenes. It is important that the painting process is not 
seen as a metonymy for Terry’s persona. It is only one facet in his life, and although 
it is his passion, it is as much part of the everyday and his alterity as his whisky 
ritual. Thus, even though I had enough material to edit eight painting scenes, I 
chose not to suffuse the narrative with this motif. 
Linked to the painting motif is the repetitive ‘fag-break’ motif (figure 78) 
that occurs after three painting scenes, a good example of the intertwining and 
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interaction between disparate everyday rhythms, topic lines and types of motifs 
(teleological and repetitive). The fag-break scenes are the only fragments that are 
chronologically linked to their preceding painting fragments; the audience knows 
that Terry smokes a cigarette after each painting session in order to relax. As 
mentioned earlier, the fag break is a ritual because it serves Terry’s subjective needs 
and is performed in the same spot after each painting session. For this reason, it 
needs to be framed by the larger painting motif, turning it into a hybrid between a 
repetitive ritual and a unique moment in a larger development.  
 
Scene: ‘Fag Break 1’ Scene: ‘Fag Break 2’ 
  
Scene: ‘Fag Break 3’ 
 
Figure 78: Fag break – the repetitive motif  
The transformative filmmaking motif – clashing habitus 
The filmmaking motif in Terry’s film is a further example of a transformative motif, 
since the filmmaking constitutes external circumstances that transform Terry. It 
results in the filmmaker’s habitus meshing with that of the character’s, revealing 
the ordinariness of both entities. Terry’s numerous, random and unexpected 
references – some more subtle than others – to the filmmaking process are 
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deliberately edited into different episodes in order to create the filmmaking motif 
(figure 79, below, shows several examples). 
 
Scene: ‘Painting 1’: Terry complains about 
having to turn off background music 
Scene: ‘Writers’ Club 1’: Terry complains 
about having to constantly repeat actions 
  
Scene: ‘Fag Break 2’: Terry bumps into the 
camera while smoking and comments 
about it 
Scene: ‘Conceptual Art’: Terry suggests 
placing a recording camera in a toilet bowl 
  
Scene: ‘Terry Interview’: Terry mentions 
why lack of music affects him 
Scene: ‘Painting 5’: Terry comments on 
the sound of the wind chimes and editing 
  
Figure 79: Filmmaking references – the transformative motif 
 
The first painting scene starts with Terry being asked to turn his music off 
because it affects the sound continuity in post-production.98
                                                             
98 Scene: ‘Painting 1’ – 03:34 
 As background music is 
part of his painting ritual, Terry challenges me to explain why, after which he 
reluctantly agrees. In this way, the audience is primed to expect that every painting 
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scene will lack music, and to consider Terry’s constant murmured asides and 
comments as an alternative auditory filler of the background ‘silence’. As when the 
everyday time that Bakhtin designates to the narrative background is brought to the 
fore, so the auditory background is foregrounded. The continuity issue becomes a 
motif of its own, and Terry takes every opportunity to refer to it. For instance, in a 
later scene, the wind chimes suddenly tinkle, and Terry mischievously comments: 
“That’s right, wind chimes, keep tinkling. I wonder how he’s going to edit that one 
out.” 99 In the writers’ club, he complains about being constantly asked to repeat 
small actions in order to get the best coverage, and being told when to start and 
stop an action to help the continuity of the shoot.100 In his interview, Terry laments 
the lack of background music, arguing that, being blind, the lack of music feels like 
being deaf, too.101
These topic lines embody the transformative clash between the filmmaker’s 
habitus and Terry’s habitus through addressing one of the most ordinary elements 
in both. For instance, Terry requires continuous background music in order to 
compensate for his blindness and his fragmented perception, and thus facilitate the 
creation of his painting, while I desire continuous background silence in order to 
compensate for the fragmented and elliptical nature of the film, facilitating the 
creation of my filmic scene as an illusory experience of actuality. The clash between 
Terry’s habitus and mine transforms Terry by making him more apt to comment on 
the filmmaking process, and also transforms me as I continually react to these 
comments on camera and do not exclude my remarks from the edit. This 
transformative post-filmic experience closely resembles my pre-filmic experience 
with Terry in the filming and editing stage, and mediates the historicity of the 
filmmaking and the filmmaker to the spectator. As MacDougall (1998, p. 89) 
comments, “the author’s position is neither uniform nor fixed, and expresses itself 
through a multileveled and constantly evolving relation with the subject”.  
 Hence, sound and general continuity become reflexive narrative 
discourses that are at times embodied in the unique moment, and at other times a 
subject of retrospective reflection. 
                                                             
99 Scene: ‘Painting 5’ – 43:02 
100 Scene: ‘Writer’s Club 1’ – 15:22 
101 Scene: ‘Terry Interview’ – 35:36 
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Terry’s evocation of the filmmaking motif also mediates everydayness. His 
random, unexpected comments on the filmmaking process, such as the camera-in-
toilet-bowl art work or the wind chimes, mediate the uniqueness of the moment 
and make the flow of our respective everyday experiences highly permeable, as 
they are spatio-temporally directed towards ordinary materialities and 
corresponding situations in both his habitus and mine – the recording camera and 
microphone in mine; the tinkling wind chimes, CD player and toilet in his. In 
addition, Terry’s comments constitute disruptions to the filmmaking habitus, which 
shows an apparent failure on my part to control the situation, despite the fact that 
they could be easily cut out of the final film. In return, my intervention, asking him 
turn off the music, disrupts his habitus and shows a failure on his part to control this 
aspect of his everyday life. These disruptions and failures reveal two different 
‘ordinarinesses’ and ‘alterities’.  
The revelation of our respective habitus though disruption is most explicit in 
the scene where Terry bumps into the camera while smoking, making him drop his 
cigarette and forcing to search for it.102
 
 This literally embodied clash reveals both 
the camera and Terry’s blindness, firstly because he did not see the camera, and 
secondly because he has to spend time finding the cigarette. When he finally 
finishes his cigarette, he reflexively announces, “putting-out time”, knowing that I 
would want to film a close-up (figure 80). Instead of cutting, I let the camera move 
in real time from a medium shot of Terry to a close-up of his fingers while he is 
waiting, thus exposing the act of shot coverage for visual continuity. Finally, upon 
my request, Terry puts out his cigarette – by squeezing it instead of just letting it go 
out – and sardonically comments: “Strange, you’re meant to enjoy a fag break, but 
here I am, being harassed ... I’ll have to have a fag break for the stress of this fag 
break.” When I apologise for imposing the filming process on his fag break, he 
quips: “Said with the sincerity of a cheap quiz-show host.” 
                                                             
102 Scene: ‘Fag Break 2’ – 22:32 
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Figure 80: ‘Putting-out time’ 
 
Pre-filmically, Terry’s knowledge in terms of continuity filming is clearly 
accumulated through all our filming encounters. It reaches a synchronicity between 
our different habitus, whereby he offers to repeat an action in order for me to cover 
a different angle or, as in the smoking example, he waits until the camera is in 
position before he performs a particular action. The anticipation of filming 
practices, and the mischievous interactions with me on-camera, result in a peculiar 
love-hate relationship developing between Terry and the filmmaking process, which 
is best expressed in his acerbic remark at the writers’ club meeting: “[Filming] 
doesn’t bother me; just this damn continuity; he keeps on and on and on about it; 
stop, start, stop, start ... [M]oaning about editing and continuity, and editing and 
continuity.” Ironically, as a motif, the continuity topic line contributes to narrative 
coherence by exposing the fractured nature of filming and editing.  
The filmmaking motif of failures, disruptions and exposure of continuity 
rules also disrupts schemas in the audience’s viewing habitus. After all, the 
audience expects to be implicitly subjected to continuity rules, not to learn about 
them reflexively. Thus, the filmmaking motif results in the clash between, and the 
post-filmic revelation of, Terry’s everyday habitus, my filmmaking habitus and the 
audience’s viewing habitus. In these moments, all three entities oscillate between 
Richardson’s two modes of material being (referred to in Chapter Five): the implicit 
interaction with an object (painting/smoking, filming, watching) and the reflexive 
perception of that object as an artefact (the painting/cigarette, the camera, the 
film). These moments reflect the intersubjective intertwining of disparate everyday 
rhythms, moods and historicities. In the film, they are deeply reflexive as they 
naturally emerge from my interaction with Terry, but at the same time they are 
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politically reflexive as they deviate from schematic portrayals and turn the spectator 
into a conscious social actor who may be encouraged to question stereotypical 
modes of representation. 
As an aside, it is interesting to note that I chose (as a politically reflexive 
comment) to use the song I asked Terry to turn off (Erik Satie’s Gymnopédie No.1) 
over the ‘Still Life’ scene,103
Interestingly, the filmmaking motif correlates with, or indeed triggers, the 
motif of Terry commenting on or enacting the inhibition of his blindness, which may 
be a consequence of his frustration at not being able to reciprocate the gaze of the 
filmmaker, the camera and the audience. It may also relate to the fact that, despite 
all his sarcastic remarks, he conscientiously tried to perform all the requested 
actions for the camera, which could have triggered a certain alienating 
consciousness about his motility and material interaction. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the home is usually a place where the disabled body disappears 
from consciousness, but the filmmaking process may have made Terry aware of his 
 which refers to my postproduction habitus where I have 
finally full control over the use of music. Naturally, the irony is that in the only scene 
in the film that features music, Terry’s body is absent; from my etic perspective, 
only his objects are granted the privilege of interacting with the music. Further, I 
deliberately chose not to lay music over the painting scenes in post-production. 
Arguably, this would have been more true to the mediation of Terry’s emic 
experience; however, that emic experience would have pretended a purely 
observational and non-interventional filmmaking approach, in which everyday life is 
constructed as if the camera were not present. With Terry, unlike June, the 
negotiation between my habitus and his is overt, since these disruptions to his 
everyday life have a profound impact, triggering all his comments and murmured 
asides. It would therefore be emically less justifiable to mix these with a musical 
overlay, and it would dilute his respective comments in the writers’ club and 
interview scenes. Thus, the post-filmic omission of music, which is reinforced by the 
stark contrast of having music in the ‘Still Life’ scene, reflects Terry’s emic 
experience in the moment of filming.   
                                                             
103 13:00 
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body once again. The commenting-on-blindness motif is occasionally shown in the 
film, but it always emerges from the habitus clash and appears to be a performance 
for the camera (he never mentions it to Pam when they interact in the actuality 
scenes).  
June, on the other hand, never openly commented pre-filmically about 
being inhibited by her blindness or, later, about being made aware of it by the 
filming process, or more generally in other situations. This may be due to the fact 
that she is used to being filmed and exposed to media as a result of her work, but 
also because of her familiarity with her home town and her corresponding 
corporeal agility in different public spaces. She has, in general, a more positive 
outlook on life with blindness than Terry, who is sometimes depressed about his 
lack of sight and his small flat, which makes him appear more cynical and reclusive.  
Also, the filmmaking motif is largely absent in June’s film. The collision 
between her habitus and mine was much more subtle than in Terry’s case, as she 
made no unsolicited remarks about the filmmaking process. She regarded the 
filmmaking process as a professional endeavour that she naturally complied with in 
order to aid my project’s objective of portraying the everyday life of blind people, 
and since this objective nominally did not involve filmic reflexivity, she did not 
expose the actual recording and editing process. Thus, a deliberate bracketing of 
the filmmaking process would have resulted in a purely etic experience and 
artificial, instead of deep, reflexivity. Comparing the formal structures of normative 
everyday behaviour to theatrical performances, Erving Goffman (1974, p. 558) 
argues that the representation of self in any situation constitutes a “lay dramatist’s 
scenario employing himself as a character”. Terry’s scenario accords with his own 
playful framework, not a conventional documentary framework, while June 
behaved in full accordance with conventional documentary character scenarios. 
This makes her film appear more conventional, which in turn mediates her more 
mainstream life, while Terry’s film mediates a more alternative and eccentric 
lifestyle. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
Chapters Four, Five and Six have covered my practice through a wide range of case 
studies and methods. These chapters may therefore appear very dense, but this 
density is exactly what is needed to demonstrate the diverse ways of mediating the 
everyday and alterity. However, this density also provides an account of the 
multitude of complex decisions in film practice that inform spectatorship, which 
serves as a latent commentary on the importance of spectatorship not only in film 
practice but also in filmmaking textbooks and scholarly discourses. The three 
practice chapters are by no means exhaustive. Chapter Four could go on to discuss, 
if space allowed, more fundamental issues of disability representation, such as the 
difference between the ‘medical’ and ‘social’ models in analysing disability, and 
account for social practices, which would help draw a necessary boundary between 
medical films (strictly speaking, also documentaries) and artistic films. Chapters Five 
and Six could extend the discussion of both films to an analysis of performance, 
since both characters perform in their own ways for the camera – June in a more 
stiff and formal fashion, and Terry in a playful, somewhat narcissistic way. They 
could also expand on the ethical dimension of a sighted person filming blind 
characters (see Chapter Seven), which inevitably shapes Terry’s and June’s 
performance.     
The limitations of space prevent a consideration of technical filmmaking 
choices and their impact on the audience, too. For example, my particular use of 
the Canon XF100 camera, which is light and compact, providing freedom of 
movement and reaction to spontaneous character actions, proved an efficient 
choice because its large depth of field visually anchors the screen body to the 
background space, facilitating the implementation of concepts such as intentional 
threads and objectification. Furthermore, the sound mixer made a conscious 
attempt to clean the sound to a level where it is clear yet still can be perceived as 
belonging to the visual materiality of the space, which involved the occasional 
addition of stock sound effects in order to materialise a space even further and/or 
mediate everyday sounds of a particular location and time of day – a strategy 
known as ‘sound sweetening’.  
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The three chapters also show that the methods used for both films are 
adaptable and near-replicable for other characters – even ones who are not blind. 
Thus, even though the films are part of a diptych, the methodology could continue 
to produce films ad infinitum. The choice of the number of films (two) is purely 
pragmatic, related to the workload and time frame of the thesis, but totally 
arbitrary in terms of the actual methodology. If the reader of this thesis feels a 
sense of arbitrariness in terms of the number of films, or even in the selection of 
the two characters, then my aim is achieved, since this proves that their blindness 
or disability as a narrative ingredient has become incidental – practically 
insignificant – and purely taxonomic; it is an inherent element within Terry’s and 
June’s ordinary lives, which, although visible, is hardly worth commenting on from a 
filmmaker’s and a spectator’s perspective. However, this sense of arbitrariness in 
terms of characters should not forfeit Terry’s and June’s particularity and alterity. 
The films, the methods and the spectatorial experience are highly particular, yet 
that particularity says absolutely nothing about why the reader of this thesis 
watches these particular films about these particular characters, and why it ends 
after two films. The experience is particular yet generic, an ambivalence that 
reflects the seemingly random ending of the films: the episodic fragments could 
continue ad infinitum, but, for practical reasons, they arbitrarily stop at a certain 
point, and that point is as insignificant as the previous fragments’ endings.   
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Chapter Seven: Reflective Conclusions 
 
7.1 Foundations 
This thesis set out to explore the proposition that the application of spectatorship 
theories could help establish a documentary film practice that critically addresses 
spectatorship in relation to the filmmaking process, and particularly in relation to 
topics or people who are persistently portrayed in schematic ways that lead to the 
formation and perpetuation of stereotypes. The aim of both the written and 
practical components of the thesis was to design a methodology that positions my 
documentary practice in a socio-cultural context in relation to other film artefacts, 
enabling me to depart from traditional ways of representing blindness. This 
involved the reflexive deployment of two types of knowledge inherent to film 
practice: ‘technical knowledge’, which provides the competence to operate 
technical equipment and organise logistics, and ‘cultural knowledge’, which 
determines how technical knowledge is mobilised in certain ways, resulting in a 
cultural artefact that has far-reaching socio-cultural implications (Wayne, 1997, 
pp. 9–10).  
Examining the tacit foundations of cultural knowledge in documentary 
filmmaking textbooks offered the dual benefit of shedding light on both the 
customary practices in the field and the spectatorial reception of the film text. The 
link between filmmaking and spectator practices can be found in the use of folk 
psychology, as encapsulated in Plantinga’s concept of the filmmaker-audience loop 
– folk psychology provides simple narrative strategies that engage the audience, 
ensuring the film’s wide and successful exposure. However, this is also its biggest 
drawback: the folk-psychological deployment of schematic and emotion-driven 
mechanisms carries the risk of stereotyping topics and people. In fact, the 
deconstruction and critique of folk-psychological filmmaking practices in this 
research was revelatory on a personal level, since I had previously capitalised on 
these practices in an unconscious and uncritical manner when making my other 
films, and taught them extensively on most of my courses. 
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7.2 The cognitive approach 
As a scholar with a keen interest in spectatorship, it came as little surprise to find a 
major gap in the documentary studies texts, since the conflation of ‘expression’ and 
‘perception’ has been a major issue in film studies in general. Finding spectatorship 
theories that prove rigorous enough to prevent this conflation, but flexible and 
pragmatic enough to be used for film practice, was a simple task as I was using 
cognitive film models in my practice, teaching and academic writing long before 
embarking on this research. So, this step was a re-validation of a practice that has 
proven particularly useful in my tripartite role as filmmaker-lecturer-scholar. 
Nevertheless, the research provided an important opportunity to critically assess 
cognitive film theory in relation to both documentary and stereotypes. As in the 
analysis of filmmaking textbooks, this endeavour brought to the fore some major 
shortcomings that I was previously oblivious to: the lack of documentary discourses 
on and  attention to spectatorial social identities; the atavistic insistence on 
narrative models (a legacy of the neo-formalist and computational paradigms where 
this field has its origins); the absence of film practice-based approaches; and most 
significantly, the uncritical examination of folk-psychological formulas that 
encourage the formation of narrative and social stereotypes. Fortunately, a 
minority of cognitive film scholars have tentatively addressed these shortcomings 
and have therefore indicated the way forward. By employing the general cognitive 
film paradigms of interdisciplinarity, groundedness, pragmatism and self-correction 
I was able to build on and expand these attempts.  
The three practice chapters clearly show that not every method adopts 
cognitive models. However, this was never the objective, since an exclusive use of 
this field for the sake of disciplinary homogeneity would run counter to the 
bricolage approach documentary practice requires and cognitive theory propagates. 
Still, the overall framing of my practice is located in this field, with the use of 
models from social cognition and folk psychology, the clear distinction between 
authorship and spectatorship, the pragmatic consideration of documentary as a 
‘mode of reception’, and the numerous models that account for momentary, 
embodied spectator experiences elicited by textual cues. 
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The cognitive concept of the filmmaker-audience loop naturally suggests a 
content analysis as the first stage of film practice. In this case, the content analysis 
had to first hypothesise a particular audience group. Since filmmaking textbooks 
and stereotype formation relate to a mainstream audience, Sawyer’s (2006) model 
of the ‘public audience’ proved useful, even if heuristic. This strategy 
simultaneously identified my own target audience, placing my films on the 
periphery, but not outside the mainstream.104
 
 This position prevents normative and 
stereotypical folk-psychological representations, but also precludes experimental 
representations.  
7.3 The problem with experimental approaches 
In terms of film-formal representation, experimental filmmakers tend to regard the 
mainstream as hegemonic, distinguishing themselves as ‘counter-hegemonic’. For 
instance, experimental ethnographic films have a long tradition of merging social 
theory with formal experimentation in a critical and aesthetic discourse on cultural 
representation (Russell, 1999b, pp. xi–xii). Feminist and post-colonial films, such as 
Trinh Minh-ha’s Surname Viet Given Name Nam (1989) or Peter Kubelka’s Our Trip 
to Africa (1966), establish a reflexivity that raises the viewer’s awareness of 
stereotypes and wider socio-cultural discourses. In these types of films, the viewer 
sees the film artefact as cultural representation, instead of seeing through the film. 
This political reflexivity stems mostly from the subversion of narrative and social 
schemas,105
                                                             
104 See footnote 11 for an explanation of how ‘mainstream’ is understood in this thesis. 
 and while the merit of these films’ socio-political, philosophical and 
conceptual experimentation is indisputable, their discourse-driven plots and 
ubiquitous political reflexivity predominantly mediate etic experience and the 
filmmakers’ alterity, rather than that of the characters (unless they are 
autobiographical films). Thus, the actual film characters become metonymies for 
social, political or philosophical statements, and the formal experimentation that 
aims to break stereotypes, ironically, ends up othering the characters.  
105 See Chapter Two for Schweinitz’s (2011) distinction between narrative and social schemas.  
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Experimental films featuring blindness follow the same philosophy. In Blindly 
(2010), Polish artist and filmmaker Artur Żmijewski asks blind people to paint 
landscapes and animals, eliciting moments of pity and tragedy when the subjects 
struggle to draw shapes and perspectives. Żmijewski’s etic approach clearly intends 
to subvert stereotypes of blind people as lacking the ability (or opportunity) to 
paint, and his rather exploitative film fetishises his blind characters’ bodies when 
portraying them applying paint on large sheets of paper, and treats the finished 
abstract paintings as exotic artefacts. Kristina Steinbock, meanwhile, challenges the 
politics of ocular-centrism in relation to gender and sexuality. Her two films, House 
without Windows (2011) and A Romantic Notion of Blindness (2015), are etic visual 
essays that place significant aesthetic emphasis on body, touch and the materiality 
of film form. It is unfortunate that Steinbock treats the under-presented issue of 
disability, gender and sexuality in conceptually subversive ways that others her 
blind characters even further – for instance, by completely displacing them from 
their everyday spaces and practices, and instead showing them engaged in symbolic 
performances in generic ‘non-places’ (Augé, 1995). The distributor of Dan 
Monceaux’s film, A Shift in Perception (2006), openly declares that the film is a 
“poetic exploration of living with blindness”.106
It is interesting that documentaries with a clearly activist agenda, even if 
they are not experimental, metonymise blind people for socio-political statements 
in a similar fashion to experimental films. For instance, Shweta Ghosh’s Accsex 
(2013) begins with the quote, “This film may subvert the viewing expectations of an 
able-bodied audience”, which immediately establishes an etically mediated cultural 
discourse that prevails until the end. The multiply disabled characters (one of them 
is blind) become symbols for a struggle against ableist hegemony, and individual 
stories are again limited to the disability and overshadowed by the filmmaker’s 
activist agenda. Still, Ghosh’s film needs to be applauded as a rare example of a film 
 The film does indeed make use of 
most aesthetic tropes mentioned in Chapter Four to distort, obscure and alienate 
the image in an attempt to subvert ocular-centric viewing habits.  
                                                             
106 See: http://www.roninfilms.com.au/feature/612/shift-in-perception.html  
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that explores the sexuality of disabled people, albeit embedded in a counter-
hegemonic critique, reminiscent of the experimental films mentioned above. 
Admittedly, in many cases, it is difficult to ascertain whether all these 
counter-mainstream films pursue a social-activist or a personal-poetic agenda. 
Furthermore, it is somewhat dangerous to generalise the intended audience. For 
instance, Ghosh’s film is obviously aimed at a public audience, while Steinbock’s 
was probably created with a limited audience of connoisseurs (artists or consumers 
of experimental films) in mind. Nevertheless, the ethical implications of 
representation automatically come to the fore as soon as a film depicts a character 
from a usually stereotyped and marginalised community, in which case, a 
consideration of the film’s spectatorship is necessary (unless, of course, the 
filmmaker consciously dismisses the idea or supports the existence of these 
stereotypes).   
  
7.4 Ethics 
Given the spectatorship-focused scope of this thesis, I did not explore aspects of 
authorship that had only indirect bearings on spectatorship, such as creativity, 
intuition and my personal experience. As suggested earlier, my presence and 
experience are inscribed to a large degree in the films, and emerges at times 
through political reflexivity, although mostly through deep reflexivity. However, my 
presence and experience are also inscribed in the written exegesis. Thus, the 
selection and manner of discussing the case study examples in Chapters Five and Six 
is indicative of my personal experience with the project and the two characters. 
Also, my journey of personal and professional growth, and the knowledge I have 
gained during this research, should be apparent from reading the very first lines in 
the introduction describing my 2004 documentary through to reading these 
concluding remarks.  
However, one final aspect is the ethical implications of my position as a 
sighted filmmaker making a film about blind characters. This has two significant 
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implications that have been raised by audience members at conferences where I 
showed clips from the films. 
The first is that, as Gili Hammer (2013) observes, a sighted person filming a 
blind person raises “specific complexities resulting from the potential of 
emphasizing imbalanced power relations and the researcher’s gaze, replicating the 
participants’ social location as ‘spectacles’ – a position which characterizes their 
everyday lives as blind and disabled”. This is a serious concern, as it may 
compromise the entire methodology underlying the mediation of everydayness. The 
only resolution to this issue would have been an overtly shared authorship – for 
example, asking Terry and June on-camera how they wanted to be represented, or 
how they wished to represent their everyday life. It could have even taken the form 
of involving them in the editing stage to give feedback about different cuts of the 
film. A more pronounced shared authorship would have comprised a participatory 
filmmaking venture, in which the characters were either asked to film their own 
footage or record their own sounds. The former would have had even graver ethical 
implications, and would have resembled the exploitative spectacle Zmijewski elicits 
by asking his blind characters to paint animals. The latter approach may have its 
merits, as recorded everyday sounds or comments could have provided interesting 
juxtapositions with the images, but the spectator would have to be made aware of 
the fact that these sounds are generated by Terry and June while the juxtaposition 
is performed by the filmmaker.   
While all these strategies may somewhat compensate for power imbalances 
and result in a creative filmic experiment, they would utterly defy the mediation of 
emic experience, since the filmmaking habitus and the agency of the author would 
shift from the periphery to the centre of the film. As a result, the mediation of emic 
everydayness would be sacrificed for the sake of political reflexivity through 
subverting, in a binary fashion, the practice of the blind subject being filmed by a 
sighted filmmaker. I would argue that this practice, which according to Hammer 
(2013) poses an ethical conundrum, may be an ableist practice but is not an ableist 
stereotype. Hence, it is not necessary to bypass or subvert it in order to reconfigure 
spectator dispositions, and indeed any attempt to do so would lead to the more 
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severe ethical implications of further rendering blindness exotic, or would 
foreground the resourcefulness of the filmmaker. 
Interestingly, although the issue of a sighted filmmaker filming a blind 
person was raised by a few audience members in academic conferences, it was not 
touched on by individual members of the public audience I showed the clips to on 
different occasions. With reference to Sawyer’s (2006) audience model, discussed in 
Chapter Three, academics in related disciplines (such as film, disability, 
anthropology and philosophy) constitute ‘connoisseurs’, and are likely to be more 
critical and reflexive, especially in the discursive context of an academic conference. 
In light of phenomenal immediacy (see Chapter Two) and the mediation of 
embodied experience, it is unlikely that a member of a public audience would raise 
such issues or consider the mediated everydayness as spectacle, especially given 
the numerous strategies to ‘de-spectalise’ and ‘ordinarise’ experience. Of course, 
this hypothesis does not resolve the issue itself, and it certainly does not guarantee 
the desired outcome, but it provides a critical assumption that could be tested in an 
audience research study. 
Hammer’s intervention also implies the impossibility of mediating the emic 
everyday experience of blindness. After all, as my aim is to render experience visible 
by mapping and capturing the body situated within space and time, visual 
impressions only function as metonymic substitutes for the experience of living in a 
world without images. Nevertheless, the concept of mediation acknowledges that a 
one-to-one immediation of emic experience is impossible, since that emic 
experience is, by default, mediated through filming, editing, exhibiting and 
reception. Any form of filmic bracketing provides the audience with a new 
perception of the pro-filmic object and event (Thompson and Bordwell, 2003, 
p. 91). In addition, that perception is inherently an amalgamation of screen 
experience and the spectator’s own experience. As MacDougall (2006, p. 16) 
explains “viewing other people’s experiences in films is not simply a matter of 
sharing them but of discovering autonomous bodily responses in ourselves”. Thus, 
although blind characters may seem to pose a methodological and ethical 
conundrum for mediating emic experience, Chapter Four argues that to hyperbolise 
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emic experience through simulating blind people’s sensory experience or hyper-
focusing on emotions in relation to a particular plot trajectory (while excluding a 
variety of other emotions or other facets of their lives) inevitably leads to othering 
and stereotyping. Consequently, a pure, immediate emic experience of blind people 
is not only impossible, but undesirable.  
The second ethical implication, also raised only by academics (that is, 
members of a connoisseur audience), is the fact that I represent Terry and June 
through predominantly using the one sense that is inaccessible to them. Hence, 
even though I will produce audio description for the films at a later stage, the visual 
paradigm aimed at eliciting embodied experience excludes them from the 
hypothesised spectator and hence the target audience. To overcome this, two of 
these academics suggested adapting the films into an installation that addresses 
non-visual senses. Although this is an interesting and challenging proposition, it 
would require the conception of a totally new artefact that operates by engaging 
with the aural, olfactory, tactile, vestibular, thermoceptive and kinaesthetic senses 
of the audience. As I am a documentary practitioner, not an installation artist, this 
would not only require that I learn new skills, but would distract me from pursuing 
the dissemination of my two ‘traditional’ films.  
Exploring the same ethical issue in Planet of Snail, Anne-Marie Callus 
(2017)107
                                                             
107 In Brylla, C. and Hughes, H. (eds.). (2017). Documentary and Disability. London: Palgrave. 
(forthcoming)  
 points out that the director Seung-Jun Yi made a film about the main 
character Young-Chan, rather than for him. However, as she explains, Seung-Jun’s 
film is not a tool for advocating on behalf of deaf-blind people; rather, it gives 
sighted and hearing people the “opportunity to appreciate more how deaf-blind 
people negotiate their way in the world”. Similar to my argument concerning 
stereotypical aesthetic tropes that try to approximate the visual perception of blind 
people, Callus observes that trying to approximate the ‘visual’ world of blind people 
by deliberately obscuring the image by blurring it or shrouding it in darkness, in 
order to homogenise the experience of the viewing spectator and the blind 
character, and render the film accessible to both, may be even more ethically 
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questionable; viewers would be misled into believing that this is a biologically 
accurate mediation of blind people’s emic experience. Instead, in my films, the 
open translation of emic experience in a manner that does not pretend to be 
literally emic allows the audience to experience Terry’s and June’s lives, but at the 
same time to become aware that this experience is limited. This maintains a 
significant level of alterity.  
In this context, my films have an activist rather than an advocacy agenda. 
They aim to raise awareness about blindness stereotypes in sighted people, not 
create an inclusive media artefact, which would require a completely different 
research rationale. I consider raising awareness, and the resulting potential benefits 
to blind people, as a more important ethical pursuit than creating an experimental 
artwork that may be more appreciated by blind people yet will have a marginal 
effect on a public audience. Hence, the rationale of this thesis deems social impact 
more important than accessibility. As Linda Alcoff (1991, p. 15) states, when 
representing a group of people that has been consistently othered, the socio-
political implications within the context of reception exceed mere questions about 
‘who’ represents ‘whom’ and ‘how’ – which also explains why neither good 
intentions, nor announcing the aim of enabling more disabled people to make films 
about disability issues, are default remedies for deconstructing hegemonic 
stereotypes (see Chapter Four and Appendix 1). Although good intentions and 
access to production are vital, filmmakers (whether disabled or not) need to be 
better equipped to critically understand the socio-political implications when 
disseminating their work, a consideration that lies at the core of this thesis. 
 
7.5 Dissemination 
Since neither of these films was commissioned by a particular institution, collective 
or individual, and since they both work on the premise of theorising their audience, 
points about dissemination and reception are tentative and speculative, at least at 
the current stage. Naturally, given the films’ spectatorship-focused approach, as 
well as their activist agenda, the next stage is to promote them in terms of 
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exhibition, distribution and exposure. Although this does not lie within the scope of 
this thesis, it is worth mentioning some preliminary ideas in line with my roles as 
filmmaker, lecturer and scholar.   
The main objective is to reach a public audience, as outlined in Chapter Four. 
Hence, I will send the films to festivals first, and at the same time, organise 
community screenings, especially in communities in which disability and/or 
blindness is ostracised. One such community is the African and Caribbean 
community in the UK. From personal experience (my partner is Ghanaian, and I 
have friends in the black community), it appears that community members 
exhibiting any physical deviance from the norm (for example, albinism, disability, 
non-normative sexual orientations or non-binary gender) are marginalised. In 
regard to blindness, the Organisation of Blind Africans and Caribbeans (OBAC) is 
working hard to improve the situation. I intend to collaborate with OBAC in the 
organisation of several community screenings for audiences of policy-makers, 
family members of blind people and the general public.108
Seminars, with the theme of media representations of blindness and 
creative activities for blind people (for example, writing and painting), could be 
combined with these community screenings. In relation to this pedagogic 
endeavour, I also intend to create a website that hosts information and educational 
resources on the socio-cultural aspect of blindness, media representation, 
stereotyping and blind people artists,
 The same idea will be 
pursued with the Royal National Institute of the Blind (RNIB), BlindArt (an 
organisation that promotes art created by blind people), ONCE (the Spanish 
Equivalent of the RNIB) and the BSVO (the Austrian equivalent of the RNIB).  
109
                                                             
108 The fact that my characters are white may add an interesting cross-cultural dimension to the 
project, and even positively influence the notion of alterity. 
 and at a later point, the films will be 
uploaded there. This website will be unlike the websites of some of the film case 
studies analysed in Chapter Four, which provide a plethora of medical information 
about blindness, again adopting an ableist perspective (see footnote 43). With 
regards to the ‘blindness and creativity’ aspect, the RNIB makes a considerable 
109 Blindness and the Arts (http://www.blindnessandarts.com/) is an excellent repository for 
resources and information about blindness and the arts, including representation, inclusion, access, 
education and policies, although it contains very little on documentary representation. 
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effort to encourage blind people to engage in creative activities, partly for 
therapeutic and partly for economic reasons. It has a dedicated arts officer with 
whom I can liaise over the possibility of cutting a shorter version of Terry’s film, 
specifically focusing on his painting process, to serve as an educational video. 
Obviously, the video will have to have audio description and more verbal 
exposition, in the form of additional interviews with Terry, for example. 
After the festival circuit, and in parallel with promoting the website and 
organising community screenings, I will submit the films to suitable broadcasters 
that, like my films, are on the periphery of the mainstream, such as The Community 
Channel. The plan is to also generate non-academic articles (such as interviews, 
news items, features and social-media items) raising public awareness about the 
impact of disability stereotypes and suggesting possible correctives that could be 
employed by media producers. Stimulating awareness of disability stereotyping 
among media producers is as much at the heart of this project as audience 
awareness. Appendix 1 provides a general idea of the British media industry’s 
attitude and practices towards disability representation, and the picture is bleak. It 
appears that while there is indeed awareness of disability representation issues, 
that awareness is not critically informed by mechanisms of stereotype generation. 
Thus, I hope that any form of dissemination will reach media producers and policy-
makers, and prompt them to rethink current practices, guidelines and policies.  
In terms of academic dissemination, the thesis is not only relevant to 
disability studies, but, as already mentioned, it also adds to discourses in cognitive 
film studies, documentary film studies, anthropology and cultural studies. Thus far, I 
have presented my research at several academic conferences and received positive 
feedback in relation to the new knowledge it aims to generate,110 and it has 
triggered three (forthcoming) publications.111
                                                             
110 See Appendix 2 for a list of conferences. 
 In addition, a network funded by the 
Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) is in the tentative planning stages. 
111 A book chapter in a forthcoming anthology, Conditions of Mediation: Phenomenological 
Approaches to Media, Technology and Communication, edited by Markham and Rodgers, will be 
published by Peter Lang in 2016, and two co-edited anthologies are forthcoming in 2017 and 2018 
respectively: Documentary and Disability (Brylla and Hughes, 2017) and Cognitive Theory and 
Documentary (Brylla and Kramer, 2018), both published by Palgrave Macmillan. 
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This aims to offer a dialogue between disability and documentary scholars, but also 
including activists, policy-makers and media practitioners, and the results will be 
published through symposia and publications. The network will also exhibit films 
and audio-visual (AV) essays about disability issues, specifically including films by 
disabled filmmakers. It is hoped that the format of the exhibition platform will 
combine the scope of online AV journals, like Screenworks112 and (in)Transition,113 
with online exhibition platforms such as Disability Arts Online.114
The thesis has also been indirectly disseminated through my pedagogical 
activities. I have introduced lectures and seminars on representation, stereotyping 
and disability into my teaching, as the curriculum of the current BA in Film 
Production at the University of West London previously had no such provisions. For 
example, on a first-year film production module, students have to make a short 
drama about a character belonging to a social group that is usually stereotyped in 
media: they are asked to interview and film a real-life character, and this serves as 
the basis for the fictional screenplay. In addition, they are given the task of 
undertaking a content analysis of related films in order to evaluate common 
stereotypes, which then they try to undo in their own films. According to Wayne 
(2003, pp. 55–56), such a theorised film practice combines two benefits for student 
filmmakers: firstly, the students’ knowledge is considerably enhanced through 
direct engagement, as they concretely experience the object of knowledge, and 
secondly, they become conscious and therefore critical of the multiple 
determinations on their practices, and this “helps to enlarge the scope for human 
agency over structure and make genuine choices over habituated routines”. 
Wayne’s second point is particularly relevant to the critical interrogation of folk-
psychological narratives and the mediation of alterity and emic experience.   
  
 
  
                                                             
112 See the Screenworks website: http://screenworks.org.uk/ 
113 See the (in)Transition website: http://mediacommons.futureofthebook.org/intransition/ 
114 See the Disability Arts Online website: http://disabilityarts.online/ 
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7.6 Reception 
In terms of the films’ reception, this project adopts a filmmaker’s perspective, 
theorising its audience. On a film-practice level, working with a hypothesised 
audience is pragmatic and largely unproblematic, as relying on what Tan (1996) calls 
the ‘natural viewer’ is the general modus operandi of independent filmmaking. 
From a cognitive perspective, Tan explains that every film has its natural viewer – a 
prototypical construct for an empirical category of viewers who not only share 
interests and knowledge but also a mindset, insofar as they are watching the film 
voluntarily, non-analytically and with an open mind (p. 11). Aligning with Sawyer’s 
public audience category, the natural viewer describes a body of spectators who 
share the same cognitive schemas in relation to media representations of, and real-
world attitudes towards, blindness (as outlined in Chapters Two and Four), and who 
are open to the possibility that these schemas could be temporarily reconfigured or 
at least questioned, whether or not conscious interpretations of meanings 
converge, diverge or take place at all. Unlike amateurs and connoisseurs, the public 
or natural viewer tends not to consciously embrace, reject or intellectually ruminate 
over what they experience during a film. All in all, the flexible and pragmatic notion 
of the natural viewer should be conflated neither with the rigid psychoanalytic 
theory of ‘subject position’ (see Chapter Three), nor with Hall’s (1980) fixed notion 
of a ‘dominant-hegemonic position’ or ‘preferred reading’.  
However, even if filmmakers usually construct their films in relation to the 
natural viewer, empirical audience studies are standard procedure in several 
mainstream and commercial domains, such as advertisements and promotional 
films. Also, high-budget films undergo test screenings in order to assess their 
commercial appeal and their adherence to ethical guidelines or culturally 
established moral attitudes. Even independent filmmakers practise the showing of 
rough cuts to individuals or test-audiences for informal feedback. In fact, I did this 
with both films by showing rough cuts to three connoisseurs (film scholars), one 
amateur (freelance filmmaker) and one public viewer. It is interesting to note that 
their reactions and comments strongly aligned with the objectives of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, the small size of the sample and the informal setting of these 
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screenings do not justify their theorisation or evaluation here (although I have 
included some of their most relevant comments in Appendix 3). They are only 
mentioned in order to demonstrate that, as an informal filmmaking practice, 
empirical audience data is often gathered and implemented in a very heuristic 
manner, and most members of the filmmaking community (including practice-based 
scholars) would agree that a rigorous audience research study for the purposes of 
conceptualising a film is neither practical nor desirable.  
On a purely academic research level, however, a dedicated audience 
research or ethnographic study could be regarded as a necessary undertaking in 
order to verify a spectatorship-focused project that hypothesises audience 
responses. However, there are three objections to this assumption in relation to my 
practice-based research context. Firstly, such a verification would have gone far 
beyond the scope and space of the written thesis. Secondly, in a setting where 
theory has been used as a critical approach to film practice, such a study would 
have been immensely complicated and potentially compromised the formulation of 
a critical methodology, completely shifting the research context and design to (in 
my opinion) the detriment of the project. Thirdly, it could be argued that the 
filmmaker-audience loop, the content analysis of filmmaking textbooks and of films 
depicting blind people, and the use of cognitive theory, which is based on empirical 
audience studies, all provide a strongly empirical foundation to my filmmaking 
practice.       
Nevertheless, although an audience research study may not be deemed a 
necessity, I am planning to informally gather data at public screenings through 
recorded Q&As, discussions and/or questionnaires. Apart from being a useful part 
of my strategy to promote the films, this data (perhaps, at a later stage, in 
conjunction with dedicated focus-group screenings) can inform a proper audience-
research evaluation. The purpose would not be to verify the reception of emic 
experience, everydayness or alterity – these concepts are merely tools for achieving 
the ultimate goal of the case study, which is the reconfiguration of blindness 
stereotypes – but the focus would be on the audience’s attitude towards and 
experience of blind people before and after the film viewing. Consequently, since 
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the aim is to elicit a change in previous dispositions by viewing the films, the data 
needs to also capture dispositions before the viewing. The methodology of the 
audience research study will be Grounded Theory (GT), which has several 
similarities with the methodology used in this thesis. In principle, GT inductively 
generates or discovers the theory used to interpret the data from the data itself 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1999, p. 3). In GT the phenomenon is first described as it 
appears, and then analysed in order to provide a conceptual context that explains it 
(p. 7, p. 22). This means that GT, at its core, resembles my methodology of 
gathering phenomenological data which is subsequently naturalised in order to 
create concepts that inform film form. Of course, the data gathered through the 
films’ screenings will be loosely framed by issues of blindness, disability, 
representation and stereotypes, but the use of GT aims to prevent confirmation 
bias by allowing for discrepancies between actual and intended reception, and by 
producing theories that can explain these discrepancies. 
This audience research study would particularly gauge public audience 
reactions that indicate not only a reconfiguration of stereotypes, but a 
corresponding effort to change behaviour. For instance, studies have shown that 
among people who are open to stereotype correction, the reflexive detection of 
stereotypes or the experience of representations that exhibit discrepancies with 
their schematic dispositions are likely to generate “feelings of guilt and 
compunction [which as a] negative self-related affect serves a warning function that 
induces people to be more careful with their responses and thus prompts them to 
behave in unprejudiced ways” (Bodenhausen et al., 2001, p. 337). Of course, it 
would be naive to assume that my two films can impact on common attitudes and 
behaviour, even if their dissemination reaches its maximum potential. Nevertheless, 
what I am propagating here is a change in filmmakers’ thinking about the 
representation of disability. Thus, my films can hopefully contribute to the 
generation of an alternative body of films that can, alongside the current 
predominant body of films analysed in Chapter Four, firstly relativise and secondly 
reconfigure predominant stereotypes and, eventually, social attitudes towards 
blindness. 
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7.7 Mediating ordinariness/everydayness 
The thesis has argued that such a reconfiguration is possible by refusing to train the 
narrative focus exclusively on visual impairment and by mediating everydayness so 
that the spectator can experience the blind character as an ‘ordinary’ person, 
instead of seeing in them, as Tasha Chemel (n.d.) is quoted in Chapter Four, the 
“need to overcome, to inspire and stand as shining examples of the extraordinary 
power of the human spirit”. Stella Young (2014) sums up this approach, manifest in 
what she sarcastically terms ‘inspirational porn’, when she comments, “disabled 
people don’t do anything out of the ordinary, they just use their bodies to the best 
of their capacities”. Young’s statement calls for abled people to look beyond what 
they deem extraordinary, and instead consider the ordinariness of disabled people 
from their own perspective. Thus, the notion of ordinariness in my research relates 
to what is experienced as ordinary by my blind screen characters, and the task of 
my films is to mediate that ordinariness to the seeing audience. For instance, Terry 
writing on a Braille typewriter or June working as an internationally known disability 
access auditor may appear extraordinary to the viewer, but they are ordinary 
attributes of the characters’ lives, and they are represented as such, using filmic 
methods to elicit an equivalent ordinary experience in the spectator. 
This research, therefore, explored the mediation of ordinariness through 
positioning spectatorial experience in relation to the everyday material interaction 
of screen body, space and objects, which arguably results in a more convergent 
audience response, enabling a collective reconfiguration of stereotypes. 
Furthermore, embodied experience constitutes a level of reception that does not 
require the theorising of top-down processes, such as interpretation. Although the 
conceptualisation of embodied experience relies on common schemas that 
cognitively operate in similar ways to stereotypes, these schemas are corporeal and, 
with reference to Merleau-Ponty’s work, they echo our accumulated experience of 
daily routines, cyclicality, materialities and disruptions, and place the spectator’s 
body into a ‘proxy habitus’ that feels ordinary, even if experienced from an extra-
ordinary character’s perspective. Unlike the mechanisms of stereotypical social 
schemas that use binary simplification to maintain established boundaries, the 
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corporeal schemas hypothesised here aim to transcend boundaries and binaries 
through mediating emic everyday experience in a form that resonates with (but 
does not equal) the audience’s own everyday experience.  
Throughout the production and postproduction process, using the everyday 
(or ordinary) as a vehicle for undoing the extraordinariness of blind people was a 
high-wire act, since I always had the feeling that the filmic bracketing of Terry’s and 
June’s ordinary routines or objects by default ‘extraordinarises’ their everyday and, 
by implication, also their screen characters. As Highmore (2002a) argues, any 
attempt to describe or interpret the everyday transforms it by ‘de-everydaying’ it; 
“to attend to it is to lose it” (p. 20). In terms of representation, film scholars 
repeatedly and consistently associate the elicitation of everyday experience with 
the filmic strategies of observation, long takes, wide shots, slow pace, narrative 
arrest and narrative incoherence, aiming to induce spectatorial experiences of 
realism, boredom and real-time, non-authorial intervention (see, for example, 
Margulies, 1996; Rassos, 2005; de Luca, 2013). However, Highmore warns against 
everyday representations that are subjected to a seemingly appropriate, 
homogenous and coherently theorised discourse, because what is deemed an 
appropriate form for portraying the everyday, results in the exclusion of some of its 
aspects (p. 21).  
To give one example, two major aspects that most film discourses purport to 
be inherently quotidian, ‘boredom’ and ‘arrest’, deny experiences on the opposite 
side of the everyday spectrum. As argued in the previous two chapters, the 
everyday is heterogeneous and ambivalently oscillates between flow and 
disruption, movement and arrest, routine and ritual, anticipation and surprise, 
regularity and deviation, cyclicality and randomness, utilised and possessed objects, 
fragments and complete structures, and discrete moments and progressive 
sequences. Consequently, different forms of the everyday require different forms of 
representation, and “the everyday might be more productively glimpsed if the 
propriety of discourses is refused” (p. 21). Michael Taussig (1991, p. 147) suggests 
that acknowledging a plurality of the everyday discloses its commonality, despite 
one person’s everyday being different from another’s. It attributes a common sense 
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to the everyday, an ability to experience everydayness, regardless of social, cultural 
or economic background. Thus, for this everydayness to be experienced across 
individuals, it must neither be coherent nor totalised, and this benefits the 
mediation of alterity. Approaching the everyday as incoherent, elusive and 
ambiguous, yet particular and embodied, inherently mediates the alterity of the 
agent of that everyday experience. Perhaps the best metaphor for everydayness is 
Terry’s painting process. Every stage is different and reveals disparate elements of 
Terry’s alter (for example, his autonomy when applying the plasticine, yet his 
dependence on Pam when mixing and applying the paint). His relationship to the 
painting remains ambiguous, and its genesis and fate unresolved. Both films 
operate in the same way, illustrating that everydayness constitutes and is 
constituted by the human being him/herself. Thus, the films represent ambivalent 
and unfinished character portraits, with no apparent purpose in terms of traditional 
disability activism or folk-psychological engagement; they portray two people who 
ordinarily are not fixed characters but are ‘work-in-progress’ (to use Sieber’s 
reference in relation to historicity in Chapter Five). 
However, there is another ambivalent oscillation that reflects the plurality 
and commonality of everydayness, which is rarely acknowledged in 
representational discourses but may be the most essential when it comes to 
representation: the oscillation between observation and authorial bracketing. My 
practice exhibits the ambiguity of deep reflexivity in relation to simultaneously 
observing and intervening in the characters’ everyday lives in a variety of ways (for 
example, the back shot, the filmmaking motif or the intertitles of narrative 
fragments). The clash of the character’s habitus with that of the filmmaker’s 
constitutes the interaction of two everyday lives and mediates the ordinariness of 
filmic bracketing itself. However, this etic ordinariness does not pretend to be 
politically reflexive or intentionally draw attention to itself, although it can be 
perceived more in some instances than in others. Rather, it is peripheral by virtue of 
its banal and (seemingly) ordinary aesthetics (for example, the long, static 
observation of back shots, or the basic intertitles), and reinforces Terry’s and June’s 
everydayness.  
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This focus of this research on everydayness (and by implication on alterity), 
and its practical application, is potentially valuable for everyday discourses in a 
variety of fields, including anthropology, cultural studies, film studies and disability 
studies. Even cognitive film studies, which tend to focus on normative folk-
psychological narratives that usually avoid the ordinary or everyday, may benefit 
from a model that explores momentary experiences through different, even 
disparate, modes of spectatorial address. Therefore, the research could prove an 
important contribution to the minority of cognitive scholarship that analyses non-
normative or non-mainstream films.  
 
7.8 Stereotypes and stereotype-undoing 
As the very last point of this thesis, I would like to offer a brief, reflexive flashback 
to the issue of stereotyping. The undoing of blindness stereotypes was the avowed 
case-study-based aim of this project. The methodology charted common 
stereotypes and corresponding social schemas of blind people – schemas that 
would inform the dispositions of a public spectator watching my films. Identifying 
these schemas enabled the formulation of alternative portrayals that would 
attempt to reconfigure these stereotypical dispositions through eliciting an 
embodied experience of everyday spaces and temporalities. This experience 
operates through low-level audience responses to film form, which was 
hypothesised through a variety of theoretical approaches rooted in cognitive 
theory. The postulation of a (more or less) homogenous audience response was 
thus grounded in a spectatorship that is fundamentally hard-wired, psychosomatic 
and non-hermeneutic (though higher-level hermeneutic processes, such as 
polysemic interpretations, are not denied), but also grounded in the established 
homogeneity of public dispositions towards blindness, which is in turn based on the 
persistence and rigidity of blindness stereotypes. At least in terms of argumentative 
consistency and the methodology-in-practice, the pragmatic yet rigorous approach 
is considered to have provided satisfactory results in undoing hegemonic 
stereotypes through theory and practice. 
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For the sake of methodological coherence, the concept of the stereotype 
has been used in the sense of socio-cultural hegemony. However, it is paramount to 
remind once more that this is a highly specific and contextualised use of the 
concept, and it should not be generalised. Alas, everyday language habitually 
demonises the stereotype by attaching it to ideas that are deemed negative, 
harmful or ignorant. Moskovitz (2005, pp. 438–439) clarifies that this naive 
understanding of the concept is misleading, as stereotypes are category-based 
expectancies of other people (and here ‘other’ alludes to Levinas’s 
phenomenological ‘other’ who differs from the ‘I’), which in our everyday lives 
inform interpersonal cognition from preconscious stages (e.g. automated, 
schematic characterisation) to conscious stages of deliberate decision-making.  
Within disability and post-colonial studies, two disciplines that thoroughly 
examine the stereotype in similar hegemonic contexts, it is all too common to 
denounce its general concept, allowing only for little room to adopt a more 
differentiated discourse that does not automatically ideologise modes of perception 
and representation. This tendency is restrictive, as it potentially confines the 
discourse to a niche of academics and activists, preventing the actual 
reconfiguration of global, public structures. In contrast, social cognition studies 
distinguish between ‘othering’ stereotypes, stereotypes as social schemas, and the 
general concept of schema. These distinctions are necessary for a bricolage and 
critical methodology that aims to have a public impact within a specific context.  
For instance, this thesis has argued that it is only the particular combination 
of folk-psychological narrative schemas (which are not inherently hegemonic or 
ideological) with social stereotypes of blind people that creates and perpetuates an 
ableist hegemony. In addition, my own methodology for un-othering blind people 
cannot function without schemas and stereotypes. The naturalisation of emic 
experience on the post-filmic level, which aims to ensure a particular intersubjective 
mediation between film and spectator, is inevitably based on the conceptualisation 
of specific schemas that evoke June’s and Terry’s alterity and everyday experience. 
As these schemas relate to how the spectator perceives these two characters, they 
are in essence stereotypes, too, especially if other filmmakers were to adopt this 
approach for portraying blind people. Nevertheless, these are significantly different 
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to the hegemonic stereotypes that other blind people, especially since they don’t 
function in relation to the blind community as a whole. The screen characters of 
June and Terry are not synecdoches for the collective of blind people but exist as 
discreet entities. 
My point is that a substantial critique of certain schemas and stereotypes in 
particular permutations should not be seen as a categorical rejection of these, but 
rather an acknowledgement of existing configurations that can be reconfigured by 
using similar mechanisms or even by partly building on old configurations. Thus, in a 
seemingly perverse final twist in the discourse of my entire project, I may even have 
to capitalise on othering stereotypes when marketing June and Terry. Paradoxically, 
the films deliberately avoid the tried-and-tested folk-psychological narrative recipe 
for a public audience success, whilst aiming to achieve a wide dissemination within 
exactly that audience. As a consequence, paratextual materials (e.g. logline and 
synopsis) would have to not only mention but actually emphasise the characters’ 
blindness. After all, it is improbable that exhibition gatekeepers (festival organisers, 
commissioning editors, distributors, etc.) would select a film described as the 
“everyday experience of an ordinary person”. Thus, in order to elicit a public 
audience’s interest, I have to consider their stereotypical expectation of emotion-
driven stories featuring blind people as a necessary evil and turn it to my advantage. 
Even more perversely, my films could indirectly profit from the contemporary 
success of films, such as Notes on Blindness and Black Sun, which have evoked 
considerable public interest (even if shaped by ableist views) in blind characters. Of 
course, my consolation is that this exhibition-related resort to hegemonic 
stereotyping is only paratextual, whereas the actual film text attempts to dismantle 
these very stereotypes.       
 Essentially, the combination of critical practice and bricolage 
conceptualisation, which has been the main research paradigm, is meant to block 
any dogmatic approach, but in hindsight, I have to admit that this paradigm needs 
to go far beyond my expectations of dealing purely with filmic representation. It 
needs to inform the films’ dissemination, their public audience and future research; 
it appears that undoing blindness stereotypes cannot happen in a vacuum, and the 
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way forward may need to include a difficult negotiation between ‘stereotyping’ (in a 
hegemonic sense) and ‘stereotype-undoing’.   
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Appendix 1: Media Industry and Representation of Disability 
 
NOTE:
 
 This short text relates to television, given its institutionally regulated 
procedures with regards to inclusion and discrimination. It was written to be added 
to Chapter Three, but in the end it was considered supplementary information, not 
essential for the main exegesis. 
Rimmerman (2013, p. 149) argues that despite media producers unintentionally 
marginalising people with disabilities in order “to appeal to public stereotypes”, 
there has also been effort to change these stereotypes. For example, an audience 
research study, Disabling Prejudice – Attitudes towards Disability and its Portrayal 
on Television (Sancho, 2003), commissioned by the BBC, the Broadcasting Standards 
Commission (BSC) and Independent Television Commission (ITC), suggests five 
triggers that may promote the audience’s acceptance of disabled people in TV 
programmes (pp. 57-59): (1) Matching (showing that disabled people are like “us”), 
(2) Likeability (positively valenced emotions towards disabled people in relation to 
humour, achievement and engaging personalities), (3) Celebrity (a famous actor or 
celebrity playing the disabled person), (4) Incidental inclusion (a disabled person not 
being primarily characterised through their disability) and (5) 
Educational/Information ‘shorts’ (specialist seasons that pick up a particular 
disability issue and show that disabled person’s point of view).  
Whilst this study is a thorough investigation of TV spectatorship, the 
conclusions are largely made without being based on a content analysis, but based 
on the viewers and their own evaluations. Thus, the evaluation of the study did not 
make any reference to disability studies, nor cultural or media studies. 
Furthermore, given that approach from a spectator’s perspective, there was no 
single mention or analysis of aesthetic treatments of disability. Given that audio-
visual film grammar constitutes the specificity of the TV medium, it is surprising that 
the study did not critically assess its own modes of mediation, identifying, for 
instance, stereotypical emotion metaphors. Instead, the focus was exclusively on 
the viewer’s generic and superficial accounts of story and plot, such as “There’s just 
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no reality…so superficial the coverage and so often the disabled people are victims 
or vulnerable. It’s not very encouraging to disabled people. You so rarely see 
successful disability.” (p. 42). Consequently, schematic formulas found in plot 
structures and character roles were not discussed or identified. 
Examining the five triggers the study suggests for inducing change, there is 
clear evidence for perpetuating the previously mentioned stereotypical tropes. For 
example, the “Matching” trigger openly suggests the universalisation of disabled 
people in order to share interchangeable qualities and values. Admittedly, this 
universalisation, according to the author, should not focus on the disability itself, 
but promoting intrinsic human qualities. However, it latently propagates folk-
psychological narratives that transfer inter-subjectively shareable emotions and 
motivations. In addition, by actively deemphasising the disability and promoting 
“sameness”, the alterity of characters is bound to be lost. 
The “Likeability” trigger is an open proposition towards positive stereotyping 
and proliferates the uplifting feel-good factor (see The Undateables), as well as the 
supercrip narrative. Interestingly, the author asserts that these five triggers may 
help to avoid negative stereotyping, which she claims is the main factor for 
exacerbating difference and thus distance (p. 57, p. 62). Thus, positive stereotyping 
is accepted, and its implication of creating otherness (e.g. the quasi supernatural 
use of non-visual senses in blind people) is not acknowledged. Positive stereotyping 
is strongly embedded in folk-psychological, character-based narratives that portray 
the main character as a sort of hero (whether (s)he needs to overcome his fear or 
trauma of becoming blind, climb a mountain despite being blind, or defy social 
stigmatisation in general). Examples of identifying the risks of positive media 
stereotypes as perpetuating otherness appear to stem from non-media related 
sources. For instance, the booklet Media Guidelines for the Portrayal of Disability 
(Sánchez, 2015), commissioned by The International Labour Organization (ILO), 
suggests that disabled people should not be represented as “heroes” who achieve 
apparently unrealistic goals, despite the public’s admiration for high achievers.  
The “Incidental Inclusion” trigger is the one that mostly appropriates the 
findings of the content analysis, i.e. the integration of disabled people in different 
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roles that do not depend on their disability. On the other hand, the 
“Educational/Information” trigger may result in educational value and intellectual 
awareness, but the risk of social and medical ghettoising through particular 
programming/labelling is high.  
This study confirms Darke’s and Markotić’s arguments about visibility. Whilst 
developments in equal rights and political correctness have indeed triggered a 
higher visibility of disabled people in media, there is still a long way to go in order to 
undo the othering of that visibility. Alas, media’s reluctance towards critical self-
reflection (in terms of spectatorship and resulting socio-cultural views of certain 
communities), and its simultaneous insistence on increasing audience ratings and 
reach a mainstream audience through the perpetual use of folk-psychological 
narratives, constitute deeply embedded and fossilised thinking patterns that prove 
highly resistant to that change.  
For example, 104 Films is a small independent production company that 
produces films by and about disabled people, Notes on Blindness being one of their 
most critically acclaimed films. At a Q&A at the Rethinking Disability on Screen 
conference (York University, 2015) I asked co-founder and producer Alex Usborne 
whether he engages in a green-lighting or reviewing process of film proposals to 
flag the potential of spreading disability stereotypes, to which he replied that he 
gives directors almost total freedom to pursue their artistic vision, since, especially 
with disabled filmmakers, this demonstrates their policy of inclusion and guarantees 
the success of their films. Dodging the issue of stereotyping is symptomatic for 
producers and content creators who fail to critically discuss representation and 
spectatorship in terms of their impact on society, unless that impact consists of 
critical acclaim and wide distribution. 
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Appendix 2: Conferences 
 
Parts of this thesis and clips from the films have been presented at the following 
academic conferences: 
 
• Off the Lip – Transdisciplinary Approaches to Cognitive Innovation Conference 
(September 2015; University of Plymouth) 
• Society for Cognitive Studies of the Moving Images Conference (June 2015; 
Birkbeck, University of London) 
• Disability and Disciplines: The International Conference on Educational, Cultural, 
and Disability Studies (July 2015; Liverpool Hope University) 
• Rethinking Disability on Screen Symposium (May 2015; University of York) 
• Directions and Connections across Anthropology (June 2014; University College 
London) 
• Domestic Imaginaries: Homes in Film, Literature and Popular Culture 
Symposium (January 2014; University of Nottingham) 
• Ordinary/Everyday/Quotidian Conference (September 2013; University of York) 
• Documentary and (Dis)ability Symposium (September 2013; University of 
Surrey) 
• Theorising Practice, Practising Theory – Postgraduate Training Workshop (April 
2013; University of Roehampton). 
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Appendix 3: Viewers’ Comments 
 
Connoisseur Viewers 
“Terry is irascible and you get that over really well and the sense of his frustration 
whereas June seems more reconciled to the lack of sight.” 
“I found it [both films] a bit long because it is repetitive in places - some scenes are 
too ‘mundane’.” 
“What I like is the sense of him [Terry] being with people, but he is basically a 
solitary person [unlike June]”. 
“Both films really feel ‘random’ and ‘everyday’ without any teleological structures.” 
“The openness of the structure works really well [in both films].” 
 
Amateur Viewer 
“[Terry’s] film is not really about painting. Nobody cares about the painting, and it 
helps not to see the final outcome, so we are let off the hook to judge a blind 
person’s painting if we don’t like it.” 
“The painting seems excruciatingly slow, full of disruptions and frustrations” 
“June’s film is very stagnant. The dreary, mundane and unexciting tone of the film 
reflects her persona.” 
 
Public Viewer 
On June’s film: 
“It feels very ordinary and uneventful – there is no drama, no emotion, no 
anticipation of good or bad news; it is a peaceful representation of someone who 
happens to have a disability.” 
“I felt no pity nor heroism toward her, neither and sense of achievement.” 
“The film is not about disability, or not about anything, but it is about this person, 
and the blindness is not at the centre at all; it feels incidental.” 
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“The titles help, so it does not flow in one continuous flow of boringness; and they 
also create some structure.” 
On Terry’s film: 
“The film is about a blind man who is very creative, extrovert, sharp-minded and 
witty, and naturally funny – the blindness is more obvious, especially as he feels 
more about his blindness.” 
“His environment is very claustrophobic, and you feel sorry for him having to paint 
and live in such a tiny and messy home.”  
“When he expresses his frustrations about being filmed, he still seems to love being 
filmed – he performs for the camera.” 
“In some scenes, rather than watching a film about ordinary life, it is like watching 
ordinary ‘filmmaking’”. 
